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This dissertation focusses on the causes and consequences of low human cap-
ital accumulation among children and adolescents in developing countries in
Asia and Africa. My analysis is divided into three separate papers that explore
different aspects of this research agenda. Broadly, chapter 1 of the dissertation
describes the intergenerational learning impacts of a national–level school con-
struction policy in India. Chapter 2 picks up where chapter one ends – using
unique 17–year panel data from Senegal and Madagascar this analysis shows
that children who perform better on learning tests in second grade have bet-
ter later life (young adult) educational and learning outcomes (ages 23–25). In
chapter 3, I take a step back and explore the role of one of the biggest imped-
iments of school learning in the developing world – child marriage, which ac-
counts for a large proportion of school dropout among girls in developing coun-
tries.
In the first chapter of my dissertation I examine the impact of a national-level
school construction program in India on educational outcomes of direct bene-
ficiaries and their children. Between the years 1993–2004, the District Primary
Education Programme (DPEP) served over 50 million children and prioritized
districts with below–average female literacy rates. I use a fuzzy regression dis-
continuity design to estimate the causal impact of the programme by comparing
outcomes of school–age children in districts on either side of the average female
literacy cutoff. To uncover the difference in timing of programme implementa-
tion across districts, I use unique archival information that I collected and digi-
tized. The results show that DPEP increased school access, enrollment, literacy
and years of education for both male and female direct beneficiaries. I then pro-
vide one of the first evidence of intergenerational effects of a school construction
policy. Using test score data spanning the years 2007–2014, I find that children
whose mothers were DPEP beneficiaries had higher scores on math (0.18 S.D.),
vernacular (0.19 S.D.) and English (0.09 S.D.) tests. Daughters test scores went
up by more than 10 to 15 percentage points higher than that of sons. Fathers
DPEP exposure had no effect on childrens learning. I find evidence that the in-
tergenerational impacts may be mediated through mothers increased bargain-
ing power, higher investments in childrens education and better health/health
related behaviors.
In the second chapter, I (along with my co–authors) study the determinants
of human capital outcomes of young adults in Madagascar and Senegal, em-
ploying a production function approach. Using unique and comparable long–
term panel data sets, which span more than 15 years, from both countries, we
find that test scores in second grade are strong predictors of school attainment
and French/math skills of individuals in their early twenties. The association
between second–grade skills and later–life outcomes is stronger among girls
than boys, and likewise, stronger for math than French test scores. These find-
ings highlight the importance of not falling behind during early school years,
as it can lead to worse long–term outcomes, particularly for vulnerable groups
like girls. We also find that height, a proxy measure of childhood health and
nutritional status, does not affect the magnitude and significance of the early
childhood test score variable, and also has an independent effect on the test
scores of young adults in Senegal.
Chapter 3 analyzes whether Ugandan women who marry at younger ages
fare differently on a wide range of later life outcomes than women who marry
at later ages. Using a nationally representative dataset, I identify the causal
impacts of womens marriage age by using their age at menarche, a plausibly
exogenous variable, as an instrumental variable. Results indicate that a one
year delay in marriage leads to higher educational attainment (0.5–0.75 years),
literacy (10 p.p.) and labour force participation (8 p.p.) among women. I also
explore intergenerational effects of later marriage and find that the children of
mothers who marry later have higher BMI (0.11 kg/m2) and hemoglobin levels
(0.18 g/dl), and they are also less likely to be anemic (4 p.p.). Finally, I present
evidence that suggests that the observed effects might be mediated through an
enhancement womens agency within their household and positive assortative
matching in the marriage market. By pointing to the beneficial consequences
of delaying marriage, this research calls for concerted policy action to prevent
child marriage.
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CHAPTER 1
PARENTS’ SCHOOLING & INTERGENERATIONAL HUMAN CAPITAL:
EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
1.1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, there have been marked improvements in schooling
availability across most parts of the world (Barro and Lee, 2013). Even though
this has meant that more children attend school, it has not always been accom-
panied by improvements in learning levels in schools, especially in develop-
ing countries. For example, although India, the context of this study, has a net
enrolment rate of close to 100 percent, only 43 (33) percent of sixth (seventh)
grade Indian students could read a vernacular text at the second grade level,
and only around a quarter of fifth grade students were able to solve a math (di-
vision) problem (ASER, 2016). Various studies have demonstrated the adverse
effects of low childhood learning (Glewwe, 1996, Behrman et al., 2008, Kaila
et al., 2019). This has lead to an enhanced focus on policies aimed at improving
learning outcomes in schools. Although learning among children is a function
of school, household and individual level inputs (Glewwe and Muralidharan,
2016), a bulk of the interventions addressing learning deficits have targetted
school inputs. The findings of these evaluations are mixed – test scores have
been found to be unresponsive to a number of these interventions (summarized
in Kremer et al., 2013 and Muralidharan, 2013).
In this paper, I focus on the household inputs channel1, and the intergenera-
1Studies have looked at different types of interventions in this respect - information provision
(Jensen, 2010, Loyalka et al., 2013, Wang et al., 2014), conditional cash transfers (Behrman et al.,
1
tional effect that parents have in shaping children’s educational outcomes (Black
et al., 2005, Holmlund et al., 2011, Carneiro et al., 2013). In particular, I use data
from India to evaluate if enhanced schooling access for parents, when they were
of school–going age, not only improves their own educational outcomes, but if
it also leads to improvements in their children’s learning outcomes.
I do so by examining the direct and intergenerational impact of a national
level school construction policy in India – District Primary Education Pro-
gramme (DPEP). DPEP was implemented in 271 districts (in 18 states) between
the years 1993 and 2004. This programme expanded school access by construct-
ing primary and upper–primary schools, and was targetted towards districts
with female literacy below the national average at the time (39.2 percent). This
assignment mechanism creates a discontinuity in the probability of receiving
the programme around the threshold of 39.2 percent female literacy. That is,
the probability of receiving the treatment is much higher in districts just below
this cutoff, as compared to districts just above this threshold. In implementing
the Fuzzy RD design I use data–driven tools which estimate the causal impact
within an optimal neighborhood around the RD cutoff. I employ two different
approaches to constructing these neighborhoods, namely Mean Squared Error
(MSE) approach and the Coverage Error Rate (CER) approach (Calonico et al.,
2014, 2016) – the results are consistent across both approaches.
One of the innovative aspects of this paper is the use of unique archival
data that I collected, which enables me to uncover differences in timing of
programme implementation across districts, something that other analyses ex-
amining this programme have not done (like Azam and Saing, 2017, Khanna,
2009, Baird et al., 2011, Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011), scholarship programmes (Blimpo, 2014, Li
et al., 2014) and other in–kind transfers (Oster and Thornton, 2011, Muralidharan and Prakash,
2017).
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2015). These archival documents consist of programme expenditure informa-
tion, field reports on implementation and other state/federal government doc-
uments monitoring DPEP progress. I triangulate information from these docu-
ments to uncover when a programme actually took effect in a treatment district.
This enables me to accurately infer the start year of the programme in each of
the 271 treatment districts, which I use in my empirical strategy2 3.
By comparing districts on either side of the RD cutoff, I establish that DPEP
regions had higher rates of school construction4. This implies that during the
programme years children of school–going age in DPEP districts experienced
increased schooling infrastructure, as compared to children of the same age
group in non–DPEP districts. Since the bulk of the schools constructed under
the programme were primary and upper–primary schools (grades 1 to 7), chil-
dren between the ages of 5 and 14 years are expected to benefit from DPEP. Since
DPEP ended in 2004, only children born before 1999 could potentially benefit di-
rectly from the programme. The earliest cohort impacted by DPEP would vary
from one district to another, depending on when DPEP took effect in the district.
For example – If DPEP was implemented in a district in 1995, then people born
between 1981 and 1999 would be the direct beneficiaries in this district. I find
that both male and female direct beneficiaries of DPEP had higher enrolment,
literacy and years of education, as compared to non-beneficiaries. This is in line
with findings from other comparable studies (Duflo, 2001, Burde and Linden,
2I use 2004 as the uniform end year of the programme across the country. This is because the
funding for the programme was cut in a phased manner between 2001 and 2004, implying the
programme ended around late 2004.
3Since the non–DPEP districts did not receive the programme, there is no obvious start year
of the programme in these districts. Therefore, I use the within–state average start year of all
treatment districts as the start year of the programme in non–DPEP districts. This is needed to
define a comparable control group – discussed in detail later
4However, there were no changes in the quality of schools in the DPEP districts. I measure
quality using indicators on physical infrastructure, teacher quality, grants/incentives and school
oversight.
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2013, Kazianga et al., 2013).
In addition, I use school learning data from the Annual Survey of Education
Report (ASER) data to provide one of the first estimates of the intergenerational
impacts of a school construction policy. To do so, I use data from the years
2007 to 2014 and focus on a sample of children whose parents were of school
going age during the DPEP years, but the children themselves did not directly
benefit from the programme. To ensure this, I restrict my sample to children
who started school after the programme had ended, that is, children who started
school in/after the year 2005. Therefore, the intergenerational sample consists
of children who satisfied two conditions – they started school in/after 2005 and
they had at least one parent who was between 5 to 14 years of age during the
DPEP years in their district.
Using an analogous RD framework (as above), I find that the children whose
mothers were the sole beneficiaries of DPEP performed better on vernacular
(0.19 S.D.), math (0.18 S.D.) and English (0.09 S.D.) tests, and were more likely to
be enrolled in school and achieve smooth progression through grades, as com-
pared to similar children born to comparable women in non–DPEP districts.
In contrast to these results, I find no statistically significant positive impacts
among the sample of children whose fathers (and not mothers) were exposed to
DPEP. Thus, while both genders gained from direct exposure to the school con-
struction programme, the results suggest that only women were able to transmit
their benefits to the next generation. Like the evidence from several other stud-
ies (Desai and Alva, 1998, Persico et al., 2004, Case et al., 2005, Gu¨nes¸, 2015),
this result demonstrates the critical role played by mothers in their children’s
human capital development.
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I conduct a number of falsification and robustness checks. In a falsification
check, I show that people who were too old to directly benefit from the DPEP
did not experience any of its gains. In line with expectations, in another falsifi-
cation check I find that children of these people also do not show any DPEP im-
pacts. Both approaches to RD estimation employed here require the researcher
to specify the kernel function and polynomial form to be used in the estima-
tion. I show that the results are robust to changes in the RD approach (MSE &
CER), kernel function (triangular and epanechnikov) and polynomial form (lin-
ear and quadratic). In another robustness check, I use a stricter cutoff to define
the potential direct beneficiary sample – I use the 5–12 years age group to de-
fine the direct beneficiary sample, rather than 5–14 years that I use in the main
estimations5. Results remain robust to this change. In the main results, I use ap-
proaches to RD estimation that use data within a neighborhood around the RD
threshold to estimate DPEP impacts. As a robustness check, I instead use the
2SLS IV technique, which imposes parametric assumptions on the whole data
to estimate the impact coefficient. Although the value of the coefficients differ
from the main results, the effects retain their sign and significance.
Finally, while the intergenerational effects that I observe can be plausibly
attributed to parental educational attainment through DPEP, I conduct addi-
tional investigations to understand how individuals were able to use their ad-
ditional education to impact their children’s learning. I find that the women
who benefitted directly from DPEP were healthier, had enhanced bargaining
power and were investing more in their children’s education as compared to
similar women in non–DPEP districts.
5A lower cutoff of 12 years might be especially valid for girls since they tend to drop out of
schools at younger ages than boys due to a variety of reasons – including onset of menarche and
child marriage.
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I contribute to this literature in the following ways. First, I add to the evi-
dence on the important role played by parents, especially mothers, in shaping
learning outcomes of children. This outlines the critical role that household in-
puts can play in complementing school factors to engender better educational
outcomes. Second, this is one of the first papers to look at the intergenerational
impact of a large scale school construction policy. Most papers have restricted
their focus to the impact of such policies on direct beneficiaries (Duflo, 2001,
Azam and Saing, 2017). Third, it evaluates the learning impacts of a school
construction policy, something that is uncommon in the literature (Burde and
Linden, 2013). Fourth, large parts of Central/Western Africa and South Asia
have comparable educational indicators to what India had at the time of DPEP
implementation. Therefore, results from this analysis could be informative for
policy formulation in these contexts.
1.2 Literature & Background
This paper adds to the limited literature that estimates the effects of increasing
the supply of schooling infrastructure on educational outcomes in developing
countries by estimating intergenerational effects of such programmes. The bulk
of this literature estimates the impacts on direct beneficiaries (Duflo, 2001, 2004,
Handa, 2002, Alderman et al., 2003, Burde and Linden, 2013, Kazianga et al.,
2013, De Hoop and Rosati, 2014, Giri and Shrestha, 2017).
Given that the focus of this analysis is on people who directly benefit from
enhanced schooling opportunities, and their ability to impact their children’s
educational outcomes in the future, my study is closely related to the body of
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literature investigating the intergenerational links in education outcomes be-
tween parents and children. A bulk of this literature has found that parents’
enhanced education has a direct positive impact on the educational (years of
education and enrolment) and health outcomes of their children (Black et al.,
2005, Sacerdote, 2007, Chou et al., 2010, Holmlund et al., 2011)6. In addition, it is
plausible that better educational outcomes for the parent generation might lead
to improved health for themselves (Amin et al., 2013, Agu¨ero and Bharadwaj,
2014, Grossman, 2015, Gre´pin and Bharadwaj, 2015), higher age of marriage and
age at first birth (Glick et al., 2015, Grant, 2015, Marchetta and Sahn, 2016), in-
creased contraception usage and better antenatal care practices (Andalo´n et al.,
2014, Johnston et al., 2015, Behrman, 2015), higher bargaining power for women
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Duflo, 2012, Samarakoon and Parinduri, 2015)
and higher investment in children’s education (Yoong, 2012), among other out-
comes. These in turn might have a positive impact on their children’s outcomes
(intergenerational effect). Among these, in the current setting I find evidence
for a positive impact on women’s bargaining power, investment in children’s
education and own health/health related behaviors.
There so exist some papers that have evaluated the impacts of the DPEP
policy, but only on socioeconomic outcomes for direct beneficiaries. Khanna,
2015 estimates the effect of this school expansion on the rate of return to educa-
tion, while Azam and Saing, 2017 find that DPEP beneficiaries had higher en-
rollment, number of years of education and probability of completing primary
6This direct link between the educational outcomes of parents and their children has been
studied extensively using many different empirical strategies, which include comparing twins
and their children (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002, Bingley et al., 2005, 2009, Holmlund et al.,
2011), natural experiments related to compulsory schooling laws/tuition fees/location (Black
et al., 2005, Oreopoulos et al., 2006, Carneiro et al., 2013, Chevalier et al., 2013) and comparing
outcomes between biological children and adopted children of the same parents (Sacerdote,
2002, 2007, Silles, 2017).
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education. Using data from 42 districts that received the programme in phase
one, Jalan and Glinskaya, 2013 find small effects on enrolment, that too mostly
for socially disadvantaged groups. While there are some parallels between the
current analysis and these previous DPEP papers, there are critical differences.
I use detailed archive data to uncover the exact timing of the programme in the
271 treatment districts. This enables me to define the beneficiary sample more
accurately and distinguishes this analysis from the aforementioned papers –
which do not account for the different start dates of the program in this man-
ner. Also, my results not only confirm that the program had positive impacts on
the educational attainment of direct beneficiaries, but also establish that it had
intergenerational impacts – which is another key innovation of my analysis.
1.2.1 DPEP Programme
The District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) was the flagship education
programme of the Indian government in the 1990s. Implemented in a phased
manner across the country, the programme was oriented towards achieving uni-
versal education through an increase in schooling infrastructure. Program rules
stipulated that DPEP school construction would be targetted towards districts
which had District Female Literacy Rates (DFLR) below the national average.
The programme cutoff was chosen to be the national average female literacy at
the time, which was 39.2 percent – based on the most recently available cen-
sus data at the time (1991 Census). This programme allocation rule was largely
followed. The central government also specified that DPEP would only be in-
troduced in districts that had successfully implemented the Total Literacy Cam-
paign (TLC), a programme that aimed at improving literacy levels across the
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country (Rao, 1993). Since the TLC had been implemented successfully across
all districts in India by 1994, this criterion turned out to not matter for selection
into the program (Jalan and Glinskaya, 2013). The program was introduced in
42 districts in 1993, and eventually extended to 271 districts across 18 states.
DPEP was financed by different levels of governments. The central gov-
ernment bore 85 percent of the costs with the support of donors like Official
Development Assistance (ODA), the Royal Government of the Netherlands, the
U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank.
The remaining 15 percent was contributed by the state governments. To ensure
that the new programme did not crowd out state funds that were already being
spent on existing educational policies, the central government stipulated that
states had to continue with their pre–existing non–DPEP expenditures. Since
the DPEP funds were committed over and above the existing education budget,
the programme represented a massive surge in education expenditure across
the country.
1.3 Data
Below, I describe the different data sources that I use in this analysis.
1.3.1 Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER)
Pratham, an Indian non–profit organization, conducts national annual surveys
to measure schooling and learning outcomes across rural India called the An-
nual Surveys of Education Report (ASER). These provide repeated cross sec-
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tional data on the educational profile of children aged five to 16 across the en-
tire country. In my analysis, I use eight rounds of ASER data, spanning 21 states
(see figure 1.2) for the years 2007–2014. ASER data contain student test scores
for math, vernacular and English. An ASER test includes four questions, with
each being more difficult than the previous question. The score assigned to a
child indicates the level of difficulty that a child was able to solve/master. For
example, on the reading section, a child gets a score of zero if she could not read
anything; one if she is able to recognize alphabets, and two, three or four de-
pending on whether she is at best able to read words, sentences or a paragraph
respectively. I use this information to create a score variable which ranges from
zero (if a child failed to answer any question correctly) to four (if she demon-
strated the highest level of proficiency).
ASER also contains other information on additional educational outcomes
for each child that is surveyed. Based on the available information, I create a
grade–for–age variable that measures whether a child was held back at school
or joined school at a later age than he/she should have. Here I use the fact that
school starting age in India is typically 5–6 years. This variable takes a value of
one if the child is on track in school, that is when age minus grade is at most six,
and a value of zero otherwise (akin to Shah and Steinberg, 2017). For example
– if a nine year old child is in grade three or four, she get a value of one. But if
she is in grade 2, then she gets a value of zero. I create an additional indicator
variables for whether a child has ever been enrolled in school.
One of the key advantages of using the ASER dataset is its national coverage.
The sample size of each survey is large and it encompasses all rural districts in
India7. Another unique aspect of the ASER data is that it measures educational
7 See this link for further details on the ASER sampling strategy. In fact, this model has
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achievement at home instead of schools. As a result, the sample includes chil-
dren who have dropped out of school and children who have never enrolled,
along with those that are currently enrolled in school. Additionally, the format
of the tests, and the way they are administered and scored have remained uni-
form across different years and regions, thus facilitating spatial and temporal
comparisons.
1.3.2 District Information System for Education (DISE)
For school characteristics, I use the District System for Education (DISE), a
database of government schools across the country which contains information
on the physical infrastructure and amenities present in each government school,
as well as information on teachers, enrolment and other school–level covariates.
This source compiles data provided by school headmasters on a yearly basis. In-
formation provided by schools is verified at the cluster level and subsequently
transferred to the district level. At this stage, the data is verified again before be-
ing aggregated, digitized and published. I use the DISE data for the year 2005,
which is the earliest year of data that is publicly available.
I use this dataset in several different ways. The DISE data allows me to test
whether the DPEP led to higher school construction in treatment regions during
the years the program was in operation. The DISE data also enables me to ex-
amine treatment–control differences in school quality before, during and after
the implementation of DPEP. Finally, using the DISE data, I cross–verify the ac-
curacy of information I gather from government archival documents (described
been adopted in some African countries to measure learning levels among children – UWEZO
Surveys
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below).
1.3.3 Archived Government Records
In order to isolate the timing of DPEP program initiation in different parts of the
country, I take advantage of archived government records on the implementa-
tion of the program. Since the DPEP started in the early to mid 1990’s, a large
amount of the documentation pertaining to the programme was initially not in
a digital format. Although, some of the documents have been recently digitized,
a large amount of information still exists solely in paper format in libraries and
other institutions. I gather data from these digital and paper files to infer infor-
mation for programme districts across various states (a total of 271 districts). I
discuss this in further detail in the next section.
1.3.4 District Level Health Survey (DLHS)
I obtain data on the educational attainment of DPEP’s direct beneficiaries from
the DLHS, a household–level survey conducted by the government of India.
This survey collates statistics on a wide range of indicators related to household
demographic characteristics, maternal and child health, and family planning. I
draw upon two rounds of this data – rounds in 2007–2008 (wave 3) and 2012–
2013 (wave 4). In addition, I also use this data to investigate the mechanisms
that could potentially be responsible for DPEP’s intergenerational effects.
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1.3.5 Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS)
The IHDS is the other dataset that I use to probe the mechanisms that might
have mediated the intergenerational impacts of DPEP. The IHDS is a nationally
representative panel survey conducted by the University of Maryland in collab-
oration with the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi.
The first round, IHDS–I, was conducted between November 2004 and October
2005 and covered 41,554 households across 33 states and union territories of In-
dia (Desai and Vanneman, 2005). In this analysis, I primarily use the female
module that was administered to ever–married women between the ages of 15
and 49.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Before discussing the details of the empirical strategy, I describe some important
characteristics of the way I create the sample of direct and indirect DPEP ben-
eficiaries (children of direct beneficiaries). It is to be noted that in some places
the direct beneficiaries are referred to as the parent generation and the indirect
beneficiaries as the child generation or intergenerational beneficiaries.
1.4.1 Sample Definition
In this section, I first describe the sample I use for my analysis. The direct ben-
eficiaries of DPEP are those who were directly exposed to the program since
they were of school–going age at the time of programme implementation. But,
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the focus of the analysis is on estimating the intergenerational effects of DPEP.
Hence, my main sample constitutes the children of these direct beneficiaries.
Timing of the programme – DPEP Districts
DPEP was announced in 1993–94. Therefore, one way is to define everyone who
was of primary school–going age at this point in time to be a direct beneficiary
of DPEP, an approach used by Khanna, 2015. However, it is worth recognizing
that DPEP constructed over 100,000 schools spread across 271 districts. Given
the inherent challenges and the wide geographical spread of DPEP, the program
began at different times in districts across the country. Using archived govern-
ment documents8, I find the exact year of initiation of DPEP in each treatment
district, and use it to identify the direct beneficiary sample – people who were
of primary school–going age at the time that DPEP was implemented in their
district.
Given that I manually infer these start dates from these archival documents,
I conduct a check to verify if this data holds up to further scrutiny. Using data
from DISE, I plot the annual rate of growth of schools over time in select dis-
tricts (figure 1.3). DPEP was meant to boost school construction in treatment
districts. Therefore, one would expect a deviation from the long term pattern in
the rate of growth of schools in or around the time that the programme was ac-
8I manually obtained the start date of the programme by triangulating information on pro-
gramme expenditures, field reports on programme implementation and progress reports cre-
ated at the state/central level to infer the time when school construction under DPEP actu-
ally began in the treatment districts. For example – I consider DPEP to have begun in a
district if money has been received by the district(central documents), it has been spent by
the state/district authorities (expenditure reports) and construction of schools has happened
(progress reports). Therefore, when multiple pieces of information about DPEP implementa-
tion in a district provides a coherent narrative, I use this to infer the time when the programme
was implemented there.
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tually implemented in districts. On the graph (figure 1.3), the red line (dashed)
represents the year when the DPEP programme was meant to begin in all the
treatment districts (1993–94) and the black line (solid) shows the year in which
the (aforementioned) government records suggest that the programme was im-
plemented in. As the graphs illustrate, the actual spike in the rate of growth of
schools in the districts is closer to the start year that I identify from the govern-
ment documents (solid black line), rather than the uniform start year of 1993–94
(dashed red line). While the data for the underlying graph and the date from
government archives (the black line) are from different sources, both pieces of
information indicate that DPEP implementation began in different districts well
after the central announcement of the program in 1993–94. For my analysis,
I thus use the date inferred from the archives for each district (black line) to
identify which individuals were exposed to the implementation of DPEP in that
district.
Sample Selection – Non-DPEP Districts
I seek to identify the causal impacts of DPEP by comparing the prospects of in-
dividuals who were of school–going age in DPEP districts for the duration of
the program, with the outcomes of comparable individuals in non–DPEP dis-
tricts. If DPEP were assigned to these districts, some people by virtue of their
age would have benefitted from it, while others would have missed out. The
former is the comparison group in my analysis. Since the non–DPEP districts
did not receive the programme, there is no obvious start year of the programme
in these districts. Thus I need to understand when the program would have
started in these districts should they have received it.
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I use two different methods to assign a likely DPEP start year for the control
districts. Under the first method, for each state I take the average starting year
of DPEP in treatment districts within that state, and consider this year to be the
start date for all control districts within the state. I use this in my main analysis.
Another way to impute the starting year would be to assign all control districts
the nationwide average start date among the treatment districts (instead of us-
ing the individual state averages). This method ignores the state (or regional)
differences in implementation patterns across different districts. To show the
robustness of my results, I replicate the main results using this alternative (na-
tional) definition of identifying the control group.
Direct Beneficiary Sample
DPEP was mostly geared towards the construction of primary and upper–
primary schools (up to grade 7). Thus, the treatment and comparison sampels
consist of individuals who were of primary school–going age in the treatment
and control districts at the time of DPEP implementation. Primary school chil-
dren tend to be between the ages of 5 and 10 years, but studies from India in-
dicate that even children up to the age of 13 years might remain in primary
school, mostly due to delayed school entry and/or uneven grade progression
(Azam and Saing, 2017). As a result, I define the main sample of direct DPEP
beneficiaries to include children who were between 5 and 14 years of age dur-
ing the DPEP implementation years. I check the robustness of my results to an
alternative definition that consider 5 to 12 years to be the relevant group.
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Intergenerational Sample (Children of Direct Beneficiaries)
My main focus in this analysis is to identify the intergenerational effects of
DPEP. In order to do this, I need to identify the children of DPEP direct ben-
eficiaries (identified above) who themselves were not directly impacted by the
programme. Given that the DPEP programme ended around late 20049, I only
consider those who started school after this time period – specifically, I restrict
the sample of children in my analysis to those who would have began their
schooling in 2005 or later.
Identifying district of schooling
Ideally, an individual would likely be considered a DPEP direct beneficiary if
he/she were of school–going age when they resided in a treatmetn district. The
data I use to identify the impacts of DPEP on the direct beneficiaries, were col-
lected in the year 2007 and later. While they include information on past edu-
cational attainment of direct beneficiaries, the surveys did not ask individuals
to report their district of residence during their school–going years. I thus use
individuals’ current district of residence to assign treatment/control status to
each individual (direct beneficiary) in my sample. The potential issue with this
assignment mechanism is that, due to migration, the current district of residence
may not be the same as the one that the individual lived in when they went to
school.
One of the major sources of migration in India is post-marriage movement
9A different national program called Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) was introduced in In-
dia around 2001–2002. While this program also aimed at expanding educational opportunities
across the country, it differed from DPEP in that it wasn’t targeted based on an allocation rule.
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of women. In India, which is largely a patriarchal country, it is common for
women to move to live with her husband’s family after marriage which leads to
systematic inter–district migration particularly for women. As a result, the cur-
rent location of women may not always be an appropriate proxy for their past
district of residence. There is however evidence that indicates that the major-
ity of marriage–related migration occurs within and not across districts. Bloch
et al., 2004 show that on average, a woman moves 21 miles after marriage. In
2001, the average size of an Indian district was close to 2,100 squared miles
and thus it is highly likely that most post–marriage migration occurred within
districts. Evidence from multiple nationally representative data sources point
to this conclusion. Using National Sample Survey (NSS) data from 1983, 1987
and 1999, Topalova, 2007 finds that although nearly 60 percent of rural women
report a change in their location after marriage, a very small proportion (7–8
percent) move across district boundaries10. In light of these statistics, I argue
that it is reasonable to consider the current district of residence to be the district
in which individuals went to school. Hence assigning treatment status based on
the current district of residence is unlikely to lead to substantial misclassifica-
tion errors.
Changes in District Boundaries
India has witnessed substantial administrative decentralization over the past
two or three decades – the number of districts in the country has increased from
466 (in 1991) to 640 (in 2011). Given that the DPEP programme was imple-
mented at the district level, it is crucial that I be able to link current district
10Using more recent data, Kone et al., 2017 show that overall inter district migration among
women in India stands at about 9–10 percent. Almost 70 percent of this migration is due to
marriage, but most of it (more than 3/4th) occurs within the same district.
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definitions to districts boundaries that existed during the program years (1993–
2004)11. This is important because the parent cohort went to school in old dis-
tricts (1993–2004), and hence, whether or not they were received the benefits of
DPEP would depend on their district of residence during program implemen-
tation.
Based on the discussion of historical changes in district boundaries in Ku-
mar and Somanathan, 2009, I map districts in 2001 to their parent districts in
1991. While Kumar and Somanathan, 2009 only cover district changes that took
place until 2001, I extend their analysis to similarly match districts that were
created in subsequent years (until 2011). In doing so, I follow these steps. In
some cases, multiple districts were created from a single parent district, and so I
assign the treatment status of the parent district to all the new districts. In other
cases, several districts were combined to form a new big district. Here, if all the
parent districts had the same treatment status, I assign the same status to the
new district. However, there are cases in which the DPEP treatment status of
the parent districts differ. If so, if more than 50 percent of the population of the
new district comes from parent districts of a certain treatment status, I assign
this treatment status to the new district. I use analogous rules in assigning pro-
gramme start years and district characteristics (such as the 1991 district female
literacy rates) to the newly created districts.
11India is administratively split up first into states, which are then split up into districts. These
are akin to counties in the US.
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1.4.2 Empirical Methodology
The analysis here estimates the impact of DPEP on two different samples. The
parent sample comprises of those who were of school going age (5–14 years)
while DPEP was being implemented in their district; these are the direct ben-
eficiaries of the program. The child sample consists of the children of the di-
rect beneficiaries; these were indirect beneficiaries of DPEP, who started their
schooling after DPEP had been phased out in 2005. I define the treatment group
depending on when a certain district received the scheme. I use government
archival records to infer the exact start year of the programme in each of the 271
treatment districts (discussed earlier).
My estimation strategy relies on two important sources of exogenous varia-
tion – 1. the district female literacy cut off of 39.2 percent, and 2. the spatial and
temporal variation in the implementation of DPEP. With regards to the former,
the programme was assigned on the rule that districts with female literacy be-
low the national average rate (39.2 percent) were more likely to receive DPEP.
As a result, when moving from the right (above) of the cutoff to the left (below),
the probability of treatment receipt experiences a discontinuous increase. This
is illustrated in figure 1.5, where I graph the probability of programme receipt
against the female literacy rates of different districts. The figure illustrates that
around the RD cutoff (39.2 percent) there is a large discontinuity in the probabil-
ity of receiving the programme. This setup is a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
(FRD) design, and allows me to estimate the impact of DPEP around the alloca-
tion cutoff.
The intuition here is to identify the effect of DPEP by comparing the out-
comes of a subset of observations on either side of the RD cutoff (x¯). This subset
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of observations lies within a neighborhood around the cutoff. Recent innova-
tions in the field of RD estimation and inference make it possible to employ the
underlying data to estimate the size of the neighborhood12. This is in contrast
to the previously used methods, like 2SLS–IV, to compute the causal impacts
(discussed later).
The neighborhood typically takes the following form: [x¯ − h, x¯ + h], where
h is the optimally determined bandwidth. There are two main data–driven
approaches that can be used to calculate the optimal bandwidth – the Mean
Squared Error (MSE) method and the Coverage Error Rate (CER). Although
both approaches are semi–parametric in nature, and involve tradeoffs between
efficiency and robustness, they differ in the optimality criterion used to calculate
the bandwidth. In implementing these approaches, I specify several parameters
to facilitate the bandwidth estimation. First, I select the kernel function that is
to be used to determine the weight assigned to each observation. In my anal-
ysis I use a triangular kernel which puts higher weight on observations close
to the RD cutoff and less weight on observations that are further away. I show
that the results are robust to using an epanechnikov kernel. Second, I select the
polynomial function form to used in the model estimation. To allow for more
flexibility, I use a quadratic polynomial for the main results, but also use a linear
function to show that the results are not sensitive to this change.
In estimating the impacts of DPEP on direct beneficiaries, I incorporate a se-
ries of control variables such as age of the individual and categorical variables
for religion, caste, state and year of data collection. For the child level specifi-
cations, I control for child’s age and gender, age of both parents, rainfall shocks
12These observations that are close to the cutoff on either side are similar on most character-
istics, except their probability of receiving DPEP, something that I verify in the results section.
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in–utero/birth year of the child (to proxy for environmental circumstances dur-
ing this crucial period of growth)13, and dummies for caste, religion, state and
year of data collection. In all specifications, I cluster standard errors at the dis-
trict level.
Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012 discuss the MSE approach and devise an
asymptotically optimal procedure to estimate the bandwidth. Under this pro-
cedure, they assumed a squared error loss function and The formula used to
determine the ideal/appropriate bandwidth under this procedure is:
hMSE = CMSE.n−1/(2p+3) (1.1)
where n is the sample size, p is the order of the polynomial chosen by the
researcher. The constant Cmse depends on the kernel function, the polynomial
form and the bias/variance of the estimator among other factors14. Calonico
et al., 2017 discuss robust–bias corrections that make inference feasible with the
MSE approach15. In my analysis, I report these robust–bias corrected standard
errors along with the coefficient estimate.
13I use the same rainfall definition as used in the main analysis in Bjo¨rkman-Nyqvist, 2013.
14This constant is unknown and needs to be estimated in order to ascertain the bandwidth
(hmse). Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012 propose a plug–in estimator that is based on a reference
model to calculate an estimated value of the constant (Cˆmse). This estimated value is then used
to calculate the value of the bandwidth (hˆmse).
15Calonico et al., 2014 improved on the initial procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalya-
naraman, 2012 by providing a bandwidth selector that has superior finite sample properties. In
addition to being completely data driven and providing a mean squared error optimal band-
width, this improved bandwidth selection procedure also has desirable small and large sample
properties (Cattaneo and Vazquez-Bare, 2016). But, it has been shown that the standard errors
of the RD estimate obtained from this procedure are not valid for inference. This is because
the way the procedure balances between the bias and the variance makes inference logically
inconsistent (for details refer to Calonico et al., 2014). This issue in these bandwidth selection
procedures implies that the regular confidence interval that they produce cannot be used for
inference. In the limiting case, where we assume a zero bias, the bandwidth size (hmse) tends to
infinity (since Cmse is inversely proportional to the bias).
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However, Cattaneo and Vazquez-Bare, 2016 show that when inference is the
goal of the estimation, then the MSE estimator and the associated robust–bias
corrected confidence intervals may not be the preferred bandwidth selection
approach. Their discussion demonstrates that the bandwidth value that reduces
the Coverage Error (CE) of the confidence interval would be more appropriate.
This is given by:
hCER = CCER.n−1/(p+3) (1.2)
where CCER is a constant different from CMSE and is estimated based on the un-
derlying data. The confidence interval of the RD estimate based on this band-
width (hCER) has been shown to have demonstrably superior properties associ-
ated with inference1617.
These data–driven approaches are new to the literature and have not been
used extensively in empirical applications.. RD analyses usually employ global
polynomial approaches which tend to be subjective, not data driven and leads to
larger bandwidths, While the global method works best when there is minimal
misspecification bias (discussed in Gelman and Imbens, 2017), which is rare to
achieve, the approach has appeal since it allow researchers to estimate causal
impact with least squares estimation. I thus also estimate the impacts of DPEP
with the 2SLS and present these results as a robustness check. I describe the
global approach in Appendix A.
16In addition, the bandwidth which minimizes the Coverage Error (CE) is also always smaller
than the bandwidth which minimizes the Mean Squared Error (MSE)That is, the number of ob-
servations used in the estimation using MSE is larger than (or equal to) the number of observa-
tions used in the estimation using the CE method.
17 Cattaneo and Vazquez-Bare, 2016 note that owing to the large degree of variability in the
point estimates, the RD coefficient from the CER procedure may not always be useful in empir-
ical applications. Even so, I report the point estimates and the associated confidence intervals
from these estimations. I primarily focus on the confidence intervals and discuss their relevance
in assessing the statistical significance of the estimates.
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1.4.3 RD Validity
For the RD design to be valid it is critical that individuals not be able to manip-
ulate their treatment status by systematically positioning themselves on either
side of the cutoff. If individuals can choose their own value of the running vari-
able, then they can potentially decide whether or not to be a part of the treat-
ment group. This would lead to non–random assignment to treatment, which
would complicate the identification of the causal impact of the treatment. Such
violations could occur in this case in two potential ways – if sub–national gov-
ernments (at the state or district level) were able to choose their treatment status
or if individuals were able to affect their treatment status through systematic mi-
gration. As a first step to establish this, I conduct the McCrary density test (as
described in McCrary, 2008), the results of which are shown in figure 1.4. The
graphs and the associated test statistic (p–value = 0.42) suggest that there is no
discontinuity in the forcing variable (district female literacy rate) around the RD
cutoff.
Additionally, it is unlikely that states/districts were able to manipulate their
values of the running variable (district female literacy rate) since programme
allocation was based on 1991 census data, which was collected at an earlier point
of time by a central authority in India which is independent of state/district
oversight. Additionally, the census data was collected in or before 1991, whereas
the programme was announced in 1993. This meant that there was little chance
that the states/districts knew about the programme when the census data was
collected. Furthermore, it is highly likely that the states (or districts) had limited
knowledge of the exact decision rule regarding the programme prior to DPEP
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implementation18, more so because no other government programmes in the
past (or since) appear to have been allocated based on the district female literacy
rate.
While individuals could potentially have determined their treatment status
through systematic migration across districts, I argue that this is unlikely in In-
dia and could not have been large enough to bias the estimates that I identify
through my analysis. First, migration across districts in India in the 1990’s was
fairly low (Topalova, 2007). Second, the main reasons for migration in India are
marriage and employment. Schooling choice (especially primary school) was
not a major reason for migration in India, especially in rural India around the
time DPEP was implemented (1993–2004). In terms of migration that is related
to seeking enhanced education opportunities, most of it might be expected to be
confined to the realms of higher education (high school and beyond). Since the
DPEP programme mostly constructed primary, upper primary and secondary
schools, the case for systematic migration affecting the composition of the treat-
ment group seems weak.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Discontinuity in Programme Receipt
As a first step, I show that there is a significant discontinuity in treatment assign-
ment around the programme cutoff (the 1991 national average female literacy
18As decisions regarding programme placement were being made by the central government
in conjunction with the World Bank and other donors
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rate of 39.2 percent). Figure 1.5, which plots the probability of a district being
part of the treatment group against the 1991 district female literacy rate, clearly
illustrates that there is a significant difference in the probability of programme
receipt around the RD cutoff. This implies that districts just below the cutoff
were much more likely to be part of the DPEP treatment group as compared
to districts that were just above the RD threshold. Despite their being a signifi-
cant difference in probability of treatment assignment, it is possible that because
of implementation issues this might not translate into differences in the actual
number of schools constructed as a result of this programme. This is because
it is possible for districts earmarked to receive the programme, due to a variety
of reasons, to either not receive DPEP funding or be unable to use the funding
properly. Therefore, in addition to showing discontinuity in programme assign-
ment (as announced), it is also vital to establish that there is a significant break
in the number of actual schools constructed during the DPEP implementation
period in districts around the cutoff. I establish that in the next sub–section.
1.5.2 School Infrastructure (1993-2004)
I use district–level information to examine differences in school infrastructure
between DPEP and non–DPEP regions at three time periods: in 1993 (Pre-
DPEP), between 1993 & 2004 (DPEP years) and in 2005 (end of DPEP). To con-
firm whether the treatment–control differences observed above are indeed due
to the DPEP policy and not due to pre–existing variations, I check whether any
such discontinuities existed prior to program initiation in 1993. The results in
panel A of Table 1.1 indicate that while treatment districts had marginally fewer
number of schools in 1993 than control areas, the difference is statistically indis-
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tinguishable from zero. Panel B of Table 1.1 shows the impact of the DPEP pro-
gramme on school construction during the DPEP years (1993–2004). The results
indicate that an average DPEP district received almost 258 more government
schools than a comparable non–DPEP district, a difference that is statistically
significant. This difference persists when I examine total (public and private)
schools and private schools separately, though the latter is not statistically sig-
nificant. In panel B of Table 1.1, I also estimate the impact of DPEP on per capita
schooling availability – the outcome I examine is the number of schools per 1000
individuals. The results indicate that there was a significant increase in the per
capita availability of government schools (0.21 schools per 1000 population) and
all schools (0.31 schools per 1000 population) in the treatment districts. I again
fail to find any significant differences across treatment and control districts in
the per capita availability of private schools.
To estimate the intergenerational impact of DPEP, we want the parent gen-
eration to benefit from enhanced school opportunities, but do not want their
children to directly benefit from this policy. This would imply that there should
not be significant differences in schooling access when the children start going
to school – which is in the year 2005. I establish that this is the case in panel C of
Table 1.1. The results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference
in the total number and per capita (per 1000 population) government/private
schools across the RD cutoff in the year 2005. This finding indicates that the
results that I identify are likely to emerge solely due to the intergenerational
effects of enhanced parental access to schooling.
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1.5.3 School Quality (1993–2004)
Analogous to the analysis above, I test for differences in the quality of school
infrastructure at three points in time: in 1993 (Pre–DPEP), between 1993 &
2004 (DPEP years) and in 2005 (end of DPEP). This would help understand if
the programme had a significant impact on the underlying quality of schools
in DPEP regions. I use DISE school–level census data from 2005 to exam-
ine several school quality measures – physical infrastructure (classrooms, toi-
lets, electricity), teacher qualification, school oversight (inspection visits) and
grants/incentives received by the school (funding received/spent). These ar-
guably provide a comprehensive overview of the amenities/resources that a
school possesses and is a wide enough array of indicators so as to encompass
enough aspects of school quality. The results in Table 1.2 show that there were
no differences in school quality at the start of the DPEP policy (in 1993)19 and
those constructed during the DPEP years (between 1993 & 2004)20. Additionally,
I find that in the year 2005 there were no statistically significant differences on
any of the quality indicators (Table 1.2). This alleviates concerns about the pos-
itive intergenerational learning effects being driven by superior school quality
experienced by the children in the treatment group. It also further adds cre-
dence to the argument that any positive intergenerational effects of schooling
observed in this context are due to enhanced schooling access of parents and
19Ideally, to do this one would have used data on these measures from the year 1993–94.
Since such detailed data is unavailable for that time period, I use data from 2005 for schools
that were constructed before 1993. This estimation would be valid if there were no systematic
differences in upgrades/improvements in schools constructed before 1993 in districts around
the programme cutoff. There is no reason to believe that this would be the case.
20Ideally, I would want to compare the schools built under the DPEP programme to other
schools constructed in this time period to show that the DPEP schools were no different from
the other schools. But the dataset does not identify the schools specifically built under this
programme. So I compare all schools constructed in this period in districts around the cutoff.
Given that DPEP was the flagship government programme for that period, it can be argued that
any differences in school quality should be captured in this setup.
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not due to improved school quality.
1.5.4 Effect on Direct Beneficiaries
I examine the impact that DPEP had on educational outcomes of the cohort
of individuals who were of school–going age at the time of programme im-
plementation. As discussed earlier, for the main estimation results I compare
educational outcomes of DPEP direct beneficiaries, that is of people who were
14 years or below at the time of programme implementation across the RD cut-
off. Table 1.3 presents estimates for the impact of DPEP on male and female
direct beneficiaries separately. I find that the programme had a positive effect
on enrolment in school, with both males and females experiencing an 8–10 per-
centage point increase. Male and female beneficiaries also had more years of
education (0.75 – 0.9 years), were more likely to complete primary school (5 – 12
percentage points) and were nearly 9 percentage points more likely to be liter-
ate. These results indicate that those going to school in the immediate aftermath
of DPEP initiation did attain higher schooling through the enhanced schooling
access provided by the program. The effects are present for both genders.
1.5.5 Intergenerational Effects
I now present the main results of this analysis, the impact of the DPEP pro-
gramme on the learning outcomes of the children of direct DPEP beneficiaries.
As discussed in the empirical strategy section, I use estimators based on two
different approaches – Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Coverage Error Rate
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(CER). A child could have indirectly been exposed to the consequences of DPEP
through either parent (mother or father) or both parents. In my analysis, I con-
sider these cases separately.
Children – Mother was sole DPEP beneficiary
To compute treatment effects for this group, I compare test score outcomes for
children whose mothers were part of the DPEP direct beneficiary group with
those whose mothers were not, while in both cases the respective fathers were
not impacted by DPEP due to their (they were too old to be of school–going
age during DPEP years). I use the CER–optimal bandwidth estimator with a
quadratic polynomial, and the test score outcomes are scored in a way such that
zero means a failure to provide any correct answers and four indicates complete
proficiency on the test. Column 1 of table 1.4 shows that when a woman bene-
fitted from the DPEP programme (but her husband did not), her child’s reading
test score went up by 0.28 points, which is around 19 percent of the standard de-
viation (1.44) – which is also represented in figure 1.7. Since a one unit increase
on the test implies an increase of one skill level, this can also be interpreted as
an increase of a little more than one–fourth of a skill level. Given that an aver-
age child is close to being able to read a word (score = 2), the coefficient implies
that DPEP was able to nudge the child of a typical female program beneficiary
towards being able to read somewhere between a word and a sentence. The
DPEP impact on math scores of 0.21 points (column 2 in table 1.4 and figure 1.6)
would enable an average child to get closer to recognizing a two digit number
(score = 2) rather than a one–digit number (score = 1). This is an improvement
of almost 18 percent of the standard deviation (1.14) in math ability. I also find
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a positive effect of the programme on English reading ability by the children of
treatment women – the RD coefficient is 0.10 points and it is significant at the
five percent level (figure 1.8).
No studies have looked at the intergenerational learning impacts of a school
construction programme, and hence there are no obvious studies to compare
these results with. To provide some context, I look at other interventions that
have aimed to improve learning outcomes in different countries. I find that
the effect sizes I find are smaller than, but in line with, other studies from India
(and other countries) that have looked at the impact of different school construc-
tion programmes (0.4 S.D.(σ) (Kazianga et al., 2013), 0.65 σ (Burde and Linden,
2013)) and other interventions on learning outcomes21: around 0.5 σ (Banerjee
et al., 2007), 0.2 σ(Glewwe et al., 2009), around 0.2 σ (Duflo et al., 2012) and close
to 0.3 σ (Muralidharan et al., 2016).
Children – Father was sole DPEP beneficiary
Akin to the analysis above, I examine outcomes for children whose fathers ben-
efitted from the DPEP, but their mothers did not22. The results in Table 5 suggest
that there was no statistically significant impact of the programme on this set of
children. Although all the estimates (Table 1.5) are signed in the same way as
the estimates for the children whose mothers were DPEP beneficiaries (Table
1.4), none of the impacts are statistically significant. This cannot be attributed to
DPEP not benefiting male beneficiaries – recall, that male beneficiaries exposed
to DPEP were found to have improved school attainment (Table 1.3). Neither
21σ here represents standard deviation
22Because the mothers were too young to be of school–going age during DPEP programme
years
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can this null result be due to small sample sizes within the bandwidth – the
effective number of observations are more than 23,000 in each of the outcomes
(except english score). Rather, it seems likely that mothers are able to use their
enhanced schooling to improve the outcomes of their children, while fathers’
ability to do the same seems restricted.
To further probe this result, I divide the children by gender and verify if
it is the case that there are gender heterogeneities in the ability to transfer hu-
man capital benefits to children. The results in table 1.6 indicate two patterns
– father beneficiaries are not able to benefit children of either gender. Second,
daughters gain more from mother beneficiaries across all outcomes. These re-
sults are in line with other studies that find the role of mother to be vital in the
human capital formation of children (Desai and Alva, 1998, Currie and Hyson,
1999, Currie and Madrian, 1999, Persico et al., 2004, Case et al., 2002, Behrman
and Rosenzweig, 2004, Case et al., 2005, King et al., 2007, Gu¨nes¸, 2015, Vollmer
et al., 2016, Alderman and Headey, 2017). In addition, the higher impact on fe-
males (daughters) than on males (sons) is similar to the gender difference in the
impact of school construction programme in Afghanistan, which was evaluated
by Burde and Linden, 2013.
Both Parents Treatment
Table 1.7 looks at the sample of children with both parents benefitting from
the DPEP program. The results are qualitatively similar to the results for the
children who only had mothers exposed to DPEP school construction (Table
1.4). When these results are looked at in conjunction with those for the children
with treated fathers, one may conclude that while enhanced maternal schooling
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through DPEP certainly mattered for child learning, paternal schooling might
not have. As pointed out earlier, this is consistent with existing evidence in the
development economics literature.
Putting RD–LATE in perspective
The RD estimation procedure leads to a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)
of the causal impact of the programme, which is based on observations that are
close to the RD cutoff. In this context, that would be people living in districts
with female literacy rate (in 1991) close to 39.2 percent. Since this effect is a local
estimate, this could mean that the coefficient might not be widely generalizable.
Below, I present two different perspectives as why this criticism might not be as
relevant in this case.
First, from a global perspective the results here would be informative about
the impact of a similar school construction programme in other developing
countries which are in the same stage of educational development as India was
at the time DPEP was implemented. There are many countries with large pop-
ulations, like Pakistan ( 200 million) and Ethiopia ( 100 million), that have a av-
erage female literacy rate around (or below) the RD cutoff (39.2 percent) of this
study 23. Most of these countries are concentrated in Central and West Africa
and South Asia. Additionally, there are other countries in Africa and Asia that
have higher rates of overall female literacy, but have large regions within them
where educational indicators are similar to what they were in India at the start
of the DPEP. The results here would also be potentially valuable for forming
policies in these areas.
23Literacy data from UNICEF (2015) – link – accessed on 25 July 2018.
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Second, I show that these results are valuable in the Indian context. If the
districts around the cutoff were concentrated in one part of the country, then
the results would not be valid for India as a whole. To verify whether this is
the case, I plot on a graph the districts that are within a neighborhood of the
allocation cutoff. I use the effects on intergenerational reading scores to illus-
trate my point. The impact of DPEP on the reading scores for the children of
program beneficiaries is 0.28, which is based on more than 37,000 observations
(out of a total of more than 480,000 observations) within a bandwidth of around
5 percent (running variable) on either side of the cutoff. While the bandwidth is
fairly narrow, the number of observations is sizable, which is uncommon in RD
applications of this nature. Additionally, these observations are not localized
to a few districts around the cutoff – they come from 46 districts, spread across
different parts of the country.
1.5.6 Falsification Checks
I conduct several checks to demonstrate that the results that I obtain are due
to the DPEP school construction policy and are not due to any other factors.
First, I verify whether the setup I use detects any impacts for groups that should
have been un-affected by the DPEP programme – children who were 14 years
or older at the time of programme implementation would have been too old to
benefit from the school expansion under the DPEP, and should ideally show no
programme impacts. The results in table 1.14 does show that this sub–sample
of people show no effects of DPEP. Further, the children of these people should
also not exhibit any effects of the programme. I verify this in Table 1.15 – I
estimate the RD specification separately for children whose mothers just missed
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benefiting from the program (panels A and B) and for children whose fathers
just missed being exposed (panels C and D). I find that in both cases, there
are no DPEP impacts, indicating that the school construction programme had
no statistically significant impact on the outcomes for the children of women
(or men) who were likely to have left school or aged out of the school–going
age range by the time DPEP was implemented in their districts. This further
strengthens the main results.
I also use the same RD setup to estimate the impact on pre–determined or
unrelated covariates, which have been determined independently of DPEP, and
hence ideally should be unaffected by them. These include age of the mother,
gender and age of the child and birth/current year rainfall shock24. The results
from this exercise are shown in Figures 1.9 & 1.10. I plot the point estimates and
their 90 percent confidence intervals that are estimated using different band-
widths and kernel functions (Triangle and Epanechnikov). The confidence in-
terval of the point estimate of the impact of DPEP on these outcomes always
consists of the zero value, showing that DPEP, did not shape outcomes unre-
lated to the programme.
1.5.7 Robustness Checks
Table 1.4 provides the main set of results for the case when the mother of the
child is the sole DPEP beneficiary. In this section, I discuss the different robust-
ness checks that I conduct. In each of them I alter different parts of the empiri-
24The data on rainfall comes from the University of Delaware dataset on precipitation and air
temperature (Matsuura and Willmott, 2015). Any differences in current year rainfall around the
RD cutoff can potentially be a confounder, but ideally this should not be the case. Therefore, I
show this empirically to assuage any such concerns.
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cal strategy used in table 1.4 – bandwidth estimation, the polynomial functional
form and the kernel function used to assign weights to the observations around
the cutoff 25.
First, I alter the approach to RD estimation – instead of using the CER ap-
proach (Table 1.4), I use an MSE based approach in table 1.8. In the MSE ap-
proach, the point estimates change – some increase while others decrease, but
they always retain their statistical significance. Next, I check the sensitivity of
the results to the type of kernel function chosen. While, I use a triangular ker-
nel for the main results (Tables 1.4), I re–examine the results for the main out-
comes with an epanechnikov kernel (in Table 1.9). The point estimates and the
bandwidths do change marginally, but the point estimates mostly retain their
sign and significance (except the enrolled outcome variable). I conduct another
check on the same lines where I use a linear polynomial function (power = 1),
instead of a quadratic polynomial that is used in the main results (Table 1.4).
Like the change in kernel functional form, the inferences made from the main
tables still mostly remain robust (Table 1.10).
In another check, I verify how the results are affected when I change the
way in which the sample from the control districts is defined. While in the main
analysis I use the statewise averages of DPEP districts to assign start dates to
non–DPEP districts within the state, in Panel A of Table 1.11 I define the the
control group sample using nationwide average start year of DPEP. Under this
method I assign all control districts the nationwide average start date among
DPEP districts. This method ignores the state (or regional) differences in DPEP
implementation patterns across districts. The results (Panel A of Table 1.11)
25Tables for robustness check in the case of the father being the sole beneficiary of the pro-
gramme show that the results are robust in that case. Tables are available from the author on
request.
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suggest that the main results are largely robust to these changes – the impact
on all outcomes retain the right sign, while most of them remain statistically
significant as well (except English score).
For the next test, I alter the way I define the cohort of individuals who
would have directly benefitted from DPEP. In the main results, I define children
who between 5 and 14 years during DPEP years to be the beneficiary group of
DPEP school construction. It is plausible that since the majority of the schools
constructed under this policy were primary (and upper–primary) schools, chil-
dren younger than 14 years would have experienced most of the direct impact.
Therefore, I re–estimate the results with a lower age cutoff of 12 years to define
the cohort that might have been impacted by the programme26. This lower age
cutoff is especially relevant for girls since they tend to drop out of schools at
younger ages than boys due to a variety of reasons, chief among them being
child marriage and onset of menarche. The effect of onset of menses on school-
ing attainment has been studied in developed (Burrows 1 and Johnson, 2005,
Roberts et al., 2002, Joan and Zittel, 1998) and developing countries (Sommer,
2010). Other evidence finds that it may be the case that onset of menarche might
lead to higher and earlier dropout from schools amongst girls (Adukia, 2017,
Kirk and Sommer, 2006, Burgers, 2000, Fentiman et al., 1999). The results from
this exercise are presented in panel B of Table 1.11 – the RD coefficients fall in
magnitude, but retain their statistical significance for most outcomes. This im-
plies that the results mostly remain stable when using this different (potentially
stricter) definition of the treatment group.
Additionally, I check how the results change when I use the global polyno-
mial approach to RD estimation, instead of a local polynomial approach. The
26This change would lead to the reduction in the size of the treatment group.
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former uses the whole dataset to estimate the RD impact using a 2SLS–IV strat-
egy. In Tables 1.12 and 1.13, I replicate the analysis from the main results using
a global polynomial approach. I find that the overall pattern of results does
not change in cases when the mother was exposed to the DPEP programme, it
had a positive impact on children’s reading, math and English test scores while
reducing the chances of not being able to answer any questions on these tests.
1.6 Mechanisms
There are potentially multiple pathways through which a school construction
programme (like DPEP) could shape intergenerational learning outcomes in a
developing country like India. While results that I present earlier (Table 1.3)
show that individuals who directly benefitted from DPEP were able to increase
their school attainment, we don’t know what it was about this schooling that
enabled them to positively impact their children’s learning outcomes. I now
examine several potential pathways that could have been responsible for the
observed intergenerational effects. Given that female DPEP beneficiaries appear
to be most able to use their education to shape their children’s lives, here I focus
on the women beneficiaries and the sample of children who had mothers, but
not fathers, who benefitted from the program.
1.6.1 Educational Investments
It is possible that highly educated parents might invest more in their chil-
dren’s education than less educated parents, and I use IHDS data to examine
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whether DPEP’s intergenerational education effects could have been transmit-
ted through such a channel. One way that parents can do this is to enroll their
children in potentially higher quality schools, which in the Indian context could
mean private schools27. I estimate whether DPEP programme exposure had
an impact on parents’ choice between private and government schools and
find that there was no statistically significant impact on private school enrol-
ment (Table 1.17). Higher investment in children could also take the form of
greater schooling related expenditures (example – on books, tuition etc.). Re-
sults in 1.17 suggest that DPEP beneficiaries allocate more resources towards
the payment of school fees, and the purchase of books and uniforms for chil-
dren, while children of programme beneficiaries spent around two more hours
doing homework than comparable children of non-beneficiaries, which might
be due to the increased supervision by their mothers. This is similar to the re-
sults found by Andrabi et al., 2012 in a similar context (Pakistan). Therefore,
there is some evidence that DPEP’s intergenerational impacts might have been
mediated through higher parental investments in children’s education.
1.6.2 Health of Direct Beneficiaries
Extensive research shows that health in infancy (especially birthweight) has a
significant impact on later life outcomes for children (Black et al., 2007, Ore-
opoulos et al., 2008, Royer, 2009, Bharadwaj et al., 2010). Additionally, it is
well established that mother’s health (and health behaviors) are key determi-
nants of the health and well–being of her children (Ahlburg, 1998, Coneus and
27Evidence from India shows that private school attendance in India leads to large improve-
ments on English test scores and a moderate impact on mathematics and vernacular test scores
(?). This is despite the fact that private schools pay teachers lesser and spend less per pupil than
government schools (Desai et al., 2009, Kingdon, 2007, Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006).
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Spiess, 2012, Bhalotra and Rawlings, 2013, Yan, 2015). Therefore, it is plausi-
ble that DPEP’s positive effect on female education had a knock–on effect on
their health, and the latter led to higher well–being of children. Using data from
the Annual Health Survey (2012–13) I test this hypothesis. I find that DPEP fe-
male beneficiaries indeed had better health as adults (as measured by BMI and
hemoglobin – more details in Sunder, 2018b). This in line with findings from
other studies that provide evidence on the positive impact of women’s educa-
tion on their own health (Grossman, 2015, Gre´pin and Bharadwaj, 2015, Agu¨ero
and Bharadwaj, 2014, Lundborg, 2013, Amin et al., 2013, Silles, 2009, Currie and
Moretti, 2003). In addition, I find that DPEP had a beneficial impact on female
contraceptive usage – which might reduce unwanted fertility in the high fertil-
ity context of rural India (table 1.16), which in turn might foster higher human
capital of children (Kugler and Kumar, 2017), which resonates with findings
from other studies (Johnston et al., 2015, Andalo´n et al., 2014).
1.6.3 Child Care Investments
A child’s human capital is significantly impacted by in–utero and early life con-
ditions, or what is known as the first 1000 days of life (Almond and Currie,
2011a and Currie and Vogl, 2013 provide good reviews of this literature). Did
DPEP exposure lead to higher usage of Ante Natal Care (ANC) and Post Natal
Care (PNC) by beneficiaries when pregnant? Such services would have lead to
better outcomes for children as well as for the women themselves (Paudel et al.,
2014, Onasoga et al., 2012, Simkhada et al., 2008, Kerber et al., 2007). In Table
1.16, I find that the women DPEP beneficiaries were more likely to make at least
one ANC visit (7–11 percent), make more ANC visits in total (0.2–0.3 visits), ob-
40
tain Iron and Folic Acid (IFA)28 (3–10 percent), deliver in a facility (6–8 percent)
and make at least one PNC visit (6 percent). Based on these findings, it is clear
that women who were impacted by DPEP are more likely to receive care during
and after their pregnancy, which arguably could have led to the enhanced child
level human capital effects later in their lives.
1.6.4 Marriage Outcomes & Bargaining Power
Previous studies have shown that women who stayed enrolled longer in
schools, tended to marry at a higher age, and consequently experienced im-
proved outcomes in adulthood such as enhanced bargaining power (Lund-
berg and Pollak, 1993, Field and Ambrus, 2008b, Duflo, 2012, Samarakoon and
Parinduri, 2015, Crandall et al., 2016, Sunder, 2018a, Yount et al., 2018). As the
next set of potential mechanisms, I test whether DPEP impacted such outcomes
(using IHDS data). The results in Table 1.16 show that women beneficiaries
married about half a year later and had their first birth 0.25 years later than
women in the control group. I also examine the social status of female benefi-
ciaries in the households they married into, where I find that the DPEP women
report a higher likelihood of participating in decisions related to their children
and household meals (Table 1.17). These women are also less likely to say that
physical violence (by husbands) against wives is justified. It thus seems like the
women who benefitted from DPEP have higher bargaining power within the
households and might be able to shape their children’s outcomes more effec-
tively than non–beneficiaries (Yoong, 2012, Bono et al., 2016).
28This is an especially important outcome which addresses Iron Deficiency Anemia among
pregnant women – a major health concern in the context of India (see Rai et al., 2018 for a recent
discussion on this)
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I use the geographic and temporal variation in the implementa-
tion of a national–level school construction programme to conduct a Regression
Discontinuity analysis to estimate its impact on intergenerational learning out-
comes. The timing of implementation varied across the 271 treatment districts,
which I account for using detailed government archival data. I first demon-
strate that the programme engendered increased access to schooling in treat-
ment districts during the period that DPEP was in operation (1993 to 2004). I
find that individuals exposed to the program (of both genders) were more likely
to be literate and complete more years of education than comparable individ-
uals in districts that did not receive the program. Further, I find that children
of female DPEP beneficiaries experienced positive effects on vernacular read-
ing, math and English test scores. In contrast, male beneficiaries were unable to
transfer any benefits to their children.
I conduct multiple robustness checks to establish the internal validity of the
results of my analysis. I also validate the results through a placebo test – I show
that individuals too old to benefit from DPEP (and their children) show no ef-
fects of the programme. In demonstrating the potential generalizability of these
findings, I note two key points – first, that although the estimates are based on
comparing individuals in districts close to the program cutoff, the sample con-
sists of individuals from different parts of the country. This makes the results
nationally relevant. Second, there are many countries in Africa (like Ethiopia
and Ivory Coast) and South Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan) that have female
literacy levels close to or lower than the RD cutoff (39.2 percent) in this study.
Therefore, I argue that even though I am able to identify the Local Average
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Treatment Effects of DPEP, I am able to do so at a point in the female literacy
distribution which approximates those prevailing in many developing coun-
tries. Therefore, the results from this analysis can possibly inform the education
policies in these parts of the world.
In this analysis, I also explore the potential mechanisms through which the
intergenerational impacts of the school construction could have been medi-
ated. I find that women who were able to enhance their educational attain-
ment through DPEP had better health (BMI) and superior health behavior in
terms of contraceptive usage, pre–natal care and post–natal care as compared to
non–beneficiary women. I also find DPEP’s female beneficiaries married later,
and had higher bargaining power in their marital households. All these fac-
tors could have enabled women to allocate greater resources towards their chil-
dren’s welfare. In fact, I do find that the children of these women benefitted
from higher spending on school fees and uniforms/books.
Cognitive development and learning in childhood has an important bear-
ing on later life outcomes and policy needs to focus on ways to enhance these
outcomes. The bulk of the literature has focused on school based reforms to
improve learning outcomes (Kremer et al., 2013, Muralidharan, 2013). Through
this analysis I demonstrate that parents, particularly mothers, play an important
role in shaping their children’s ability to learn. Some interventions have been
found to increase parental investment in children include providing parents
with accurate info on returns to schooling (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007, Jensen,
2010, Levitt et al., 2011). Additionally, as the results of this analysis (and An-
drabi et al., 2012, Banerji et al., 2017) show, improving the skill set of mothers
could go a long way in boosting child performance on cognitive tests. There-
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fore, there is a need for policy action that targets parents to potentially increase
educational investment in their children (Houtenville and Conway, 2008, An-
drabi et al., 2015, Bergman, 2015). These reforms should complement, and not
substitute, the school–based reforms aimed at improving child learning.
1.8 Tables
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Table 1.1: Impact of DPEP on School Construction
Panel A: All Schools in 1993 (DPEP Start Year)
Total Number of Schools Schools per 1000 Population
All Schools Government Private All Schools Government Private
RD Estimate -143.7 -104.2 -50.77 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01
S.E. (coef) 343.9 301.6 83.2 0.28 0.49 0.03
Total Obs. 495 495 495 488 488 488
Panel B: Schools Constructed Between 1993 & 2005 (During DPEP Years)
Total Number of Schools Schools per 1000 Population
All Schools Government Private All Schools Government Private
RD Estimate 413.8** 258.1** 148.5 0.31** 0.21** 0.08
S.E. (coef) 173.3 125.6 103 0.14 0.11 0.07
Total Obs. 495 495 495 488 488 488
Panel C: All Schools in 2005 (DPEP End Year)
Total Number of Schools Schools per 1000 Population
All Schools Government Private All Schools Government Private
RD Estimate 270.1 153.9 107.7 0.28 0.19 0.09
S.E. (coef) 335.9 359.4 128.4 0.40 0.37 0.06
Total Obs. 495 495 495 488 488 488
Based on author’s calculations using the District Information on System of Education (DISE) district level data for the year 2005. The RD point
estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. The
standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level.
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Table 1.2: Impact of DPEP on School Quality
School Infrastructure
# Classrooms Any Common Toilet Any Girls Toilet Any Electricity
In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005
RD Estimate 5.06 3.6 6.5 0.68 -0.35 0.46 -0.90 -0.6 0.03 0.78 -0.08 0.58
S.E. (coef) 62.9 3.1 16.1 3.9 0.4 2.26 4.3 0.6 2.5 6.6 0.4 2.3
Total Obs. 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894
Teacher Characteristics
# Male Teachers # Female Teachers # Graduate Teachers Professional Qual.
In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005
RD Estimate -2.2 -0.79 -3.22 6.12 3.05 5.33 4.79 1.24 3.44 4.99 2.06 6.74
S.E. (coef) 15.1 1.22 9.2 18.8 3.1 10.1 19.2 1.9 7.5 21.1 1.84 11.2
Total Obs. 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894
School Oversight
Distance – Block (kms) Distance – Cluster (kms) # Visits – Block # Visits – Cluster
In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005
RD Estimate -20.8 -7.54 -9.22 7.62 0.15 8.04 9.09 2.62 6.15 -10.76 -1.41 -8.49
S.E. (coef) 49.5 9.4 7.9 12.2 3.08 36.6 58.6 2.37 12 22.4 3.1 27.6
Total Obs. 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894
Grants & Incentives
Devt. Grant – Received (’000 Rs.) Devt. Grant – Spent (’000 Rs.) TLM Grant – Received (’000 Rs.) TLM Grant – Spent (’000 Rs.)
In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005 In 1993 1993-2004 In 2005
RD Estimate -0.68 -0.11 0.34 -0.96 -0.11 0.23 -0.05 0.16 0.34 0.11 0.08 0.26
S.E. (coef) 8.9 0.2 0.9 8.6 0.16 0.8 1.68 0.12 0.5 1.46 0.05 0.3
Total Obs. 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894 726,494 291,280 1,017,894
Based on author’s calculations using the District Information on System of Education (DISE) district level data for the year 2005. The RD point
estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. The
standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level. TLM Grant refers to grants received under the Total Literacy
Mission. The triangular kernel with local polynomial of order 2 is used to construct the point estimates. Estimates are based on author’s
calculations using the individual school level data from DISE (2005).
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Table 1.3: Direct Beneficiary Impacts
District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS) Round 3 (2007-08)
Panel A: Female Sample Panel B: Male Sample
Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate
RD Estimate 0.10*** 0.84*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.90*** 0.05*** 0.08***
S.E. (coef) 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.02
Total Obs. 110,543 110,517 110,517 110,212 92,098 90,759 90,759 90,756
District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS) Round 4 (2011-12)
Panel A: Female Sample Panel B: Male Sample
Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate
RD Estimate 0.08*** 0.75*** 0.11*** - 0.08*** 0.78*** 0.05*** -
S.E. (coef) 0.01 0.17 0.03 - 0.02 0.21 0.01 -
Total Obs. 101,513 101,233 101,233 - 90,976 90,116 90,116 -
Note: The sample for this table consists of people who were below the age of 14 years at the time of programme implementation (from
government archives data) in the treatment districts (DLHS data Rounds 3 & 4). The starting year of the programme for control districts is the
state average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD impact point estimates are constructed using the triangular
kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector bandwidth selector. All the specifications control for
the age of the individual and categorical variables for caste, religion, state and year of data collection. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the district level.
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Table 1.4: Impact on Children when mother is sole DPEP beneficiary – CER Optimal
Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.28*** 0.21** 0.10** 0.04* 0.06***
S.E. (coef) 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.024 0.018
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 2.4 1.5 1.5 0.9 3.9
Effective Obs. 37,203 28,240 13,159 25,604 51,154
Mean (Y) 1.93 1.70 1.5 0.85 0.90
S.E. (Y) 1.44 1.14 1.1 0.20 0.15
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their mother was below the age of 14 years
at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both
parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard errors are
robust and are clustered at the district level. The bandwidth is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991.
The effective number of observations indicates the number of observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are
different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within
the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.5: Impact on Children when father is sole DPEP beneficiary – CER Optimal
Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.07 0.002
S.E. (coef) 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.07 0.04
Total Obs. 142,217 141,821 73,713 129,773 131,605
Bandwidth 6.1 4.7 6.1 4.9 5
Effective Obs. 32,672 26,172 16,680 23,662 23,936
Mean (Y) 2.39 2.16 2.08 0.84 0.92
S.E. (Y) 1.44 1.27 1.45 0.29 0.09
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their father was below the age of 14 years at
the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both
parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard errors are
robust and are clustered at the district level. The standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. The bandwidth is expressed in
terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the number of observations
that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in the table. The
mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.6: Impact of DPEP on child outcomes – Gender Heterogeneity
Mother to Daughter Mother to Son
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate 0.29*** 0.27** 0.13*** 0.26*** 0.23* 0.11**
S.E. (coef) 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.04
Total Obs. 230,101 229,266 119,616 253,913 252,977 133,556
Father to Daughter Father to Son
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate 0.29 0.39 0.30 0.26 0.37 0.24
S.E. (coef) 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.16
Total Obs. 68,264 68,074 34,645 73,953 73,747 39,068
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their father was below the age of 14 years at
the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both
parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard errors are
robust and are clustered at the district level. The bandwidth is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991.
The effective number of observations indicates the number of observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are
different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within
the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.7: Impact on Children when both parents are DPEP beneficiaries – CER Optimal
Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.22*** 0.22** 0.12** 0.03** 0.05*
S.E. (coef) 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.015 0.027
Total Obs. 137,980 137,611 71,325 125,660 127,408
Bandwidth 3.6 3.6 3.9 2.1 3.7
Effective Obs. 11,959 11,742 6,575 7,349 12,021
Mean (Y) 1.98 1.78 1.55 0.88 0.91
S.E. (Y) 1.46 1.16 1.12 0.21 0.14
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that both their mother and father were below the
age of 14 years at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control
districts is the state average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the
triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of
the child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The
standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The bandwidth
is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the number of
observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in
the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.8: Impact on Children when mother is sole DPEP Beneficiary – MSE Optimal
Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.22*** 0.19** 0.11** 0.05** 0.08***
S.E. (coef) 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.025 0.022
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 5.4 3.3 2.8 8.9 7.5
Effective Obs. 73,180 46,664 21,406 102,179 80,078
Mean (Y) 1.97 1.70 1.53 0.84 0.9
S.E. (Y) 1.44 1.16 1.12 0.22 0.15
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their mother was below the age of 14 years
at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common MSE–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both
parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard errors are
robust and are clustered at the district level. The standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level. The bandwidth
is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the number of
observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in
the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check – Epanechnikov Kernel
CER Optimal Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.29*** 0.22** 0.10 0.04* 0.04
S.E. (coef) 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.023 0.04
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 1.5 2.5 2.6 1.1 4.6
Effective Obs. 13,791 25,660 32,370 28,203 26,469
MSE Optimal Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.23*** 0.24* 0.10** 0.05* 0.07
S.E. (coef) 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.028 0.08
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 1.6 3.6 3.6 8.4 6.1
Effective Obs. 26,981 56,560 56,381 94,230 139,999
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their mother was below the age of 14 years
at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the epanechnikov kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal & MSE–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child,
ages of both parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard
errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. The standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level. The
bandwidth is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the
number of observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also
indicated in the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check – Linear Polynomial
CER Optimal Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.28*** 0.27** 0.08* 0.06** 0.09
S.E. (coef) 0.12 0.13 0.102 0.04 0.06
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 0.92 0.96 3.1 0.92 0.98
Effective Obs. 7,140 19,780 25,603 27,203 14,756
MSE Optimal Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.33*** 0.29** 0.09* 0.04*** 0.06
S.E. (coef) 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.05
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Bandwidth 1.5 1.8 2.7 8.2 1.84
Effective Obs. 14,642 32,451 37,669 91,661 30,274
Based on author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The score
variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a Grade–for–Age measure. The sample consists of
children satisfying two criterion – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their mother was below the age of 14 years
at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts is the state
average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 1 and with one common CER–optimal & MSE–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the child,
ages of both parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The standard
errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. The standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level. The
bandwidth is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the
number of observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also
indicated in the table. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth for each outcome is indicated.
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Table 1.11: Robustness Checks – Different Start Years – CER RD
Panel A: National Avg. Start Panel B: Control = Age Cutoff = 12 yrs
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.12 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.11***
S.E. (coef) 0.09 0.07 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.04
Total Obs. 486,264 484,428 247,489 309,775 310,074 164,351
Note: The score variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. The sample for this table consists of children born
in or after the year 2000 to parents who were both below the age of 14 years at the time of programme implementation (from government
archives data) in the treatment districts (ASER data, 2007–2014). The starting year of the programme for control districts is the state average
starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD impact point estimates are constructed with triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the
child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The
standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. The bandwidth is expressed in terms of percentage of the running variable
(district female literacy rate in 1991). The effective number of observations indicates the number of observations that lie within the bandwidths
indicated in the table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in the table. The mean and standard deviation
of the dependent variable within the bandwidth of that particular outcome are included in the table.
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Table 1.12: Robustness Check – Full Sample Regression – Exact Timing
Read Score Math Score English Score GFA Enrolled
RD Estimate 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.024*** 0.002
S.E. (coef) 0.06 0.035 0.03 0.004 0.002
Total Obs. 488,862 487,037 253,172 472,338 526,087
Note: The sample consists of children born in or after 2000 to mothers who were below 14 years of age at the time of implementation of the
DPEP programme in their district. The score variables run from 0–4, whereas the other outcomes are categorical variables. GFA refers to a
Grade–for–Age measure. This programme implementation timing is derived from detailed government archives that describe the exact process
of programme implementation. The corresponding population in the control districts is identified on the basis of the average start date in
treatment districts within the same state. All specifications control for a quadratic polynomial of the running variable, the child’s age, ages of
both parent, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child, and dummies for caste, religion, state and year of data collection. The standard
errors are robust and are clustered at the district level.
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Table 1.13: Robustness Check – Full Sample Regression – Different Start Years
Panel A: Control = National Avg. Start Panel B: Age Cutoff = 12 yrs
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.14** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.14***
S.E. (coef) 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.04
Total Obs. 486,264 484,428 247,489 309,775 310,074 164,351
Note: The score variables run from 0–4. The sample consists of children born in or after 2000 to mothers who were below 14 years of age in a
particular year. This year is the estimated start date of the programme using the DISE dataset – the year with the maximum year on year rate of
growth of schools in a particular district after the implementation of the DPEP programme. All specifications control for a quadratic polynomial
of the running variable, the child’s age, ages of both parent, rainfall shocks in–utero/birth year of the child, and dummies for caste, religion,
state and year of data collection. Standard errors are robust and clustered at district level.
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Table 1.14: Falsification – Direct Beneficiary Impacts
District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS) Round 3 (2007-08)
Panel A: Female Sample Panel B: Male Sample
Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate
RD Estimate -0.08 -0.54 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.34 -0.06 -0.01
S.E. (coef) 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.04 0.02
Total Obs. 271,978 271,940 271,940 269,320 189,231 188,764 188,764 188,223
District Level Household & Facility Survey (DLHS) Round 4 (2011-12)
Panel A: Female Sample Panel B: Male Sample
Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate Ever School Highest Grade Completed Primary Literate
RD Estimate 0.15 0.35 0.11 - 0.11 0.38 0.09 -
S.E. (coef) 0.12 0.22 0.08 - 0.09 0.27 0.06 -
Total Obs. 116,593 113,760 113,760 - 101,982 101,124 101,124 -
Note: The score variables run from 0–4. The sample for this table consists of people who were below the age of 14 years at the time of
programme implementation (from government archives data) in the treatment districts (DLHS data Rounds 3 & 4). The starting year of the
programme for control districts is the state average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD impact point estimates are
constructed using the triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector bandwidth
selector. All the specifications control for the age of the individual and categorical variables for caste, religion, state and year of data collection.
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level.
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Table 1.15: Falsification Check – DPEP impact on children of non–beneficiaries
Panel A: Non-Beneficiary Mother – CER Panel B: Non-Beneficiary Mother – MSE
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.24
S.E. (coef) 0.47 0.46 0.95 0.37 0.49 0.88
Total Obs. 737,551 733,786 382,316 737,551 733,786 382,316
Bandwidth 7.5 6.1 7.6 10.2 8.9 10.3
Effective Obs. 161,474 131,288 81,412 266,237 183,369 131,179
Panel C: Non-Beneficiary Father – CER Panel D: Non-Beneficiary Father – MSE
Read Score Math Score English Score Read Score Math Score English Score
RD Estimate -0.11 -0.16 -0.29 -0.13 -0.29 -0.22
S.E. (coef) 0.47 1.75 0.32 0.12 1.17 2.2
Total Obs. 584,862 582,528 266,994 584,862 582,528 266,994
Bandwidth 7.8 5.3 5.1 7.7 7.5 7.2
Effective Obs. 154,024 99.949 45,407 148,117 147,485 65,504
Author’s calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the years 2007–2014. The sample consists
of children satisfying two criteria – likely started school after the year 2005 (DPEP end year) and that their mother (or father) was above the age
of 14 years at the time of DPEP implementation (start year from government archives data). The start year of the programme for control districts
is the state average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The RD estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal & MSE–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the age of the
child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks in-utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection, and
standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The bandwidth is expressed in terms of the running variable – district female
literacy rate in 1991. The effective number of observations indicates the number of observations that lie within the bandwidths indicated in the
table – these are different from the the full sample sizes which are also indicated in the table. The score variables run from 0–4, whereas the other
outcomes are categorical variables. The mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable within the bandwidth is indicated.
LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
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Table 1.16: Potential Mechanisms – Woman (Parent) Level
Marriage Age Age at First Birth Contraceptive Use Any ANC
DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4
RD Estimate 7.53*** 6.62*** 3.72*** 3.01*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.11***
S.E. (coef) 0.52 0.68 0.42 0.6 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Total Obs. 110,564 89,773 73,628 72,712 72,775 55,033 64,276 47,993
# ANC Visits IFA Taken Delivery – Formal Any PNC
DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4 DLHS-3 DLHS-4
RD Estimate 0.22** 0.31 0.032** 0.098** 0.063*** 0.083*** 0.058** -
S.E. (coef) 0.12 0.03 0.014 0.038 0.021 0.027 0.024 -
Total Obs. 48,482 39,497 41,228 43,041 41,212 47,560 64,274 -
Source: Based on authors calculations using the District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS) data from Rounds 3 (2007–08) and Round
4 (2011–12). The sample consists of women who were below 14 years of age at the time of implementation of the DPEP programme in their
district. This programme implementation timing is derived from detailed government archives that describe the exact process of programme
implementation. The corresponding population in the control districts is identified on the basis of the average start date in treatment districts
within the same state. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common
CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications control for the same set of variables as the main specifications. The standard errors are
robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district level. Marriage age refers to the age at marriage (in months), Age at first birth refers to age
when the woman had her first child (In months), Contraceptive use is a dummy that takes a value of one if the women reported using
contraceptives, Any ANC is a categorical variable that takes a value of one if the woman accessed any ANC facilities during the last pregnancy, #
ANC visits refers to the number of ANC visits made during the last pregnancy, IFA Taken is a categorical variable that takes a value of one if the
woman reported taking IFA tablets during the last pregnancy, Delivery–Formal is a categorical that takes a value of one if the woman reported
giving birth in a formal health facility and Any PNC refers to a dummy that takes a value of one if the woman reported using any Post Natal
Care (PNC) facilities.
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Table 1.17: Potential Mechanisms – Woman (Parent) & Child level
Decision–Child Decision–Cook Decision–Purchases Beat–Bad Cook Beat–Neglect House
RD Estimate 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.08*** -0.09*** -0.05***
S.E. (coef) 0.02 0.053 0.03 0.02 0.01
Total Obs. 13,159 13,159 13,159 13,114 13,114
School Fees Uniform/Books Tuition Fees Private School Homework Hours
RD Estimate 781.8* 706.8** -15.6 0.05 2.06*
S.E. (coef) 426.3 328.6 312.8 0.05 1.16
Total Obs. 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545
Source: Based on authors calculations using the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2005 round. The sample consists of women who
were below 14 years of age at the time of implementation of the DPEP programme in their district. This programme implementation timing is
derived from detailed government archives that describe the exact process of programme implementation. The corresponding population in the
control districts is identified on the basis of the average start date in treatment districts within the same state. The RD point estimates are
constructed using the triangular kernel, local polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All specifications
control for the same set of variables as the main specifications. The standard errors are robust–bias corrected and are clustered at the district
level. Decision–Cook and Decision–Purchases are dummy variables that take a value of one if the woman reported being involved in decisions
related to cooking and purchases made in the household. Beat–Bad Cook and Beat–Neglect House are categorical variables that take a value of one
if woman reported that it was common for women in their community to be beaten up in cases when she was a bad cook or neglected
household work respectively. School Fees, Uniform/Books and Tuition fees refer to variables that measure the expenditure on these categories
made on the woman’s children. Private School is a dummy that takes a value of one if the child goes to private school, and homework hours
refers to the amount of time the child spent doing homework.
LINK TO MECHANISMS SECTION
61
1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Sample of districts that received the DPEP programme
LINK TO BACKGROUND SECTION
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Figure 1.2: States included in my sample (ASER DATA).
LINK TO DATA SECTION
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Figure 1.3: Yearly rate of growth of school construction plotted against time –
Treatment Districts
The graphs in this figure illustrate that the peak in school construction growth in
treatment districts is better predicted by the year of programme implementation that I
infer using the government archival data, rather than the uniform start year of 1993-94.
Data : DISE 2005.
LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
LINK TO EMPIRICAL STRATEGY SECTION
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Figure 1.4: McCrary Density test using ASER data.
(described in the data section) as per McCrary, 2008. The associated test statistic is
0.003, and the p-value is 0.42. LINK TO RD VAIDITY SECTION
Figure 1.5: Probability of Receiving DPEP Programme.
The graph shows the discontinuity of treatment assignment at the cutoff of 39.2 percent in
terms of District Female Literacy Rate. Data Source : ASER data combined with information in
government archives. LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
LINK TO EMPIRICAL STRATEGY SECTION
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Figure 1.6: Impact on Mathematics test scores.
This is a graphical representation of the estimate presented in table 1.4. Based on author’s
calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the
years 2007–2014. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All
specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks
in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The
standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
Figure 1.7: Impact on Reading test scores.
This is a graphical representation of the estimate presented in table 1.4. Based on author’s
calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the
years 2007–2014. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All
specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks
in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The
standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
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Figure 1.8: Impact on English test scores.
This is a graphical representation of the estimate presented in table 1.4. Based on author’s
calculations using the Annual Survey of Education Report (ASER) individual level data for the
years 2007–2014. The RD point estimates are constructed using the triangular kernel, local
polynomial of order 2 and with one common CER–optimal bandwidth selector. All
specifications control for the age of the child, ages of both parents, rainfall shocks
in–utero/birth year of the child and dummy variables for state and year of data collection. The
standard errors are robust and are clustered at the district level. LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
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Figure 1.9: Discontinuity in Pre-Determined Outcomes
These graphs show that the DPEP programme had a statistically insignificant (i.e.
indistinguishable from zero) impact on these outcomes. The staring year for the treatment
districts comes from the government archives, while that for the control districts comes from
the average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The left panel shows
graphs of the RD impact estimate for an outcome using triangular kernel with a polynomial of
degree 2. The right panel does the same with an epanechnikov kernel. In both graphs the
coefficients are estimated at different bandwidths, where bandwidths are increased in steps of
0.05. All estimates use robust–bias standard errors with clustering at the district level. LINK
TO RESULTS SECTION
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Figure 1.10: Discontinuity in Pre-Determined Outcomes
These graphs show that the DPEP programme had a statistically insignificant (i.e.
indistinguishable from zero) impact on these outcomes. The staring year for the treatment
districts comes from the government archives, while that for the control districts comes from
the average starting year of treatment districts within the same state. The left panel shows
graphs of the RD impact estimate for an outcome using triangular kernel with a polynomial of
degree 2. The right panel does the same with an epanechnikov kernel. In both graphs the
coefficients are estimated at different bandwidths, where bandwidths are increased in steps of
0.05. All estimates use robust–bias standard errors with clustering at the district level. LINK
TO RESULTS SECTION
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Figure 1.11: Yearly rate of growth of school construction plotted against time –
Control Districts
The graphs in this figure illustrate that there was no upward trend in school construction in the
control districts around the time the DPEP programme was implemented. Data : DISE 2005.
LINK TO RESULTS SECTION
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT YOU LEARNED BY SECOND GRADE MATTERS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION IN
MADAGASCAR AND SENEGAL
(with Heidi Kaila & David Sahn)
2.1 Introduction
Cognitive skills have important implications not only for individual wellbeing
(Heckman, 2006), but also for economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann,
2008, Hanushek, 2013). In this paper, we study the determinants of grade at-
tainment and academic performance among young adults in two francophone
African countries, Madagascar and Senegal. We examine the importance of
second–grade skills, measured by test scores on math and French, in determin-
ing the educational level and test scores of young adults1. Additionally, we
explore the role of other conditions, such as health, wealth, and parental educa-
tion in shaping the outcomes. We do so by using two unique and comparable
panel surveys from Madagascar and Senegal that follow children from second
grade until they are young adults. The cohorts are followed over a period of
15 years in Madagascar and 17 years in Senegal, an unusually long period for
survey data, especially in the African context.
Our study adds to the literature in economics and psychology that discusses
the positive relationship between childrens performance in elementary school
1We use the term skills to refer to academic skills, that is French and math skills, measured
in second grade and early adulthood. Even though these skills strictly measure academic per-
formance, we consider them a proxy for cognitive skills formation in general.
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and their academic performance later in life (Cunningham and Stanovich, 1997,
Feinstein, 2003, Bourne et al., 2007, Duncan et al., 20072). For the most part,
these studies measure academic performance in terms of school attainment and
test scores. We follow this literature and compare the relative importance of
the impact of early–life math and language scores on school attainment and
young adult test scores across two African countries. Our results closely mirror
those of Duncan et al., 2007, who used data from the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom to show that math skills at school entry were a stronger
predictor of later achievement than language skills3.
Apart from contributing to the literature on the persistence of academic skills
from school entry to young adulthood, we also examine how second–grade
skills affect school progression. Glick and Sahn, 2010 found that skills in early
primary school (second grade) in 1995–6 were strongly positively associated
with school progression (measured through grade repetition) eight years later.
Similarly, Singh, 2017, using panel data from India found that skills in primary
school increased the likelihood of completing secondary schooling. In our anal-
ysis, we document similar relationships with the added dimension of using data
sets that span a longer period of time, as compared to the aforementioned stud-
ies. This allows us to examine the impact that second grade test scores have on
human capital formation of a cohort of young adults who were last surveyed in
their early twenties, which previous studies have not been able to do.
While the primary focus of our research is on the relationship between
2For a review article on effects of early life attributes on adult outcomes, see Heckman and
Mosso, 2014.
3Our results should be interpreted while keeping in mind that French, which is the language
of instruction in our sample, might not be the first language learned by the children at home.
This contrasts with the case of Duncan et al., 2007, who presented evidence from predominantly
anglophone developed countries where the language of instruction was likely to have been the
same as the primary language at home.
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second–grade skills and human capital outcomes later in life, we are also in-
terested in the role played by health in determining later–life outcomes. There-
fore, we include height in our models to examine the role of childhood health in
shaping adult outcomes. The additional benefit of including height in our mod-
els is that it controls for the confounding effect it could have on our primary
question of interest: the relationship between skills in second grade on grade
attainment and academic skills in young adulthood. In this regard, we build
upon the related evidence of the impact of health, measured using adult height,
on human capital formation. Adult height is determined largely by a conflu-
ence of genetic and environmental factors, especially in–utero and during the
first 24 months of life (Tanner, 1979, Strauss, 1997, Currie and Vogl, 2013). It has
been found to be strongly associated with a variety of adult socioeconomic out-
comes (Case and Paxson, 2008a, Lundborg et al., 2014, Vogl, 2014, Sohn, 2015,
LaFave and Thomas, 2017). Case and Paxson, 2008a found a strong relationship
between adult height and earnings, with the pathway being higher cognitive
skills of taller individuals, leading them to select into occupations with higher
earnings. Lundborg et al., 2014 also found that height at age 18 has a significant
impact on wages, even after controlling for cognitive and noncognitive skills in
Sweden. Similarly, Vogl, 2014 and Sohn, 2015 found a large height premium in
wages in Mexico and Indonesia, respectively4.
In our work we also control for family background, particularly wealth and
parental education, as they play a critical role in the process of mental and phys-
ical development. In doing so, our paper builds on the literature that provides
4With respect to childhood height, it has not only been shown to be a strong determinant
of adult height ( Case and Paxson, 2008b), but Alderman et al., 2006 reported that childhood
health status (as measured by height–for–age) had a positive impact on completed schooling as
an adult. Behrman et al., 2014 also found that height–for–age at age six affected adult cognitive
skills, and further made the point that excluding height from a cognitive production function
will result in the overestimation of the effect of schooling on cognitive ability.
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strong evidence of parents education affecting grade progression and academic
skills of their children, both in developing and developed countries (Cunha and
Heckman, 2007, Todd and Wolpin, 2007, Cunha et al., 2010, Glick et al., 2011,
Behrman et al., 2014, Jones et al., 2014, Marchetta and Sahn, 2016, Behrman
et al., 2017). In the context of India, Helmers and Patnam, 2011 found that
parental investment had an impact on skill levels of children of primary school
age or lower. Glick et al., 2011 and Jones et al., 2014 used data from sub-Saharan
African countries to find that parental background plays a significant role in
the determination of childrens ability, and similarly, children of educated (and
nonpoor parents) have been found to perform much better than their peers on
cognitive tests (Dumas and Lambert, 2010).
We also control for wealth by having an asset index in our models – there is
significant evidence that material wellbeing matters for education and cognition
outcomes (Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008, Todd and Wolpin, 2007, Helmers
and Patnam, 2011, Schady et al., 2015). However, in most studies from develop-
ing countries, income, expenditure, or wealth is measured contemporaneously
with the outcome of interest. This association between contemporaneous house-
hold resources and skills needs to be interpreted with caution, since causality
runs in both directions. In contrast to the preponderance of the related litera-
ture, we explore the relationship between wealth (measured by assets) at the
time children were in second grade on their human capital as young adults. Al-
though a causal interpretation is still not possible, especially due to the impact
of unobserved heterogeneity, using wealth lagged 15 years eliminates, at least,
the concern of reverse causality in our context.
To explore the importance of the aforementioned socioeconomic factors,
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height, and skills in second grade on young adult outcomes, we build upon
a standard human capital production function framework (Todd and Wolpin,
2003, 2007, Cunha and Heckman, 2007, Cunha et al., 2010), in which skills are
developed over time and are a function of inputs received by the child, such as
parents education, wealth, and the schooling environment. The unique nature
of our dataset permits us to assess these relationships while controlling for a
variety of household – and school–level factors. We also discuss heterogeneous
effects on dimensions related to gender, height, and household wealth.
Another distinguishing characteristic of our work is that we study these re-
search questions in the context of two sub-Saharan African countries using com-
parable data sets. There is a relative lack of evidence of the type that we present
here with respect to Africa, mostly due to the lack of availability of long–term
panel data sets. It is even more lacking with respect to being able to provide
comparative evidence across countries. Our paper bridges this gap in the liter-
ature.
To strengthen the comparability of our results from Madagascar and Senegal,
we use Item Response Theory (IRT)5 to create joint test score indices for the two
countries. We use these scores to compare performance across the two countries
at two points of time (childhood and adult life). Such comparisons of human
capital formation, especially from developing countries, are quite rare (Jones
et al., 2014, Schady et al., 2015, Singh, 2017). Our analysis is different from these
papers insofar as our data covers a longer time period, effectively spanning the
entire course of the schooling experience from second grade to early adulthood.
We find that human capital in young adulthood is strongly associated with
5Appendix A explains the construction of the IRT scores and how this facilitates comparison
of test scores across the two countries.
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skills in second grade in both countries. We observe heterogeneous effects of
math and French skills in second grade, where math scores have a stronger re-
lationship with later–life outcomes. These results confirm patterns observed
in Duncan et al., 2007. The results also suggest that taller individuals have
higher test scores, evidence similar to that found in Case and Paxson, 2008a
and LaFave and Thomas, 2017. We also find that height plays an important role
in grade attainment among young adults in Senegal, but the coefficient esti-
mate is not statistically significant in the Malagasy case. This coefficient of child
health is obtained after controlling for skills in second grade. In addition, our
results indicate that wealth of the household when children are in second grade
is associated with schooling and skills measured more than 15 years later. Fur-
thermore, we find that parents education matters more in Madagascar than in
Senegal. Finally, our heterogeneity analysis shows that second grade test scores
are more strongly associated with later–life outcomes for shorter individuals
and females, groups that are potentially more vulnerable (akin to the analysis
of Glewwe et al., 2017). This implies that poor performance in second grade is
more detrimental to outcomes as an adult for certain groups, as compared to
others.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
country contexts, while Section 3 expands on the data and some comparative
descriptive statistics on Madagascar and Senegal. In Section 4 we discuss the
conceptual framework and the empirical strategy used. In Section 5 we present
the results and discuss robustness checks in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we
draw conclusions.
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2.2 Context
Our comparative study examines the production of human capital among
young adults in two poor sub–Saharan African countries, Madagascar and
Senegal. Although these countries differ along many dimensions, they share
many similarities. Both are low–income countries that struggle with low school
attainment and primary school completion rates. This is still the case despite
significant improvements in primary school completion rates over the study pe-
riod (1996–2012), from 40 to 59 percent in Senegal and from 31 to 70 percent in
Madagascar. In the same period, gross enrollment rates in primary schools have
also risen, in Senegal from 59 percent to 81 percent, and in Madagascar from 86
percent to 145 percent (WorldBank, 2016). Additionally, in the 1990s, grade rep-
etition and dropout rates were high in both countries (Michaelowa, 2001, Glick
and Sahn, 2010). The educational systems in these countries are modeled after
the French system, and the primary language of instruction is French.
Although children in Madagascar and Senegal are exposed to potentially
similar schooling systems, they differ critically in the opportunities they may
encounter and the extent to which their background matters for their achieve-
ments in later life. Madagascar is an island economy that has experienced al-
most two decades of political turmoil, with average GDP per capita growth be-
ing zero during the period of our study (World Bank 2016). In contrast, Senegal
is one of the more dynamic economies in West Africa, with GDP per capita
growth averaging 1.2 percent from 1995 to 2012. Likewise, the poverty head-
count ratio has increased slightly in Madagascar, to nearly 75 percent in 2010.
However, in Senegal the headcount ratio stood at 47 percent in 2010 (World-
Bank, 2016). Madagascar has lower levels of intergenerational mobility of ed-
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ucation and occupation than does Senegal, as well as most other African coun-
tries (Bossuroy and Cogneau, 2013, Azomahou and Yitbarek, 2016). Further,
Glick et al., 2011 found that parents education and schooling are important de-
terminants of learning in Madagascar. In Senegal, Glick and Sahn, 2009 showed
that, conditional on a childs level of schooling at 14 to 17 years of age, having
better educated parents or a higher level of household resources have only mod-
est benefits for academic performance. They found similar results for school–
level variables.
2.3 Data
The first round of the survey was conducted in 1995–6 in Senegal and in
1997–8 in Madagascar. Math and French tests were administered to children
at the beginning and end of second grade, when the children were between
7 and 10 years of age6. These school–based tests were administered as part
of a multicountry study called the Program on the Analysis of the Confer-
ence of Francophone Ministers of Education, which is referred to by its French
acronym, PASEC7. Both urban and rural communities were included in the
PASEC school–based sample, which was designed to be a nationally represen-
tative selection of schools from communities throughout the country. This in-
volved randomly selecting communities from throughout the country. In cases
where there were multiple schools in the selected community, one school was
chosen at random to be part of the sample. Despite the intention to draw a
6Some children were older or younger because of early or delayed enrollment.
7In French, the study name is Programme danalyse des systmes ducatifs de la Confemen.
They were conducted under the authority of the Conference of Education Ministers for Fran-
cophone Africa, CONFEMEN. For more information on the PASEC, see PASEC (2016) and
Michaelowa, 2001.
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representative sample of students from the entire country, there are two im-
portant qualifications. First, while the communities, and then schools within
the communities were randomly selected, the PASEC tests were school–based
tests, which meant they were were administered only to school–going children.
As with all school-based testing for such national testing programs, as well as
large cross–national surveys such as the Program for International Student As-
sessment (PISA)8, the sample is restricted to those who were enrolled in school.
Hence, the sample is not representative of the entire cohort of children in the rel-
evant age range, since there were some children in each country who had never
been enrolled in school and other children who had left or dropped out of school
before second grade. Second, schools were selected for the sample only if they
had a class size of at least 20 students, although that could include multi–grade
classrooms. In practice, almost all schools in Senegal had sufficient number of
children in the classroom and thus were eligible to be included in the sample,
but, in Madagascar, we found that the smallest and most remote communities
in the country were underrepresented in the sample of schools that was selected
in the mid–1990s.
A subset of the children in the PASEC surveys in Madagascar in 1997–98
and Senegal in 1995–96 were followed up in 2012–13. The 2012–13 data sets are
referred to as the Life Course Transition of Young Adults Surveys. The young
adults were, on average, 22 years old in Madagascar and 24 years old in Senegal
at the time of the surveys in 2012–13. The children in this long–term cohort were
randomly selected from slightly less than half the original clusters included in
the PASEC surveys of the mid–1990s9. Our final sample that spans the period
of over 15 years includes 333 and 447 children who were in second grade in the
8http://www.oecd.org/pisa/test/
9Selecting of subset of communities was necessitated by budgetary constraints at the time.
79
1990s in Madagascar and Senegal, respectively10.
As indicated above, skills assessments, in the form of math and French tests,
were administered in both survey rounds. It should be noted that the tests ad-
ministered in the two countries were either the same or had a subset of com-
mon questions (more details in B.1). However, the tests for children and for
adults were different, reflecting the different periods in the cohort members life
courses. The presence of common questions in the tests administered in the two
countries allows us to construct test scores based on the Item Response Theory
(IRT), using the joint distribution of the two test scores. The parameters of IRT
are estimated jointly for the common items, which renders scores comparable
across the countries for a given time period1112. This enables us to conduct a
descriptive comparison of the test performance across the two countries. Ad-
ditionally, the IRT score also has the benefit of being a cardinal measure of test
performance, as opposed to the more commonly used measure of percentage of
correct answers, which is merely an ordinal measure.
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 plot the cumulative density functions (CDF) of the
test scores for the two time periods, using the IRT estimates from the joint dis-
tribution of the test scores. The distribution of second grade composite scores
(Figure 2.1) for Madagascar first order stochastically dominates the distribution
for Senegal. This pattern holds for both math (Figure 2.2) and French (Figure
2.3) scores separately. By 2012, there had been considerable convergence in the
10The main reason for the smaller sample size in Madagascar is that fewer communities with
PASEC schools were followed up in Madagascar than in Senegal. More information on attrition,
along with robustness checks for attrition, is provided in Appendix C.
11The details of which tests were merely similar, and which were the same, are given in Ap-
pendix A along with the description of the IRT methodology.
12While we can compare the performance across countries, we cannot do so across time. This
is because as the tests administered to adults have no common items with the tests administered
to children.
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distribution of the scores across the countries. In Figure 2.4 we provide descrip-
tive evidence on the relationship between the second grade and early adulthood
scores, using the jointly estimated (comparable) IRT scores. A clear implica-
tion from Figure 2.4 is that the relationship between the second grade and early
adulthood scores is stronger in Senegal than in Madagascar, as the slopes of
the curves are steeper. Furthermore, the narrower confidence bounds further il-
lustrate the strength of this relationship in Senegal, compared to Madagascar13.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the nonparametric relationship of test scores measured
for young adults in relation to height in young adulthood. We can see that, in
both countries, the test scores are increasing in height, implying taller individu-
als did better in cognitive tests as adults. This is similar to the findings of Case
and Paxson, 2008a and LaFave and Thomas, 2017.
While the IRT scores based on the joint distribution are especially useful for
descriptive comparisons of test scores across countries, in the regression anal-
ysis presented below, we employ IRT scores that were estimated separately for
each country. This allows us to better model changes in test scores within coun-
try and across time, since the country–specific IRT scores are a better estimate
of the country–specific measures of ability.
Tables A2.1 present summary statistics of the variables of interest in Senegal
and Madagascar, respectively14. The test score variables are the country–specific
IRT transformations with means close to zero, both in the 1990s and in 2012. In
Senegal the adult sample has completed an average of 9 grades in school, com-
13The larger confidence bounds in the low and high ends of the test score distribution reflect
the fact that there are less observations at the ends of the distributions.
14The sample sizes vary slightly depending on the dependent variable, due to missing obser-
vations in the test scores. The highest grade completed in Madagascar (Senegal) is available for
333 (447) individuals; the 2012 Math scores are available for 318 (447); the 2012 French scores
for 312 (381) individuals; and the joint math and French test scores are available for 310 (381)
individuals in Madagascar.
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pared to 10 grades in Madagascar. In Senegal the sample has a slight majority
of males, whereas in Madagascar, it is the opposite. On average, the Senegalese
sample is 24 years of age, slightly older than the Malagasy sample of 22 years
of age. This is consistent with the second–grade baseline data having been col-
lected two years earlier in Senegal. In addition, the Malagasy sample is roughly
10 cm shorter than the Senegalese sample. The discrepancy is similar to that
found in the DHS data (Subramanian et al., 2011). The difference is large and
is likely to be partially explained by different ethnic compositions of the pop-
ulations, where the largest ethnic groups in Madagascar are of Asian descent.
Additional information on household characteristics were collected in the orig-
inal PASEC surveys conducted in the mid–1990s, including a detailed listing of
all the assets owned by the household. This allows us to create a household
asset index using factor analysis.
One concern with the data sets we use is attrition. We faced the challenge of
returning to communities many years after the original PASEC survey was con-
ducted in the mid–1990s and searching for the original children over 15 years
later. The difficultly of doing so was exacerbated by the exceedingly low living
standards, volatility in economic conditions, and the constant social transforma-
tion in the original communities surveyed. Despite these challenges, we began
by randomly selecting a subset of the communities and a subset of the children
in each community to be included in our follow up surveys. Despite our efforts
to identify as many of the children as possible, the attrition rates in both in Sene-
gal and in Madagascar were just under 50 percent for the 17– and the 15–year
intervals, respectively.
To better understand the implications of this attrition rate, we compared the
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sample of children in the cohort included in our analysis with those in the orig-
inal PASEC samples, recalling that the original surveys conducted in the mid-
1990s were designed to be representative of school–aged children in the coun-
tries. Appendix Table A2.2 show a comparison of means for key variables be-
tween these samples. For Senegal, the children in the panel had slightly lower
second–grade test scores on average than the children not in the panel, and they
also came from households with slightly lower asset scores. For Madagascar,
the children interviewed in second grade, and as adults, came from households
with slightly less wealth. These individuals are also slightly younger than the
overall sample. In Madagascar, however, we see no systematic differences in
test scores. We find that the differences arise from the fact that an attempt was
not made to reach all communities in the follow–up, rather than arising from at-
trition within a community (Tables A2.3 and A2.4). To alleviate concerns related
to attrition and sample selection, we conducted a robustness check of our results
by estimating inverse probability weighted regressions, where the weights are
calculated based on the estimated probability of being in a community that was
included in our follow–up surveys. This check is based on different character-
istics in the baseline data. This is discussed in detail in Section 6. The results
from this exercise show that the results are robust to the attrition and sample
selection-related adjustment.
Despite the checks intended to alleviate concerns over attrition and sample
selection for follow–up, we want to emphasize that we do not make any claims
regarding our cohort being representative of the entire population in the age
group of the cohorts in the two countries. This is because, as noted above, this
is a school–based sample where children in second grade were administered
these tests. Therefore, by design, the sample excludes children who had not
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completed at least one year of schooling at the time of the first survey and those
from the smallest, most remote villages in Madagascar. We note, however, that
we have a unique, long–term panel data set from two developing sub–Saharan
African countries where we were able to follow individuals cognitive ability, as
measured by test scores, from second grade until young adulthood and explain
the evolution of scores with information on socioeconomic background. There-
fore, despite the recognized limitations in terms of sample size and attrition,
there is much to learn from these data sets15.
2.4 Conceptual framework
In this section, we first present a simple theoretical framework of the cognitive
production function, and then, present the empirical framework that we use to
estimate it.
2.4.1 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework builds on the work of Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007,
which is also the analytical point of departure of Aubery and Sahn, 2014, Fiorini
and Keane, 2014, Singh, 2017. We also draw on literature, studying the relation-
ship between height and later–life outcomes, which for the most part, finds a
strong association between height and cognitive skills in adulthood (Case and
Paxson, 2008b, LaFave and Thomas, 2017).
15We should note that other panels of this type of duration and detail from developing coun-
tries, such as the Guatemalan studies ( Grajeda et al., 2005, Behrman et al., 2014) and Young
Lives studies (see link), suffer from similar attrition problems. For a discussion, see Alderman
et al., 2001
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Considering childhood and adulthood as two periods of life, the following
would be a simple illustration of the two–period mechanism pertaining to grade
attainment
Y2 = f (β1A1 (µ0) + β2P1 + β3H2 (n1, µo) + β4S 1) (2.1)
where the grade attainment Y2 in Period 2 is a function of cognitive ability
A1, and height H2 in Period 2, which is largely determined by cumulative
health/nutritional endowments and socioeconomic factors (particularly, in the
first few years of life) denoted by n1 (Martorell and Habicht, 1986b). Also, both
ability and height are functions of a genetic component, o, at the time of concep-
tion. In Period 1, S 1 denotes the school inputs and P1 denotes parental invest-
ments, including factors such as household wealth and the education of parents.
If expressed in the form of skill accumulation, the model is
A2 = g (γ1A1 (µ0) + γ2P1 + γ3H2 (n1, µo) + γ4S 1) (2.2)
2.4.2 Empirical Framework
The simplest empirical counterpart of equation 2.1 is a reduced form model,
which can be estimated using an OLS model:
Yi,2012 = βo + β1Ai,1996 + β2Heighti,2012 + β3HHi + β5Xi + γ j + εi (2.3)
In this regression, Yi,2012 stands for the highest grade attained by the cohort mem-
ber in 2012, and Ai,1996 stands for a measure of childhood skills, which in our case
is measured using math and French scores at the beginning and end of second
grade (called pretest and posttest, respectively). The time index used in equa-
tion 2.3 is 1996, which is the year corresponding to the Senegal data, while in the
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Madagascar data it is 1998. Heighti,2012 refers to height measured in early adult-
hood in 2012, which is a function of both health inputs received over the life
course, particularly, in utero and in early childhood, as well as genetics (Mar-
torell and Habicht, 1986b). We include it in our model, as evidence suggests
that adult height is strongly related to outcomes in adulthood; thus, omitting
height from the model could potentially lead to inflated coefficient estimates for
other covariates in the model (Case and Paxson, 2008b, LaFave and Thomas,
2017). HHi is a vector of household–level (time–invariant) inputs; γ j are school
fixed effects, corresponding to school j; and Xi denotes time–invariant control
variables.
Estimating equation 2.2 leads to a very similar reduced form regression:
Ai,2012 = βo + β1Ai,1996 + β2Heighti,2012 + β3HHi + β4Xi + γ j + εi (2.4)
Our dependent variables Ai,2012 are performances on French and math tests in
2012. We model these test score outcomes individually, as well as a composite
score.
This setup is analogous to a value–added (VA) specification in which current
test scores are regressed on earlier period outcomes and other determinants. Al-
though value–added models have primarily been used to analyze skill acquisi-
tion from one grade to another, often focusing on estimating teacher and school
characteristics and quality of learning, our paper differs in an important way:
we are interested in explaining skills in early adulthooda time during which
the cohort is no longer in school using skills from a previous period (second
grade)16. Since our empirical specification includes lagged inputs and lagged
16See Fiorini and Keane, 2014 for an overview of different specifications of VA models to
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achievement, it can therefore be thought of as a combination of the cumulative
and value–added models, as described in Fiorini and Keane, 2014. It generalizes
the value–added (VA) model, which was preferred in Todd and Wolpin, 2007,
because it minimized the out–of–sample root mean squared error17. Although
our framework is statistically equivalent to a VA model with lagged inputs, it
differs conceptually, as the time period between our waves is fairly large, 15–17
years.
Our model takes school inputs into account through the inclusion of school
fixed effects. Each individual is assigned to the school that he/she attended
in second grade. The school fixed effects control for all time–invariant,
school–level factors, as well as class-level, time–invariant unobservables, as
our data has only one class per school. The fixed effects also control for time–
invariant, community–level factors, due to the one–to–one correspondence be-
tween schools and communities. Consequently, our empirical specification
compares children who attended the same school (and class) when in second
grade, after controlling for other household and individual covariates. Hence, it
is likely that the children were exposed to roughly the same socioeconomic and
environmental factors in their childhood, thus making the comparisons even
more relevant. We include in the models the asset index of the household where
the young adult lived when in the second grade. The coefficient can then be in-
terpreted the effect of wealth in early childhood on later–life outcomes. We also
use height in early adulthood, a proxy for the lifetime cumulative health status
(but predominantly influenced by the period from conception to 24 months of
explain cognitive skill formation for school–aged children with contemporaneous and lagged
inputs.
17In addition, Fiorini and Keane, 2014 also discussed data intensiveness of these procedures
and the associated sample size issues in their analysis. We also face similar challenges but still
end with nearly the same sample size as their specifications.
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age) on young adult test scores. Additionally, we control for some individual–
specific attributes, such as parents education, which further reduces concerns
regarding omitted variables in this specification.
We measure childhood academic ability of the individual using second–
grade math and French test scores. We obtain information on scores of pretests
that were administered to students at the start of second grade (1995 in Senegal
and 1997 in Madagascar), and posttests that were administered at the end of sec-
ond grade (1996 in Senegal and 1998 in Madagascar). In addition to capturing
the role of cognitive ability and genetic factors that contribute to test perfor-
mance in the second grade, these early–life test scores are a function of house-
hold and school inputs that the children received from the time of conception
until the second–grade test was conducted. Although we have a choice of us-
ing scores from tests conducted at the start and end of the school year, we use
the latter in our specifications, because the tests are comparable across the two
countries. We also show models with composite scores (using both the pretests
and posttests) during second grade as a robustness check (2.9).
We also estimate a model with only lagged inputs, as well as a model that
excludes lagged test scores, which in Todd and Wolpin, 2007 and Fiorini and
Keane, 2014 is referred to as the cumulative model. This model assumes that
the lagged inputs incorporate the innate ability and unobserved inputs. Our
estimations clearly show that this is not the preferred specification, as the lagged
test scores are statistically significant18.
18Another potential specification for studying the effect of lagged inputs on skills in early
adulthood is to employ a fixed effects framework, as in Fiorini and Keane, 2014. The underlying
assumption is that the lagged coefficient of the test score is equal to one (Singh, 2017). Our
results show that this is not a valid assumption, as the coefficient estimates are much lower, as
in Singh, 2017 and Fiorini and Keane, 2014; but more important, this approach is not feasible
due to the fact that we do not have time–varying inputs in our regressions.
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In the main specifications, we use test score variables that are created based
on Item Response Theory (IRT). We use this method to create three separate
sets of test scores for each round of survey in each countrymath, French, and
composite scores. In latter specifications, we explore whether math and French
test scores obtained during the second grade are equally strong predictors for
adult skills, or if, as found in some literature from the predominantly English–
speaking world, math ability is a stronger predictor of skills in later life (Duncan
et al., 2007, 2011).
2.4.3 Correcting for Measurement Error
We can only control for the observed individual, household, and school factors;
thus, unobserved factors are part of the error term. These unobserved factors
might in turn be correlated with both our outcome of interest (such as later–life
schooling) and the childhood test scores, thus leading to endogeneity bias. It is
important to note that the previously discussed instrumental variable strategy
does not necessarily correct for this endogeneity bias and simply addresses sys-
tematic measurement errors. Thus, similar to other papers that have looked at
childhood ability and how it affects outcomes in adult life, we rely on an im-
portant set of controls to at least mitigate endogeneity concerns. While we ac-
knowledge the possibility of endogeneity in our specification, we also note that
several recent papers, which have compared value–added estimates of the type
explored here and estimates from experimental or quasi–experimental analy-
ses, have mostly concluded that the non–experimental estimates are unbiased,
when compared with estimates from experiments (Angrist et al., 2013, Kane
et al., 2013, Deming et al., 2014, Deming, 2014). Also, the long duration of our
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panel mitigates concerns related to endogeneity and, to our knowledge, there is
no research that covers this large a span of time that has fully addressed these
endogeneity concerns, and which could only be done if there was some sort of
experimental design implemented during the original time periodin our case,
the mid 1990s. To further assuage concerns related to this issue, we conduct a
variety of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Highest Grade Attained
First, we turn our attention to the models in Tables 2.1a and 2.1b, in which we
show the relationship between second–grade test scores and the highest grade
attained by young adults in Senegal and Madagascar, respectively. It should
be noted that the highest grade attained might be different from the number
of years of schooling. This is because repetition of grades is quite common in
the two countries in our sample, as it is the case in most African countries that
follow the French educational model. The first column of Tables 2.1a and 2.1b
display the results from OLS regressions using a single covariate, the composite
French and math score from the second–grade posttest. As pointed out previ-
ously, the test score variables have been created using IRT; thus, the test score
mean and standard deviation are close to zero and one, respectively. In Senegal,
a second–grade composite test score one standard deviation above the mean is
associated with an increase in the highest grade attained by around 1.64 years.
In Madagascar, the corresponding coefficient is 0.99 (Table 2.1b, column 1). Both
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of these coefficients are significant at the one percent level.
In columns 2 through 5, we introduce school fixed effects into the model.
School fixed effects account for all time–invariant school characteristics and,
hence, control for school–specific factors that impact young adult–life cognitive
scores. As noted earlier, since each community had one school, the school fixed
effects can also be thought of as community–level fixed effects. The coefficients
in column (2) change little relative to column (1), remaining significant at the
one per cent level in both countries.
In columns (3) and (4), we add a series of household and individual covari-
ates. They do not lead to noteworthy changes in the coefficient of the second–
grade test scores in either country and the test score coefficient remains strongly
statistically significant (at 1 percent level) in these specifications. The fathers ed-
ucation level has a positive relationship with grade attainment in Madagascar,
with the mothers education having a modest additional effect. In Senegal, the
average level of parents education is low, so we use dummies for whether each
parent has any education, instead of using a continuous measure19. The results
for Senegal indicate that parents education has a positive, albeit statistically in-
significant, relationship with grade attainment.
The second–grade household asset index, created using factor analysis, has
a large positive and significant association with the highest grade attained in
Senegal. We find that an increase of one unit in the asset index raises schooling
by around 0.50 years in Senegal. In Madagascar, we do not see any significant
effects of assets in early childhood. This might be because of the lower over-
all level of assets in households in Madagascar, as compared to those in Sene-
19In Senegal, mothers education is 1.3 years and fathers 2.7 years, on average. In Madagascar,
mothers and fathers have 5.6 and 6.2 years of education, respectively.
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gal20. It could also be that the coefficient estimate of the asset index is insignif-
icant, because the regressions already control for parental education, which is
an important determinant of living standards of the household21. We also tried
adding interaction terms of the second–grade scores with assets and parents
educationthese variables were not significant and therefore omitted from the
specifications reported here.
In columns (4) and (5), we add the height of the cohort member into the
model. As discussed in Case and Paxson, 2008a, Vogl, 2014, LaFave and
Thomas, 2017, height is a proxy measure of childhood health and nutritional
status, particularly, as affected by in utero and early childhood inputs. Results
indicate that, in both countries, the coefficient on second–grade test scores is
largely unaffected by the inclusion of height. In Senegal, height has a signifi-
cant positive relationship with highest grade attained, whereas in Madagascar
the coefficient albeit positive, is much smaller in magnitude and not significant.
Our results indicate that being 1 cm taller is associated with an increase of 0.04
years of schooling in Senegal. The fact that we find that the relationship of early
childhood and adult test scores is not affected by the inclusion of the height vari-
able shows that early–life health and human capital (measured by test scores)
have independent effects on adult outcomes22. This is largely consistent with
the current literature, which found a statistically significant effect of height on
human capital formation (Persico et al., 2004, Case and Paxson, 2008a, 2010,
Spears, 2012).
20Summary statistics on the number of assets owned are available from the authors by re-
quest.
21The coefficient of the asset index is significant when we remove the parental education
variable.
22In the case of Madagascar, we have also run the model controlling for ethnicity, which
should be correlated with height, given that there is a mix of ethnic groups that are both Asian
and African in origin. The results remain similar, when ethnicity is controlled for. Results are
available from the authors by request.
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As explained earlier, the second–grade test score suffers from idiosyncratic
measurement error problems, which could lead to a biased estimate of its co-
efficient. In column (5) of Tables 2.1a and 2.1b, we report the results from the
IV strategy that corrects for this measurement error by instrumenting the com-
posite test score taken at the end of second grade with the score on the test
administered at the beginning of second grade. The F–statistic for the excluded
instrument (labeled widstat) is 254.8 in Senegal and 82.7 in Madagascar, which
is well above the conventional threshold of 10 considered for weak instruments.
The magnitudes of the IV coefficients of the impact of composite test scores
on grade attainment are similar in both countries, 1.38 and 1.29 for Senegal and
Madagascar, respectively. Thus, the IV results portray a consistent narrative
of a significant positive relationship between second–grade test scores and ed-
ucational achievement later in life. It is not clear, however, why the idiosyn-
cratic measurement error correction matters more in Madagascar than in Sene-
gal. This may reflect the fact that the measurement error correction seems to
work better with the pretest conducted in Madagascar than it does with that
in Senegal, or that there might have been greater measurement error in Mada-
gascar to start with. In addition, the difference in the correction from the IV can
also stem from the fact that the questions in the pretests (used as the instrument)
differed across the two countries.
2.5.2 Test Scores
In Tables 2.2a and 2.2b, we estimate the relationship between second–grade test
scores and adult composite French and math test scores (columns 1 and 2), as
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well as math (columns 3 and 4) and French separately (columns 5 and 6). The
findings in these tables are consistent with the results discussed previously in
terms of grade attainment: second–grade cognitive ability has a strong and per-
sistent association with later–life skills. More specifically, columns 1 and 2 show
evidence of a robust positive and statistically significant relationship between
second–grade skills and later–life composite French and math scores in Sene-
gal and Madagascar. Consistent with the attainment models, the magnitude on
the test score parameter rises in Madagascar when we adjust for measurement
error using IV regressions (column 2). The results in the IV model in column
2 of Tables 2.a and 2.b show that a 1 standard deviation increase in composite
scores in second grade is associated with higher adult composite scores by 0.27
and 0.32 standard deviation in Senegal and Madagascar, respectively. The re-
sults for Senegal are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, whereas the
Madagascar results are significant at the 5 percent level.
As expected, results in Table 2.2a suggest that, in Senegal, the assets of the
household when the cohort member was in the second grade is positively and
significantly associated with later–life cognition, even after controlling for par-
ents education. A standard deviation increase in the asset index is associated
with an increase in the composite test score of 0.14 standard deviation. In Mada-
gascar, although the asset index coefficient is positive in all the models, it is not
statistically significant. Mothers education has a positive and marginally signif-
icant relationship with the composite test score in Madagascar.
We observe similar patterns in the results in columns 3 through 6 in Tables
2.2a and 2.2b, in which the individual scores on 2012 math and French tests
are modeled separately. Childhood skills have a statistically significant positive
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association with both adult math and adult French scores in Senegal and Mada-
gascar. However, the coefficient estimate is far stronger in the case of math
than for French23. Overall, the results describe a situation in which childhood
test scores are strongly and persistently associated with later–life human capital
outcomes. These relationships hold even after the addition of control variables,
the introduction of an IV strategy to correct for measurement error, and the use
of school fixed effects. Thus, we provide persuasive evidence of the importance
of better performance on tests in as early as second grade on adult human capi-
tal outcomes.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity tests
Differential results of French and math scores
In order to explore another dimension of the relationships discussed above, we
replicate the regressions using a slightly modified empirical strategy. Instead of
using the composite math and French scores in childhood, we enter the math
and French scores separately as independent variables in different regression
models. In the corresponding IV regressions, we use the French (math) test
administered before second grade as an instrument for the French (math) test
scores taken at the end of second grade24.
We are motivated to do so because math and French tests potentially capture
different types of abilities. Previous research has found that math skills in child-
23Using the z–scores of the percentage of correct answers as a dependent variable yields very
similar results to the ones presented here. This is due to the fact that the z–scores and the IRT
scores are very highly correlated. The results are available from the authors by request.
24The results are qualitatively similar if we were to use the pretest as the independent variable
and the posttest as the instrument. The results are available from the authors by request.
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hood are stronger predictors of later–life skills than language skills, although
this evidence is from predominantly English–speaking countries (Duncan et al.,
2007, 2011). Our results show that there is a strong and positive association of
highest grade attained with second-grade math scores in both countries (Tables
2.3a and 2.3b, column 1). This is consistent with our main results, based on us-
ing the composite score (Tables 2.1a and 2.1b). In Senegal, a standard deviation
increase in the second–grade math score is associated with an increase in high-
est grade attained by 1.4 years, whereas the corresponding coefficient estimate
in Madagascar is 1.18 years (column 2 of Tables 2.3a and 2.3b, respectively).
In the first two columns of Tables 2.4a and 2.4b, we present similar evidence
on the relationship between second–grade French scores and later–life grade
attainment. The relationship between a 1 standard deviation increase in the
second-grade French test score and highest grade attained is around 1.6 and
1.7 years in Senegal and Madagascar, respectively (column 2 in Tables 2.4a and
2.4b). These coefficient estimates are similar to the results that use the composite
test score (Tables 2.1a and 2.1b).
In columns 3 to 8 of Tables 2.3a, 2.3b, 2.4a, and 2.4b, we run similar mod-
els, but this time the dependent variables are scores on the composite, math,
and French tests in the second grade, respectively. In Senegal, the French score
has a statistically significant association with all cognition outcomes, while the
magnitudes are similar to the coefficients we get from the main specifications
(Tables 2.1a and 2.1b). The results with second–grade French tests are relatively
weaker in Madagascar (Table 2.4b). These results suggest that childhood math
scores are stronger predictors of later–life math scores of later–life French scores,
particularly in Senegal. Additionally, childhood math scores predict later–life
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French scores better than childhood French scores do, in the case of Madagascar.
For Senegal, adult French scores are equally well predicted by both childhood
French and math scores. In sum, there is some evidence that the math scores
are driving the strong relationship between composite scores (math and French)
and later–life outcomes in Madagascar (Table 2.1b). We also note that the impor-
tance of other background characteristics is similar in the models when math,
French, and composite scores from early childhood are used as covariates in the
model.
Gender Differences
We also explore whether there are any gender differences in the relationship be-
tween childhood skills and later-life outcomes by running separate models for
boys and girls. The results in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b indicate that the test score co-
efficient differs in magnitude between girls and boys in both countries. Across
all outcomes in both countries, the coefficient for the childhood test score is
consistently higher for girls than for boys. This gender difference is especially
pronounced in Senegal. We conduct a t–test to check for the equality of the test
score coefficients in the male and female regressions and reject the null of equal-
ity of coefficients in one case in Madagascar and in two cases in Senegal. The
evidence that childhood performance is potentially more persistent in its impact
on later–life cognitive ability for girls implies larger negative consequences for
girls who fall behind in early grades. In other words, catching up from early
cognitive deficits may be harder for girls, as compared to boys in both Mada-
gascar and Senegal.
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Height Differences
We next divide the sample into two groups based on whether the cohort mem-
bers height falls above or below the median gender–specific height in each coun-
try (Tables 2.6a and 2.6b). In Senegal, the second–grade test score coefficient in
the grade attainment models for the below–median group (relatively shorter) is
greater than the coefficient in the above–median group (relatively taller). These
differences, however, are not statistically significant. In Madagascar, the pat-
terns are similar, but, again, we do not find statistically significant differences in
the coefficient on test scores of the two groups of relatively shorter/taller cohort
members. Taken together, these results provide some suggestive evidence that
there is greater persistence in test scores from childhood to adulthood among
shorter individuals. To the extent that shorter and less healthy cohort members
are not only more vulnerable in childhood, but also have a higher persistence
in their poor performance over time, the result suggests early deficits are un-
likely to be overcome unless concerted investment/effort is expended to correct
them25.
2.6 Robustness Checks
2.6.1 Accounting for Attrition and Sample Selection
The attrition rates and sample selection described in Section 2 might raise a con-
cern that our results could be driven by some form of sample selection. There-
25Due to the large ethnic diversity in Madagascar, we also ran the model in Madagascar that
controlled for ethnicity. The results are qualitatively similar and not reported here.
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fore, in Appendix C, we investigate the robustness of our findings to adjust-
ments for attrition and sample selection for the follow–up. Recall from our dis-
cussion above that only a subset of the communities was randomly selected for
follow–up, but this selection process does not necessarily ensure that they are
representative of the original communities. First, in Table A2.2 we test whether
there are systematic differences between the sample of observations in the panel
and the full sample of students at baseline. In the balance test, we include a
number of school–level covariates, available from the PASEC surveys, to check
whether the school environments differ across the full baseline sample and the
panel sample. We only find modest differences, mostly in the Senegalese sam-
ple. To control for these differences, we run school fixed effects models, which
account for all time–invariant, school–specific characteristics.
In Tables A2.3 and A2.4, we compare other subsamples. Table A2.3 com-
pares the means for observations in clusters chosen for follow-up with the full
sample of students at baseline. We find that, for both countries, the results in
Table A2.3 are similar to the ones that we found in Table A2.2, which are ac-
counted for by the school fixed effects. However, we find no systematic mean
differences within the clusters that were chosen for follow–up (Table CA2.4).
That is, individuals reached and not reached within the communities that were
chosen for the follow–up were very similar at baseline. To conclude, the bal-
ance checks presented in Tables A2.2–A2.4 show that, insofar as there are dif-
ferences between the baseline PASEC sample and the panel subsample, they are
driven by the geographical differences arising from the fact that only a subset of
PASEC communities were included in the follow–up, and not due to differences
between individuals that were reached and not reached within the selected com-
munities. This finding applies for both countries.
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Second, we estimate Inverse Probability Weighted (IPW) regressions, to ac-
count for these differences in the panel subsample and the full sample at base-
line. These weights are obtained from a logistic regression and use a dummy
variable denoting the probability of being in the panel sample as the dependent
variable. This model contains a variety of household – and individual–level
covariates from the full sample of the first round of data as covariates26. This
specification is run using the baseline data, and the predicted probabilities are
used as weights in the main regression to check their robustness to this adjust-
ment. Table A2.5 replicate results of Tables 1.a and 1.b, columns 1–5, for Senegal
and Madagascar, respectively, using the sample adjusted with the inverse prob-
ability weights. A comparison of Tables 2.1a and A2.5 shows that the results
for the highest grade obtained in Senegal are consistent in sign, significance,
and value, even after the aforementioned attrition adjustment. A comparison of
2.1b and A2.5 shows that the magnitudes are very similar in the case of Mada-
gascar as well, and that most of the statistical significance levels also remain
the same. The pattern of the results is similar for the test score outcome vari-
ables (comparing Tables 2.2a and 2.2b with A2.5, columns 6–8). The fact that
the results do not change considerably when adjustments are made for attrition
and sample selection demonstrates the robustness of this relationship across the
two countries, despite small differences in the samples between the full original
sample from the PASEC surveys in the mid–1990s, and the long panel of cohort
members that we were able to track over the 17–year interval in Senegal.
We do a similar analysis to study attrition from within the clusters chosen
for follow–up. More specifically, we run the IPW regressions (described above)
26Namely, the test scores of the second grade, gender, asset index, a school–level infrastruc-
ture index constructed with factor analysis, and the education level of the teacher. Observations
with a missing weight have been given the average IPW weight.
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based on the weights from a logistic model, which estimates the probability of
being in the panel sample, conditional on being in a community that was cho-
sen for the follow–up. The results are presented in Table A2.6 for Senegal and
Madagascar, respectively. A comparison with Tables 2.1a and 2.1b shows that
the results are robust to attrition in both countriesthe coefficient estimates of
the grade attained are very similar in both magnitude and significance. Finally,
columns 6–8 in Tables A2.6 confirm also that the coefficient estimates of the test
score variables are similar to those in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b. They show a similar
pattern of math scores being more persistent than French scores in both coun-
tries. Overall, we can conclude that even though the selection of only a subset
of the communities for follow–up introduced some differences across the panel
and the full PASEC sample at baseline, we find that our results are robust to
this sample selection and also to accounting for the fact that the follow–up only
included a subset of the children in the communities that were visited again.
2.6.2 Corrections based on Lewbel, 2012
In another robustness check, we complement our main IV strategy that is cor-
recting for measurement error with a novel methodological approach. Lewbel,
2012 described an empirical framework in which the IV strategy exploits het-
eroskedasticity, in place of imposing the standard exclusion restrictions in the
two–stage least squares framework. There are two main conditions that need to
be satisfied to be able to apply this model: the presence of at least one exogenous
variable in the structural equation and the heteroskedasticity of the error terms.
This set of exogenous variables (Z) could be a subset of the independent vari-
ables (X) or could be the same as them. Under this method, one regresses each
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endogenous regressor on the set of exogenous variables. The residuals from
these regressions are used along with the demeaned set of exogenous variables
to construct generated instruments. This estimation framework is similar in na-
ture to other approaches in which heteroskedasticity has been used as a source
of identification (King et al., 1994, Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998, Sentana and
Fiorentini, 2001 among others).
In our case, we present results using the pretest and the generated instru-
ments as instrumental variables in our model27. The inclusion of an extra instru-
ment allows us to conduct the Sargan–Hansen overidentification test. Under the
null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, the test has a chi–square dis-
tribution. We are unable to compute this statistic in our main tables, because the
IV models are exactly identified, that is, the number of instruments is equal to
the number of endogenous regressors. The usage of the Lewbel, 2012 method
allows us to conduct this test as the generated instruments make the model
overidentified. These results can be compared to the IV regression results in
Tables 2.1a–2.2b, which use only the pretest as an instrument.
The results in Table 8 indicate that the addition of the generated instrument
using this method does not significantly alter the IV results. This is especially
the case in Senegal, where the coefficient estimate of the test score on all the
outcomes remains relatively stable (as compared to Tables 2.1a and 2.2a) and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The results for Madagascar lose a
little bit of statistical significance but still retain the correct sign and are of a simi-
lar magnitude as the IV results in Tables 2.1b and 2.2b. In addition, the J–statistic
p–value shows that the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions is
valid for all outcomes across both countries. Therefore, we conclude that our
27We do not present the models with only the generated instruments.
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main IV specification, employed to correct for measurement error, is robust to
the Lewbel, 2012 instrumental variables strategy.
2.7 Conclusions
We find persuasive evidence of a strong association of childhood academic skills
with those measured in early adult life in two francophone sub–Saharan African
countries, Senegal and Madagascar. Using a production function framework for
human capital, we find that composite math and French test scores, measured in
the second grade, have large and significant positive associations with the high-
est grade attained, as well as math and French test scores in young adulthood in
both countries. This enduring relationship is stronger in the case of Senegal, as
compared to Madagascar; we also find that childhood math scores are stronger
predictors of later–life cognitive outcomes, as compared to childhood French
scores. This finding is consistent with results reported elsewhere that indicate
certain types of abilities in childhood are more important in predicting human
capital outcomes later in life.
We also explore whether lifetime cumulative health, measured using adult
height, is significantly associated with adult human capital, and whether its
inclusion in the models affects the strength of the relationship between second–
grade test scores and adult cognition. We only find statistically significant co-
efficient estimates of height in Senegal, although in Madagascar, the sign and
magnitude of the coefficient is quite similar. Despite the inclusion of height,
the aforementioned relationships between childhood test scores and later– life
schooling and skills are persistent and found to operate through independent
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channels.
The results we report are robust to the addition of other childhood inputs,
namely parental education and asset levels when the cohort member was in the
second grade, as well as school fixed effects. Parental inputs have an indepen-
dent relationship with early adulthood outcomes in both countries. Household
assets measured in second grade have a significant positive association with
adulthood outcomes, even controlling for early test scores and other variables
in Senegal and whereas in Madagascar, parents education matters more.
We also run a series of heterogeneity tests and find that there are larger neg-
ative consequences for girls who fall behind in early grades. We similarly find
that shorter and less healthy cohort members have a higher persistence in their
poor cognitive performance over time. In other words, catching up from early
cognitive deficits may be harder for girls and unhealthy children. In contrast,
low levels of assets early in life do not seem to imply that children from rela-
tively richer households are better able to sustain their better performance in
second grade later into life.
Additionally, we discuss challenges that arose, due to the ambitions of exam-
ining test scores over a span of more than 15 years, including issues of attrition,
as well the potential for measurement error. By employing techniques, such as
estimating inverse probability weighted regressions, and employing the Lew-
bel, 2012 instrumental variable method, we show that our results are robust to
these potential issues.
While we do not directly address policies to improve cognitive outcomes of
young adults, our results imply that childhood academic skills are a powerful
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predictor of young adulthood human capital outcomes. In turn, this implies that
policies should target preschool–aged children who are lagging behind other
children in terms of their skills and health status, and that such interventions
are particularly important for young girls (and shorter individuals) who seem
less able to catch up from early academic disadvantage.
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2.8 Tables
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Table 2.1a: Highest grade completed as a function of childhood composite French and math scores – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Second Grade Composite Score 1.645*** 1.783*** 1.728*** 1.695*** 1.380***
(0.185) (0.207) (0.194) (0.195) (0.310)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.042* 0.045**
(0.023) (0.021)
Assets in second grade 0.495* 0.487* 0.549**
(0.285) (0.285) (0.271)
Mother’s Education (dummy) 0.616 0.473 0.459
(0.582) (0.596) (0.559)
Father’s Education (dummy) 0.331 0.285 0.285
(0.516) (0.516) (0.481)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.496*** -0.498*** -0.497***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.074)
Female -0.151 0.262 0.227
(0.330) (0.406) (0.380)
Total Obs. 447 447 447 447 447
R-squared 0.143 0.349 0.413 0.419 0.235
F-stat (instrument) 254.8
Second grade denotes the year 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All test scores are constructed using
country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years. Mothers and fathers education are continuous
variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any education. Household asset index is constructed
using factor analysis. The F–stat denotes the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
107
Table 2.1b: Highest grade completed as a function of childhood composite French and math scores – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Second Grade Composite Score 0.993*** 0.716*** 0.666*** 0.665*** 1.285***
(0.193) (0.273) (0.232) (0.232) (0.462)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.019 0.019
(0.02) (0.018)
Assets in second grade -0.063 -0.059 -0.119
(0.246) (0.248) (0.242)
Mother’s Education 0.09* 0.087 0.077
(0.053) (0.053) (0.05)
Father’s Education 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.137***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.045)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.707*** -0.711*** -0.733***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.113)
Female -0.267 -0.116 -0.096
(0.301) (0.327) (0.300)
Total Obs. 333 333 333 333 333
R–squared 0.085 0.366 0.496 0.498 0.209
F–stat (instrument) 82.7
Second grade denotes the year 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All test scores are constructed using
country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years. Mothers and fathers education are continuous
variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any education. Household asset index is constructed
using factor analysis. The F–stat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.2a: Adult test scores as a function of childhood composite French and math scores – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade Composite Score 0.362*** 0.269*** 0.625*** 0.556*** 0.307*** 0.210***
(0.051) (0.070) (0.08) (0.117) (0.048) (0.068)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Assets in second grade 0.123* 0.141** 0.20* 0.213** 0.134** 0.152**
(0.067) (0.063) (0.105) (0.101) (0.065) (0.061)
Mother’s Education (dummy) -0.078 -0.072 -0.068 -0.071 -0.024 -0.018
(0.145) (0.135) (0.212) (0.199) (0.138) (0.128)
Father’s Education (dummy) 0.016 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.045 0.046
(0.128) (0.118) (0.177) (0.165) (0.128) (0.118)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.057*** -0.058***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.03) (0.028) (0.02) (0.018)
Female 0.072 0.06 -0.069 -0.07 0.101 0.089
(0.106) (0.098) (0.153) (0.142) (0.103) (0.095)
Total Obs. 381 381 447 447 381 381
R-squared 0.351 0.166 0.327 0.193 0.342 0.140
F-stat (instrument) 232.9 254.8 232.9
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.2b: Adult test scores as a function of childhood composite French and math scores – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade Composite Score 0.146** 0.316** 0.154** 0.349** 0.127* 0.26*
(0.064) (0.134) (0.07) (0.139) (0.068) (0.142)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Assets in second grade 0.064 0.052 0.088 0.074 0.019 0.009
(0.07) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.082) (0.077)
Mother’s Education 0.026* 0.023* 0.024 0.021 0.03** 0.028**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Father’s Education 0.017 0.016 -0.002 -0.004 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.057*** -0.058***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.03) (0.028) (0.02) (0.018)
Female -0.029 -0.025 -0.150 -0.143 0.07 0.073
(0.101) (0.092) (0.102) (0.095) (0.107) (0.097)
Total Obs. 310 310 318 318 312 312
R–squared 0.490 0.118 0.377 0.071 0.529 0.133
F–stat (instrument) 57.8 60.01 57.39
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country-specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.3a: Adult test scores as a function of childhood Math scores – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade Grade Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade Math Score 1.383*** 1.406*** 0.284*** 0.267*** 0.532*** 0.566*** 0.223*** 0.211***
(0.202) (0.330) (0.052) (0.077) (0.079) (0.125) (0.048) (0.073)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.041* 0.041* 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.007
(0.023) (0.022) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Assets in second grade 0.575** 0.571** 0.135** 0.138** 0.228** 0.222** 0.147** 0.150**
(0.285) (0.268) (0.068) (0.064) (0.104) (0.100) (0.067) (0.062)
Mother’s Education (Dummy) 0.560 0.563 -0.055 -0.055 -0.033 -0.029 -0.005 -0.005
(0.616) (0.576) (0.146) (0.134) (0.212) (0.197) (0.140) (0.129)
Father’s Education (Dummy) 0.309 0.309 0.011 0.012 0.037 0.038 0.042 0.042
(0.531) (0.493) (0.131) (0.120) (0.183) (0.170) (0.131) (0.120)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.500*** -0.501*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.082) (0.076) (0.021) (0.019) (0.03) (0.028) (0.02) (0.018)
Female 0.397 0.403 0.098 0.093 -0.014 -0.006 0.118 0.115
(0.414) (0.392) (0.107) (0.101) (0.153) (0.145) (0.104) (0.097)
Total Obs. 447 447 381 381 447 447 381 381
R–squared 0.396 0.210 0.323 0.138 0.310 0.173 0.312 0.111
F–stat (instrument) 191.9 169.3 191.9 169.3
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.3b: Adult test scores as a function of childhood composite Math scores – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade Grade Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade Math Score 0.617*** 1.179** 0.161*** 0.356** 0.190*** 0.336* 0.125*** 0.355**
(0.194) (0.471) (0.055) (0.173) (0.061) (0.180) (0.057) (0.173)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.018 0.017 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.02) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Assets in second grade -0.045 -0.09 0.065 0.053 0.088 0.079 0.021 0.007
(0.245) (0.238) (0.069) (0.064) (0.066) (0.060) (0.082) (0.079)
Mother’s Education 0.092* 0.087* 0.027* 0.025* 0.024 0.023 0.031* 0.029*
(0.052) (0.049) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Father’s Education 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.017 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 0.036*** 0.033***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.715*** -0.739*** -0.134*** -0.147*** -0.123*** -0.133*** -0.101*** -0.117***
(0.122) (0.114) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
Female -0.085 -0.038 -0.02 -0.005 -0.14 -0.128 0.076 0.094
(0.329) (0.306) (0.101) (0.094) (0.103) (0.095) (0.107) (0.099)
Total Obs. 333 333 310 310 318 318 312 312
R–squared 0.500 0.210 0.496 0.112 0.388 0.093 0.531 0.099
F–stat (instrument) 51.28 45.16 45.84 44.94
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.4a: Adult test scores as a function of childhood composite French scores – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade Grade Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade French Score 1.652*** 1.592*** 0.363*** 0.333*** 0.595*** 0.650*** 0.327*** 0.251***
(0.203) (0.409) (0.052) (0.099) (0.081) (0.157) (0.050) (0.096)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.048** 0.049** 0.008 0.008 0.014* 0.014* 0.007 0.007
(0.023) (0.021) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Assets in second grade 0.511* 0.522* 0.136** 0.140** 0.211** 0.201* 0.141** 0.153**
(0.293) (0.286) (0.069) (0.064) (0.108) (0.106) (0.066) (0.062)
Mother’s Education (Dummy) 0.439 0.437 -0.083 -0.081 -0.081 -0.080 -0.030 -0.024
(0.600) (0.558) (0.150) (0.137) (0.220) (0.204) (0.140) (0.129)
Father’s Education (Dummy) 0.220 0.222 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.042 0.044
(0.516) (0.479) (0.128) (0.117) (0.178) (0.164) (0.127) (0.117)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.059*** -0.059***
(0.081) (0.075) (0.021) (0.019) (0.031) (0.029) (0.02) (0.018)
Female 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.030 -0.153 -0.154 0.066 0.065
(0.414) (0.386) (0.108) (0.099) (0.156) (0.145) (0.104) (0.095)
Total Obs. 447 447 381 381 447 447 381 381
R–squared 0.405 0.221 0.343 0.163 0.308 0.171 0.344 0.148
F–stat (instrument) 121.4 101.3 121.4 101.3
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.4b: Adult test scores as a function of childhood French scores – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade Grade Composite Composite Math Math French French
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Second Grade French Score 0.424 1.696 0.047 0.303 0.006 0.420* 0.083 0.208
(0.265) (0.876) (0.075) (0.215) (0.081) (0.232) (0.077) (0.222)
Height (in 2012 cms) 0.019 0.020 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.005
(0.02) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Assets in second grade -0.027 -0.122 0.072 0.059 0.099 0.077 0.024 0.017
(0.248) (0.254) (0.071) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067) (0.083) (0.077)
Mother’s Education 0.092* 0.075 0.028* 0.024* 0.026* 0.021 0.031** 0.030**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Father’s Education 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.018 0.017 -0.001 -0.003 0.036*** 0.033***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Age in 2012 (years) -0.692*** -0.704*** -0.123*** -0.127*** -0.109*** -0.116*** -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.126) (0.117) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036)
Female -0.153 -0.201 -0.034 -0.046 -0.156 -0.168* 0.063 0.058
(0.333) (0.312) (0.102) (0.092) (0.103) (0.097) (0.107) (0.097)
Total Obs. 333 333 310 310 318 318 312 312
R–squared 0.488 0.156 0.481 0.088 0.366 0.006 0.525 0.130
F–stat (instrument) 31.73 25.56 26.65 25.19
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed
effects. All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years.
Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any
education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F
statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Table 2.5a: Gender Heterogeneity – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Second Grade Composite Score 2.264*** 1.231*** 0.507*** 0.259*** 0.470*** 0.201*** 0.866*** 0.578***
(0.538) (0.401) (0.121) (0.088) (0.106) (0.090) (0.196) (0.140)
Total Obs. 188 259 161 220 161 220 188 259
R–squared 0.344 0.184 0.273 0.156 0.279 0.125 0.256 0.183
F–stat (instrument) 67.03 180.8 66.58 149.3 66.58 149.3 67.03 180.8
P–value of diff 0.123 0.097 0.054 0.232
Table 2.5b: Gender Heterogeneity – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys
Second Grade Composite Score 2.448*** 0.586 0.620** 0.221 0.559* 0.161 0.685** 0.282
(0.660) (0.591) (0.283) (0.178) (0.300) (0.172) (0.271) (0.200)
Total Obs. 179 154 164 146 165 147 170 148
R–squared 0.216 0.201 0.114 0.142 0.153 0.144 0.035 0.079
F–stat (instrument) 41.94 30.97 20.45 25.94 20.58 25.17 24 25.27
P–value of diff. 0.036 0.233 0.251 0.232
All coefficients are from the second stage of IV regressions. Second grade denotes 1995—96 in the case of Senegal and 1997—98 in
Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed effects.Specifications same as in Tables 1,2 and 3, but not reported in
this table (excluding female). Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.6a: Height Heterogeneity – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med
Second Grade Composite Score 1.495*** 1.638*** 0.304*** 0.319*** 0.210* 0.259*** 0.545*** 0.648***
(0.437) (0.385) (0.116) (0.105) (0.118) (0.098) (0.186) (0.149)
Total Obs. 234 213 198 183 198 183 234 213
R–squared 0.313 0.275 0.183 0.236 0.156 0.232 0.194 0.219
F–stat (instrument) 100.3 156.1 84.57 156.3 84.57 156.3 100.3 156.1
P–value of diff 0.807 0.924 0.751 0.667
Table 2.6b: Height Heterogeneity – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med
Second Grade Composite Score 0.983** 1.105 0.22 0.443** 0.125 0.452* 0.312 0.476***
(0.471) (0.829) (0.168) (0.201) (0.151) (0.254) (0.209) (0.181)
Total Obs. 172 161 160 150 161 151 164 154
R–squared 0.192 0.225 0.08 0.136 0.12 0.117 0.029 0.09
F–stat (instrument) 55.84 25.34 30.63 23.05 30.68 22.93 33.28 23.15
P–value of diff. 0.898 0.393 0.268 0.554
All coefficients are from the second stage of IV regressions. Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in
Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed effects.Specifications same as in Tables 1,2 and 3, but not reported in
this table (excluding female). Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.7a: Assett Heterogeneity – Senegal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med
Second Grade Composite Score 1.820*** 0.893* 0.300* 0.180 0.221* 0.143 0.707*** 0.476***
(0.513) (0.467) (0.125) (0.113) (0.121) (0.112) (0.202) (0.168)
Total Obs. 224 223 190 191 190 191 224 223
R–squared 0.294 0.145 0.212 0.089 0.184 0.061 0.254 0.136
F–stat (instrument) 81.96 128.4 74.9 117.7 74.9 128.4 81.96 128.4
P–value of diff 0.181 0.477 0.636 0.379
Table 2.7b: Asset Heterogeneity – Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Edu Years Composite Composite Math Math French French
Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med Above Med Below Med
Second Grade Composite Score 0.983** 1.105 0.22 0.443** 0.125 0.452* 0.312 0.476***
(0.471) (0.829) (0.168) (0.201) (0.151) (0.254) (0.209) (0.181)
Total Obs. 172 161 160 150 161 151 164 154
R–squared 0.192 0.225 0.08 0.136 0.12 0.117 0.029 0.09
F–stat (instrument) 55.84 25.34 30.63 23.05 30.68 22.93 33.28 23.15
P–value of diff. 0.898 0.393 0.268 0.554
All coefficients are from the second stage of IV regressions. Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in
Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed effects.Specifications same as in Tables 1,2 and 3, but not reported in
this table (excluding female). Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 2.8: Lewbel Corrections – Senegal & Madagascar
Senegal Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Composite Math French Edu Years Composite Math French
Second Grade Composite Score 1.338*** 0.265*** 0.570*** 0.203*** 1.023* 0.24* 0.239* 0.196
(0.327) (0.076) (0.127) (0.074) (0.478) (0.128) (0.133) (0.137)
Total Obs. 447 381 447 381 333 310 318 312
R–squared 0.234 0.165 0.196 0.139 0.221 0.133 0.086 0.142
F–stat (instrument) 41.75 38.07 42.32 38.07 13.55 6.25 3.82 6.49
J–statistic p–value 0.172 0.716 0.928 0.525 0.395 0.699 0.631 0.663
All these models are IV models where the instruments are the pretest score in second grade and the generated instrument based on
the method described in Lewbel, 2012. These specifications contain school fixed effects. The mothers and fathers education
variables in Senegal are dummy variables for whether they have any education or not. In Madagascar, those variables are based on
the number of years of education they have. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
118
Table 2.9: Robustness Check – Average of Pre & Post-test – Senegal & Madagascar
Senegal Madagascar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Edu Years Composite Math French Edu Years Composite Math French
Second Grade Average Composite Score 1.612*** 0.328*** 0.608*** 0.271*** 0.885*** 0.206*** 0.221*** 0.175**
(0.237) (0.058) (0.093) (0.055) (0.283) (0.079) (0.082) (0.084)
Total Obs. 447 381 447 381 333 310 318 312
R–squared 0.390 0.321 0.302 0.316 0.502 0.494 0.382 0.531
The main independent variable of interest is the second-grade average of pretest and posttests. Second grade denotes 1995–96 in
the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All the specifications include school–level fixed effects. All test scores are
constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years. Mothers and fathers education
are continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any education. Household asset index is
constructed using factor analysis. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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2.9 Figures
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative distribution functions of composite scores
Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution functions of math
121
Figure 2.3: Cumulative distribution functions of French
Figure 2.4: Learning progress curves composite scores
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Figure 2.5: Height and composite test scores in 2012 – Madagascar
Figure 2.6: Height and composite test scores in 2012 – Senegal
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CHAPTER 3
MARRIAGE AGE, SOCIAL STATUS AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EFFECTS IN UGANDA
3.1 Introduction
Early or child marriage among girls, is a common practice in large parts of the
developing world, especially in South Asia and Sub–Saharan Africa (SSA). It
contributes greatly to the entrenchment of female disadvantages in these soci-
eties. More than 37% of marriages in SSA involve a child and in Uganda, which
is the setting for the current study, 49% and 15% of women aged 20–49 years are
married before the age of 18 and 15 years respectively (UBOS and ICF Interna-
tional, 20121).
Studies in different contexts show that earlier marriage among women leads
to a fall in female literacy and educational attainment (Field and Ambrus, 2008a,
Sekhri and Debnath, 2014, Hicks and Hicks, 2015). The lower levels of educa-
tion, associated with early marriage, might have further effects on employment
and wages (as documented in Joshi and Schultz, 2007). In fact, Dahl, 2010 finds
that women who marry earlier in life are 31 percentage points more likely to live
in poverty when they are older. Early marriage can also have an effect on later
life outcomes for the woman and her post–marital household through her pref-
erences, and bargaining power (Glewwe, 1999, Christiaensen and Alderman,
2004, Banerji et al., 2017). These might in part be due to marriage market sort-
ing on the kind of spouses (and households) that younger brides get married to,
which might be worse than the average (Becker, 1973, Anderson, 2007).
1Accessed on 6 February 2018 – Link
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Early marriage also poses large health risks to women and their children.
Women who marry younger are less likely to be able to carry out fertility con-
trol, and thus avoid unwanted and terminated pregnancies (Raj et al., 2009).
Early female marriage is also likely to be associated with early childbearing,
which leads to a higher risk of maternal mortality and other pregnancy–related
complications such as maternal anemia and pre–term labour (Clark et al., 2006,
Nour, 2006). These complications have negative consequences for the health of
both the mother and the child (Steer, 2000, Stoltzfus et al., 2004, Joanne, 2011,
Goli et al., 2015). The intergenerational impacts might be mediated by women’s
bargaining power and their preferences regarding investment in children’s hu-
man capital (Beegle et al., 2001, Majlesi, 2016).
In this paper, I explore the negative effects of early marriage among Ugandan
women. In the main analysis, marriage age is conceptualized as a continuous
variable where lower values imply marriage at a younger age. In a robustness
check I check if the results are sensitive to alternative measures of early mar-
riage. Various factors such as customs, beliefs and household characteristics
could shape the age at which a woman gets married and also influence other
circumstances of her life, and so marriage age is likely to be endogenous. I use
an Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy to estimate the impacts of the timing of
marriage for women – I use age at menarche to instrument for age of marriage
(as used first by Field and Ambrus, 2008a). In many developing country con-
texts such as in Uganda, girls are married only after they reach puberty and
so the onset of menarche is a binding constraint for the marriage of girls in
these regions. I would thus expect marriage age to be strongly correlated with
menarche age, with the relationship being positively signed. I show that such
an association exists between the instrument and marriage age for the sample
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I examine in my analysis. Furthermore, I argue that since menarche is largely
biologically determined (Jahanfar et al., 2013, Adair, 2001), it is plausibly exoge-
nous and affects later life outcomes only through its impact on marriage age.
Having said that, in my empirical strategy I account for other factors that may
affect menarche age (example – early life socioeconomic and nutrition inputs,
shocks in infancy and altitude) or be affected by it (like age at first sex). I show
that the effects I find remain robust to controlling for these additional factors.
I focus on four main categories of outcomes: schooling, work, health be-
haviors and child health, with the last category capturing the intergenerational
effects of marriage age. My results suggest that early marriage leads to lower
female educational attainment, literacy and labour force participation. Women
who marry earlier also demonstrate poorer health behaviors related to the use
of contraceptives, ante natal care and age at first birth. I find that children born
to women who marry young have lower BMI and hemoglobin levels, and are
at a higher risk of being anemic compared to children of women who marry
at older ages. In exploring the mechanisms, apart from enhanced educational
levels, through which the observed effects could have been mediated, I find evi-
dence for the possible role of two other factors – greater female decision making
power and positive assortative matching in the marriage market (that is, women
who marry later tend to attract better quality spouses).
I demonstrate that the results I find are robust to various checks. First, while
I measure marriage age as a continuous variable for my main analysis, I show
that the results hold when I define early marriage to apply to those marrying
below different age thresholds (18, 16 or 14 years). In another robustness check,
I use the method proposed by Conley et al., 2012 to demonstrate that the co-
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efficient estimates that I identify persist when I relax what is known as the ex-
clusion restriction of an IV strategy, under which age at menarche is expected
to shape the outcome(s) of interest only through marriage age and not through
any other confounders. Analogous to this, I convey the stability of the results
to increases in potential biases due to unobservable factors (as per Oster, 2014).
I also demonstrate that the results remain unchanged when I use an alternative
empirical model – probit instead of the Linear Probability Model (LPM) that I
use for the main analysis.
This paper adds to the literature by estimating the impacts of early marriage
among women in Uganda, a context in which this topic has not been explored
before with rigorous empirical methods. Since child marriage is still widely
practiced in Uganda, this is an important setting to study the topic in. The
current analysis also adds to the literature that examines the long term con-
sequences of early female marriage, for example on outcomes such as post–
marriage labour force participation and decision making power. In addition,
this is one of the few papers to explore the intergenerational health impacts
of early marriage. Finally, this paper makes a valuable empirical contribution
by demonstrating the external validity of an econometric methodology which
has previously been used mostly in South Asian countries (Field and Ambrus,
2008a, Sekhri and Debnath, 2014).
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3.2 Study Context: Uganda
Uganda is a low income country with a per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of around USD 1300 (2010 data2) and an economy that is primarily agrar-
ian. Uganda fares poorly in terms of health – the life expectancy at birth is 57
years, and the infant mortality rate is high at 61 per 1000 live births. Uganda’s
2015 HDI value (a measures that reflects life expectancy, educational status and
income) ranked it as 163rd in a list of 188 countries, making it one of the poor-
est performers across the globe. The HDI is often calculated separately for the
female and male populations of a country and the ratio of these two figures
(female HDI/male HDI) used to get a sense of the prevalence of gender dis-
parity. Given that a GDI value below one implies gender inequality (skewed
against women), Uganda’s GDI of 0.878 demonstrates how poorly the country
fares on gender issues. The country’s GDI is close to the average for all coun-
tries in Sub–Saharan Africa, but below that of countries such as Tanzania and
Madagascar. Female adolescents in Uganda fare particularly poorly. DHS data
from 2011 suggests that dropout from secondary schools is significantly larger
for girls than for boys – although primary school completion rate for boys (68
percent) is not very different from that of girls (66 percent)3, there is a large dis-
parity in their secondary school completion rate for boys (52 percent) and girls
(24 percent).
The gender divide in Uganda is evident when examining marriage patterns
– median age at marriage for men in 2011 was 22.3 years, while for women it
was around 18 years. While only 9 percent of men were married by the age
2Source: World Bank database – World Bank website. This is in Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) terms.
3From DHS reports
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of 18, nearly 49% of women were married by that age. A study by Jain and
Kurz, 2007 ranked Uganda ninth among the top 20 hotspot countries for child
marriage, while another study in 2013 ranked Uganda as 16th among the 25
countries with the highest rates of early marriages, with 46% and 12% of girls
married below the ages of 18 and 15 years respectively (World Vision 20134).
The Constitution of Uganda stipulates 18 years as the minimum legal age
for marriage for both boys and girls. Despite this provision, child marriage,
still persists among many ethnic and tribal groups. Rubin et al., 2009 discuss
reasons why the practice is common in Uganda. First, given that pre–marital
pregnancy is viewed as a shameful and stigmatizing event in Uganda, parents
are likely to view early marriage among girls to be a way of reducing the chance
of pregnancies outside wedlock and of thus protecting family dignity. Second,
impoverished households that are large might have an incentive to marry girls
off at an early age because of the common custom of bride price under which
the household of the groom gives the household of the bride a relatively large
amount of money at the time of the wedding (Rubin et al., 2009, Lubaale, 2013).
The Constitution of Uganda stipulates 18 years as the minimum legal age
for marriage for both boys and girls. Despite this provision, child marriage,
still persists among many ethnic and tribal groups. Rubin et al., 2009 discuss
reasons why the practice is common in Uganda. First, given that pre–marital
pregnancy is viewed as a shameful and stigmatizing event in Uganda, parents
are likely to view early marriage among girls to be a way of reducing the chance
of pregnancies outside wedlock and of thus protecting family dignity. Second,
impoverished households that are large might have an incentive to marry girls
off at an early age because of the common custom of bride price under which
4UNICEF Website – Accessed on 31 January 2017
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the household of the groom gives the household of the bride a relatively large
amount of money at the time of the wedding5 (Rubin et al., 2009, Lubaale, 2013).
3.3 Data
For this analysis, I use data from the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
(UDHS) conducted in 20016. The DHS are nationally representative surveys that
collect information on a wide range of population and health indicators. I focus
on the module that was administered to women between the ages of 15 and 49
years, which covered topics such as household characteristics, schooling, labour
force participation, fertility, infant and reproductive health, antenatal and post-
natal care. This section of the survey contains one of the key variables around
which I set up my empirical strategy – the age at which women experienced the
onset of menarche. I restrict my sample to all the female respondents who had
data available on this variable. Below I describe the different outcomes I exam-
ine for the women in my sample. In addition, I also focus on health outcomes
for children between the ages of zero and five years who were born to these
women.
Since this study is focused on identifying the impacts of women’s age at
marriage, women who report the age at which they got married provide the
sampling frame for my analysis – a total of 5643 women. I drop 315 of these ob-
servations since they are missing information on age at menarche, which I use
5In a study on Uganda, Bishai and Grossbard, 2010 find that the size of the transfers are
around 14 percent of household annual income. See Kaye et al., 2005, Huzayyin and Acsadi,
1976, Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2002 for a detailed discussion on bride price and associated con-
cepts.
6Although there are more recent rounds of data available for Uganda, I use this dataset be-
cause this is the only DHS data from Uganda that has information on the age of menarche.
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as an instrument, or women who report outlier values on this variable. Subse-
quently, I also exclude 379 women who do not have data on height since this
is an important control variable in my empirical specifications. The remaining
4949 women constitute the sample for the woman–level analysis that I conduct.
To understand whether the criteria used to identify the woman-level sample
lead to a systematically different sample , I conduct two sets of mean–difference
analyses: first, I compare women who report marriage age (5643 women) with
women who compose the sample for the main analysis (4949 women). This is
presented in table A3.1 – the results indicate that there are no differences be-
tween the two samples. Second, table A3.2 presents results for the comparison
between women who are part of the sample for the analysis (4949 women) and
the ones who drop out due to the different criteria described above (315 + 379 =
694 women). While there appear to be no statistically significant differences on
most characteristics, I find that the women in the study sample are less likely
to be married to men who have multiple wives and more likely to be from the
western part of Uganda. Note that these are covariates that I control for in all
specifications.
The child–level sample for this analysis consists of the children of the 4949
individuals in the woman–level sample who are five years or below at the time
of the DHS survey. The data indicates that 3998 of the women have children
in this age group – a total of 5022 children. I conduct the following mean dif-
ference tests: first, I compare women who report marriage age (5643 women)
with women who have children in the sample for the child–level analysis (3998
women). This is presented in table A3.3 – the results indicate that there are no
differences between the two samples. Second, table A3.3 presents results for
the comparison between women who are part of the sample for the analysis
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(3998 women) and the ones who do not have a child in the child–level analysis
(5643 – 3998 = 1645 women). These results are presented in table A3.3. While
there appear to be no statistically significant differences on most characteristics,
I find that the women in the study sample are less likely to be married to men
who have multiple wives – I control for this in all child–level analysis empirical
specifications.
3.3.1 Key Variables
The DHS contains data on several outcomes that might be impacted by a
woman’s marriage age – those pertaining to her educational attainment, labour
market participation and health knowledge. To measure literacy, I create a cate-
gorical variable that takes a value of one if a woman is fully literate (able to read
and write in her native language), and zero otherwise. The DHS enumerators
were trained to judge women’s literacy levels based on her ability to read sen-
tences printed on cards. I use a continuous variable for educational attainment
that equals the highest grade attained by a woman (in years). Woman’s labour
force participation is a dummy variable equal to one if she reports being part of
the labour force at the time of the survey. In examining health practices, I use
indicator variables for the use of contraceptives and for the obtainment of Ante
Natal Care (ANC) during pregnancy. I also examine effects of marriage age on
the age at which the woman gives birth to her first child.
The intergenerational health outcomes that I probe are height (measured in
terms of height for age z–score), weight (weight for age z–scores) and BMI (mea-
sured in kg/m2). I construct Z–scores for height and weight based on standard
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World Health Organization (WHO) definitions. I also examine children’s blood
hemoglobin levels using absolute hemoglobin values and also with indicator
variables that capture whether children are anemic (below 11 g/dl) or severely
anemic (below 7 g/dl)7.
In seeking to identify the factors that might mediate the relationships I ob-
serve between women’s marriage age and her later life outcomes, I investigate
the role of marriage quality and women’s decision making power in their post–
marriage household. I measure marriage quality using three different measures.
I create a variable for spousal education (measured in years of education) which
is akin to the educational attainment variable for women. The wellbeing effects
stemming from the human capital of the husband and wife would further be re-
inforced by the positive synergy that is likely to result if the marital relationship
were an equitable one (Schultz, 1990, Engle, 1997). While having more educated
spouses might be considered to be desirable, an increase in the education of a
spouse relative to that of the woman could have a countervailing negative effect.
I measure the potential for such an effect using a spousal education gap variable
which takes a value that is equal to the difference in the educational attainment
of a woman and her husband. Analogously, a high age difference between a
woman and her spouse could skew the balance of power in the household in
the favor of the husband and to probe whether this is the case, I construct an
age gap variable (Basu and Koolwal, 2005, Mahmud et al., 2012).
The DHS asks female respondents a range of questions about her role in
decision making on the following topics – own health care, children’s health
care, large household purchases, daily purchases, visits to family and friends,
and items cooked in the household. The survey allowed for several responses
7I define these variables in accordance with the WHO guidelines on Anemia detection – Link.
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in order to capture different levels of involvement in these decisions89. I create
categorical variables for each decision area that take a value of one if the woman
reports making a particular decision individually since this indicates full female
autonomy.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to examine the relationship between
women’s marriage age and an outcome such as educational attainment, would
likely produce biased results. These biases could occur due to unobservable
factors that might shape both the outcome of interest and the main explanatory
variable (marriage age). For example, the traditional beliefs of a woman’s natal
family could have an impact on how long she stays in school, and also deter-
mine when she gets married. Since all such potential confounders cannot be
directly observed or measured, endogeneity bias tends to be unavoidable when
using the OLS framework. To overcome these issues, I use an Instrumental Vari-
able (IV) strategy, where I treat woman’s age at menarche as an instrument for
her age at marriage10.
8The responses are as follows: Respondent alone, Husband/Partner alone, Respondent and Hus-
band/Partner jointly, Someone else individually, Someone else and respondent jointly, Not Applicable.
9Based on the past literature on the subject, I argue that the recorded responses to these
questions are credible proxies for the different dimensions of women’s bargaining power –
their sense of entitlement and confidence (Kabeer, 1998, Taylor and Pereznieto, 2014), female
access to economic resources within the household (Kabeer, 2008) and women’s ability to inter-
act/socialize with people outside the household (Kabeer, 2011). In more recent developments,
factor analysis has been used to create an index of female empowerment based on the responses
to the different bargaining power questions in surveys like the DHS (example – Yount et al.,
2016, Cheong et al., 2017). I create a similar measure and check the robustness of the main
results with this new variable and find qualitatively similar results.
10Age of menarche has also been used as an instrument in many developed country contexts.
For example, see Klepinger et al., 1999, Chevalier and Viitanen, 2003, Sabia and Rees, 2009, 2011.
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3.4.1 Age of Menarche as an IV
Child marriage is commonly practiced in many developing countries. Since
the ability to bear children is an important part of marriage in these contexts
(Anderson, 2007), girls are typically married only after they have reached pu-
berty. Thus the age at menarche (first period) tends to be a strong determinant
of female age of marriage (Field and Ambrus, 2008a). Since age at menarche
is primarily determined by genetic factors, this variable provides the quasi–
random variation in age at marriage required to uncover its causal effects on
subsequently realized outcomes. I thus use age at menarche as an instrumental
variable for the timing of marriage in a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estima-
tion strategy.
The methodological approach that I use requires that the instrumental vari-
able meet two conditions – the inclusion and the exclusion restriction. The in-
clusion restriction requires that the instrument, or menarche age, be a strong
predictor of the potentially endogenous variable, which in my case is women’s
marriage age. Figure 3.1, which presents the relationship between these two
variables, shows that the distribution of marriage age is a parallel but shifted
version of that of menarche age, with the peak of the former being to the right
of the highest point of the latter. This kind of a relationship would arise if par-
ents married off their daughters shortly after the onset of puberty. In fact, this
is consistent with what I find in my dataset – nearly 72 percent of the women in
my sample report marrying within three years of the onset of puberty. Figure
3.1 also demonstrates that as age of menarche goes up, age of marriage also goes
up, thus showing the tight co–movement of the two measures.
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Insert Figure 3.1
I further examine the relationship between the ages of menarche and mar-
riage using regression results. In Table 3.2, I look at the relationship between
menarche age and marriage (and other controls that I discuss below), which
represents the first stage of the 2SLS estimation which captures the relationship
between the instrument (age of menarche) and the potentially endogenous main
variable of interest (marriage age). The results indicate that each year of delay
in menarche increases marriage age of a woman by around 0.5 years. This re-
lationship is statistically significant at the one percent level and is robust to the
addition of a large number of control variables. The F-statistic of the excluded
regressor in the first stage is well above the critical value of 10 (the cutoff sug-
gested by Staiger and Stock [1997] for a weak instrument). Given the evidence
from figure 3.1 and the first stage results in table 3.2, it seems more likely that
menarche age meets the inclusion restriction requirement for a valid instrument.
Insert Table 3.2
Women’s age at menarche also needs to meet the exclusion restriction so
that it can serve as a valid instrument for marriage age. Under this restriction,
the instrument can impact the outcomes of interest through no channels apart
from the endogenous variable, but this condition is not directly testable (Bound
et al., 1995, Angrist and Krueger, 2001). Although the exclusion restriction is not
directly testable, I argue that age of menarche is exogenous as it is biologically
determined, which implies that the exclusion restriction plausibly holds in this
setup. Having said that, there are ways in which the exclusion restriction can be
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violated – I discuss them below and also provide the steps I take to account for
them.
One potential concern is that the onset of puberty could be shaped by a
woman’s early life socioeconomic and nutritional conditions, which in turn
could also influence her later life outcomes (Freedman et al., 2005). This would
make age at puberty, the instrument, endogenous with later life outcomes. In
fact, some studies have shown that early life circumstances play an important
role in determining menarche age11 (Berkey et al., 2000, Chowdhury et al., 2000,
Ellis, 2004). In contrast, other evidence suggests that genetic composition at
birth matters more for puberty onset than post–birth environmental factors (Ja-
hanfar et al., 2013, Sørensen et al., 2013, Adair, 2001). Along these lines, a recent
study (Mpora et al., 2014) finds that early life adverse events do not have a
significant effect on age at menarche in Uganda, the context that I examine in
this study. Given the debate that exists on this topic, it is unclear whether age
of menarche can truly be considered to be an exogenous variable. One way in
which I could overcome potential endogeneity in the instrument is by including
measures for women’s early life conditions in my estimation models.
While the ideal way to control for a woman’s childhood nutritional status
would be to use information from that time, the data I use does not contain
such details. Therefore, in order to account for the role of childhood nutrition in
determining menarche age (Ellis, 2004, Victora et al., 2008), I use woman’s adult
height as a control variable. This approach is predicated on the intuition that
a woman’s adult height reflects her childhood height, which itself corresponds
closely to childhood nutritional status (Martorell and Habicht, 1986a, Martorell,
11This is consistent with literature that shows the negative effects of shocks in the prenatal
and perinatal period (Barker, 1995, Almond and Currie, 2011b) and in early life (Dercon and
Porter, 2014, Almond, 2006, Fogel, 1993, 1990).
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1993). Adult height can thus be used to proxy for the different inputs experi-
enced by women during childhood. In addition, research indicates that people
with lower stature in infancy and childhood are more likely to have lower adult
height (Sørensen et al., 1999, Eide et al., 2005, Adair, 2007, Currie and Vogl,
2013). As adult height is strongly correlated with childhood size and nutritional
inputs in childhood, including it in my empirical model would control for the
effect of childhood stature on menarche.
In addition, I use birth year fixed effects to control for the effect that events
in infancy can have on long term outcomes. I also include district fixed effects
and cluster altitude (in meters) in my specifications to account for the potential
consequences of geographical conditions (such as temperature and altitude) and
other time–invariant district level factors on the age of puberty onset (Kapoor
and Kapoor, 1986, Saar et al., 1988).
Another concern that arises when using reported age at menarche stems
from potential recall bias. Given that a considerable amount of time is likely
to have passed from the date when a women attained menarche (recall that
survey respondents could be a maximum of 49 years of age at the time of the
survey), one might question the ability of women to accurately report their age
at puberty onset. To get a sense of how dependable the reports of menarche are
in the DHS dataset that I use, I compare the mean menarche age in my sample
(14.4 years) with information available from other parts of Africa. I find that the
mean in my sample is broadly consistent with that of other studies that examine
comparable settings – such as Padez, 2003 in Mozambique (13.2 years), Leenstra
et al., 2005 in Kenya (15.8 years), Zegeye et al., 2009 in Ethiopia (15.7 years) and
Adebara and Ijaiya, 2013 in Nigeria (13.2 years). It is also worth pointing out
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that in the cultural context of many developing countries (such as Uganda), on-
set of menarche is a major event in a woman’s life and hence respondents could
be expected to remember its timing with a fair degree of accuracy12 (Leenstra
et al., 2005, Ellis, 2004).
3.4.2 Identification Strategy
As discussed above, I examine outcomes for women and for their children.
When examining women’s outcomes, I use the following specification:
MarriageAge j = α0+α1MenarcheAge j+α2Controls j+η1jYi j = δ0+δ1MarriageAge j+δ2Controls j+η
2
j
(3.1)
where Y j is the outcome variable for woman j, MarriageAge j is the age at
marriage of woman j, MenarcheAge j is the age at which a woman hits puberty
and Controls j is a vector of factors at the individual, household and community
level that could potentially shape the outcome of interest including household
size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives,
religion, ethnicity, and residence in an urban area. In addition, I also include
woman’s height, and fixed effects for both district and birth year to account
for potential non–genetic factors associated with age of menarche. I cluster the
standard errors at the district level.
12A related concern is that women might recall the age at which they reached puberty using
the year in which they got married as a reference point. Since marriage is another major so-
cial event in one’s life, its recall is also less likely to be fraught with measurement error. Given
that women in Uganda tend to get married in and around the time of puberty onset (as dis-
cussed earlier), this kind of a connection between the two events could only improve the recall
of menarche onset, thus plausibly improving the accuracy of the data.
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The specification that I use to analyze child level outcomes is similar, but
now each observation pertains to a child born to a woman in the main sample.
I use the following approach:
MarriageAge j = αc0+α
c
1MenarcheAge j+α
c
2Controlsi j+ζ
1
i jYi j = δ
c
0+δ
c
1MarriageAge j+δ
c
2Controlsi j+ζ
2
i j
(3.2)
In this case, the outcomes would be for child i born to woman j, MarriageAge j
is the age at marriage of the mother of child i, Controls j include all the con-
trol variables discussed for the mother–level specification as well as age of the
child, mother’s age at the child’s birth, child gender and birth order of the child.
Again, I cluster the standard errors at the district level.
Even though most of the outcomes that I examine in this research are binary
variables, I use LPM for my main analysis for ease of coefficient interpretation.
However, I also estimate probit models to demonstrate the robustness of the
main estimates13.
13LPM suffers from the criticism that the error term in the specification is not independent
of the covariates in the model (unless there is just a single binary covariate). Since we have
more than one covariate, this becomes important. Another drawback of the LPM is that the
predicted values of the dependent variable can sometimes be outside the zero to one (feasible
values) range. The typical response to these criticisms is that the purpose of the LPM is not to
make predictions for the entire support of the covariates, but rather for a subset of the support.
Additionally, LPM has a constant marginal effect that might be preferable in a variety of cir-
cumstances. In the same vein, Probit and Logit models have their own pros and cons. While
they are both non–linear models of binary choice affording more flexibility, they impose strong
assumptions on the error term of the structural model. It is hard to check if these assumptions
are the right ones for the data provided, unless there is some prior theory that supports these
assumptions.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Impact on Woman’s Outcomes
I begin by examining the consequences of women’s marriage age on her educa-
tional attainment. First in Table 3.3 (columns 1–4), I examine this relationship
with an OLS approach and find that marriage age has a positive impact on num-
ber of years of education. In other words, women who marry at a younger age
appear to have lower educational attainment. The OLS estimates (columns 1–4)
are likely to suffer from endogeneity bias, which can be accounted for with an
instrumental variable approach. In the IV results which I present in columns
5–8, the coefficients on marriage age are positive and the magnitudes do not
change much when I include additional sets of control variables in the models.
These findings point to the potentially large gains in female education that can
be realized by delaying marriage.
Insert Table 3.3
In table 3.3, the coefficient on marriage age in the IV specification with all
the control variables (column 8) is larger in magnitude than the corresponding
OLS coefficient (column 4) which suggests that OLS underestimates the effect
of marriage age. I observe similar trends for all the other outcome variables
that I examine. Such a situation, where the IV estimates are greater than the
OLS estimates, could arise due to omitted variable bias. For example, fami-
lies in Uganda might be making decisions regarding their daughter’s schooling
and marriage with the goal of maximizing the bride price that they can obtain
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from the groom’s family at the time of the wedding – which I do not observe
with the available data. Given that bride price is primarily paid for the fruits
of a woman’s labour and her reproductive capabilities (Anderson, 2007), girls’
parents might try to increase the amount they receive by keeping girls in school
longer and thus enhancing girls’ future labour market returns. At the same time
since bride price also depends on the virginity of the bride, in relatively unsafe
areas, parents might want to get their girls married sooner rather than later. The
interaction effect of the desire of parents to keep their girls in school longer but
to also marry them off younger would attenuate the OLS estimates14.
Insert Table 3.4
Table 3.4 explores the effect of marriage age on other woman level outcomes.
I find that later marriage among women enhances the likelihood of being liter-
ate and of participating in the labor market. Specifically, a one year delay in
marriage increases the probability of being literate and of working by 10 and
eight percentage points respectively. Subsequent columns show that there also
are positive impacts of marriage age on different health behavior outcomes –
when women marry later, they are more likely to use contraception and obtain
antenatal care when pregnant. I find evidence for delays in childbearing due to
later marriage, which indicates that policy interventions to encourage delayed
marriage could be crucial for alleviating the high maternal health burdens borne
by young mothers (O’Flaherty et al., 2015).
14The IV estimate being greater than the OLS is also consistent with the theory of positive
assortative matching in the marriage market Becker, 1991, which I find evidence for in my data.
Positive matching implies that higher quality grooms would get matched to women with more
desirable traits – which in this case would imply higher education (stay in school), and virginity
(get married sooner).
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3.5.2 Intergenerational Impacts
I now explore whether the timing of a woman’s marriage shapes her children’s
health outcomes. Table 3.5 shows that there are no effects of marriage age on
standardized height and weight measures of children, but the coefficients are
signed as expected with older age at marriage leading to healthier children. I do,
however, find positive and statistically significant effects of later marriage on
child BMI and hemoglobin level. In other words, when mothers delay marriage
by one year, their children in the future are likely to have better BMI and have
higher hemoglobin levels. Other results in table 3.5 indicate that later marriage
reduces the chances that a woman’s child will be anemic (4 percentage points),
but the impact on the likelihood of being severe anemic is small (0.2 percentage
points) and insignificant.
Insert Table 3.5
3.6 Mechanisms
The results in the previous section present a unified narrative – delayed mar-
riage brings about better later life outcomes for women, as well as positive ef-
fects for child health. Since I find that later marriage enhances women’s ed-
ucational levels, many of the other benefits that I find for these women could
stem directly from the higher education that they obtain. Other factors that
are shaped by later marriage (and that could also be influenced by education)
could lead to improved later life outcomes. Here I examine the role played by
women’s bargaining power and the nature of their marital relationship.
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Studies show that an increase in female autonomy could raise the wellbeing
of women and also enhance their ability to allocate more resources towards their
children (Ashraf et al., 2010, Aslam and Kingdon, 2010, Doss, 2013). Women
with more agency might have more autonomy to make decisions regarding
contraceptive use and might thus have lower fertility rates (Beegle et al., 2001).
Due to the quantity–quality tradeoffs in children (discussed first by Becker and
Lewis, 1973), lower fertility is likely to enhance the quality of children, poten-
tially due to higher investments per child (Barber and Gertler, 2010, Carneiro
et al., 2013, Bjo¨rkman Nyqvist and Jayachandran, 2017).
Recall that I measure women’s decision making power by observing
whether she self–reports being solely responsible for making decisions regard-
ing different aspects of the household. In table 3.6 (columns 1–5), I find that
later marriage leads to increase in the likelihood of women being the sole de-
cision maker on every measured decision category – child health (4 p.p.), own
health (5 p.p.), large purchases (4 p.p.), family visits (3 p.p.) and cooking food
(5 p.p.). This is consistent with the evidence from other recent analyses that find
that women who marry later in life benefit from post–marital economic empow-
erment, have higher decision making power and enjoy more equitable gender
relations (Yount et al., 2018, Crandall et al., 2016).
Insert Table 3.6
Next, I examine the potential role of spousal characteristics in mediating
the observed effects of later marriage. Previous studies have found that more
educated women are likely to marry higher quality spouses (Fafchamps and
Quisumbing, 2005, Abramitzky et al., 2011), with quality being defined on many
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dimensions such as education and income. I verify whether this is the case for
the women in my sample who marry later in and who I find are also likely to
be more educated. Results in Table 3.6 suggest that women who marry later in
life are matched with husbands who have higher education. Other measures of
relative marriage market match quality are the differences in educational lev-
els and age between the spouses – lower the difference,the more equitable the
marriage is likely to be. The coefficients on marriage age for both outcomes
are negative and significant, thus demonstrating that the spousal educational
and age gap falls as marriage age rises. These results indicate that older brides
experience improved marriage market outcomes.
3.7 Robustness Checks
I conduct several robustness checks to demonstrate that the results from my
main analysis are not sensitive to model variations, definitional adjustments
and other changes. First, I estimate probit models for the outcome variables
that are binary and examine whether the results are consistent with those from
the LPM model that I use for my main analysis. Results in Table 3.7 indicate that
the sign and significance of the marriage age coefficients in the probit models
are consistent with those in the main results. In addition, the marginal effects
from the Probit model are comparable in magnitude to the estimates identified
with the LPM specification.
Second, I re—estimate the specifications for all the outcomes that I examine
with alternative measures for early marriage. While I use a continuous mea-
sure for marriage age in the main analysis, I now choose three different cutoffs
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(18, 16 and 14 years) to create binary variables indicating early marriage – these
measures consider women marrying at ages below the thresholds to have mar-
ried early. A cutoff of 18 years is almost universally accepted as an appropriate
minimum age for marriage and hence is a useful threshold to examine. In the
Ugandan context, using cutoffs for 16 and 14 years also makes sense as almost
34% and 18% of the study sample marry under these respective ages. The re-
sults in table 3.8 show that my results are robust to these alternative definitions
of marriage age (with one exception). I find that women identified as having
married early by these categorical variables have poorer later life outcomes and
less children.
Insert Table 3.8
Third, I conduct a check to predict what would happen to the identified
impact estimates if the exclusion restriction were to be violated. In this case
the exclusion restriction requires that age of menarche affect later life outcomes
only through its impact on marriage age, and not through any other variables.
Through the check, I seek to understand whether the results would hold if there
was a non–zero direct relationship between the instrument and the outcomes of
interest. I employ the Union of Confidence Intervals (UCI) procedure outlined
in Conley et al., 2012, where the authors relax the complete exogeneity assump-
tion made in an IV setup15. This method requires that the researcher specify
a value for the (assumed) direct relationship between the instrument and the
outcome (referred to by the authors as γ). The γ term can be thought of as a
measure of the degree to which the exclusion restriction is violated. This pro-
cedure calculates the confidence interval for the coefficient of interest (marriage
15For a detailed discussion on this, please look at Conley et al., 2012.
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age) for a specified value of γ. If this confidence interval contains the value zero,
it indicates that the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In assuming different values of γ, I start with zero (complete exogeneity)
and gradually go up to 0.25. The cutoff of 0.25 is arbitrary, but is a fairly high
number – the correlation between menarche age and any outcome of interest is
not expected to be this high due to the extensive set of control variables in the
estimation models. Upon generating the relevant confidence intervals, I find
that the study results persist for most variables16.
Since this analysis explores the impact of marriage age on a large number
of outcomes, I also calculate multiple hypothesis testing adjusted p–values to
understand whether the results I find are spuriously significant. Given that a
large number of my point estimates are significant and they fit into a consistent
narrative, it is unlikely that such corrections would largely change my conclu-
sions. I present the results adjusted for multiple testing (with the Romano–Wolf
procedure procedure (Romano and Wolf, 2005a,b, 2016) in Table 3.9 – only one
outcome (Child BMI) goes from being significant to not significant after adjust-
ing for multiple hypothesis testing. The coefficients that were not significant to
begin with remain so.
As a final check, I explore whether my results might be impacted by omitted
variable bias. Although I control for a large number of factors in my specifica-
tions, there is a possibility of there being other factors that affect the outcome
16Although this method provides a technique to test the sensitivity of the results to violation
of the exogeneity assumption, Conley et al., 2012 state that one of the caveats of this technique
is that it might give a wide confidence interval, which might not be very informative. However,
the wide confidence intervals actually makes the test harder to pass– if the confidence intervals
are larger, then they are more likely to include the null result. Therefore, if the results hold for
fairly large values of γ (which I show), then they could be interpreted as being extremely robust.
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which I am unable to account for17. to check for this, I employ the bounding
exercise undertaken in Oster, 201418. Under this robustness check, one case
would be to assume that the bias due to unobservables is of the same size as
the bias due to observables – this is an extreme assumption because it implies
that the unexplained part of the regression is as large as the explained part of
the regression, an implausible contingency since I control for a large number
of individual, household and community factors in all the specifications. I find
that even under such a restrictive assumption, the impact of marriage age re-
tains the direction of the impacts identified in the main analysis and does not
move towards zero for 9 out of 12 outcomes19.
3.8 Conclusion
Using a nationally representative dataset from Uganda and an IV estimation
strategy, I provide causal evidence for the effects of marriage age on a variety
of later life outcomes. Early marriage reduces women’s educational attainment,
literacy and labour force participation, and leads to poor health behaviors. I
also find that the lower the age at which women get married worse their out-
comes are in terms of contraceptive use, age at first birth and usage of ante natal
care during pregnancy. Furthermore, I find that marriage age shapes intergen-
erational health outcomes – I find strong negative effects of early marriage on
child hemoglobin levels, anemia and BMI. While the impacts on child height
17For example, we do not observe the educational/health infrastructure that women experi-
enced when they were children, which would have an impact on their later life outcomes.
18Under this method, she extends the theoretical framework proposed by Altonji et al., 2005 to
connect bias on unobservables to coefficient stability. She uses the movement of the R–squared
value with and without the controls along with the potential size of the bias of the unobservables
to estimate lower bounds on the reduced form estimate.
19Results available from the author on request
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and weight are not statistically significant, the direction of effect implies that
earlier marriage leads to worse child health status. In examining the potential
mechanisms through which the observed effects might be mediated, I detect
strong positive impacts of later marriage on women’s decision making power
and status, and evidence of positive assortative marriage market matching (that
is women who marry later are more likely to attract higher quality spouses).
These factors, along with the higher educational levels stemming from delayed
marriage among women, might be responsible for the many positive later life
outcomes for women and the improvements to child health that I find evidence
for in my analysis.
Further, this paper adds to the literature by bringing forth evidence in a con-
text where bride price is commonly practiced. This is a valuable contribution
since the bulk of the existing economic literature on the topic has focused on
the effects of marriage age in developing country contexts where the practice of
dowry (payments from the bride’s family to the groom’s family) is prevalent.
For example, Sekhri and Debnath, 2014 and Chari et al., 2017 find that marrying
at an older age has positive effects on a number of later life outcomes for women
and their children in India, a setting where dowry is commonly practiced. Sim-
ilar results have been found in other dowry contexts – Bangladesh (Field and
Ambrus, 2008a), Egypt (Yount et al., 2018) and Kenya (Hicks and Hicks, 2015).
Additionally, my findings are consistent with those of the aforementioned
studies – earlier marriage has a negative impact on a variety of later life socio–
economic outcomes. The findings are similar in other regions where neither
dowry nor bride price is widely practiced (such as USA. Studies have found
detrimental effects of child marriage on maternal education and employment,
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as well as on maternal and child health outcomes (Overpeck et al., 1998, Hotz
et al., 1997, Hunt, 2003, Dahl, 2010). The fact that my results qualitatively match
those found in areas with different marriage customs suggests that the negative
effects of early marriage is a global phenomenon and is independent of the spe-
cific features of the marriage market. Having said that, the exact mechanisms
through which this effect operates may be more context–specific.
Although there has been considerable global reduction in the prevalence of
child marriage over the past couple of decades, it still remains a major concern
today. According to UNICEF, nearly 650 million girls marry before the age of
18 years (UNICEF, 2018). Given the persistence of this problem, ending child
marriage has been included as part of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
(goal 5.3). Child marriage in Uganda in recent years mirrors broad global trends.
The country has experienced a decline in marriage age – from 52.8 percent in
2001 to 36.5 percent in 2011, but absolute levels of child marriage in the country
remain high (Male and Wodon, 2016, Wodon et al., 2017). Given that Uganda’s
population is extremely young (6 in 10 people are below 18 years of age (Se-
budde et al., 2017) and that the practice of child marriage remains common, a
large section of the country’s population is likely to continue to experience the
far reaching harms of early marriage documented in this research. It is, thus,
crucial to design policies to limit this practice in Uganda and around the world.
In policy terms, developing country governments can reap potentially large
(and long–term) gains by taking steps to restrict child marriage practices. Var-
ious strategies for delaying marriage among young girls have been studied.
One approach has been to encourage girls to stay in school by providing school
vouchers or stipends. Evaluations of such programs in Colombia, Bangladesh
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and Kenya (Angrist et al., 2006, Duflo et al., 2015, Hahn et al., 2018, Hong and
Sarr, 2012) show promising results. In a unique cash transfer experiment in
Malawi, Baird et al., 2011 find that the unconditional transfers outperform the
conditional ones in their effectiveness to impact early marriage and child bear-
ing outcomes. Another strategy is to expose girls to material and information
that enhance female empowerment. For example, girls can be provided with vo-
cational training and with information on sex, reproduction and marriage. Such
policies have been tested in Uganda (Bandiera et al., 2014), Tanzania (Buehren
et al., 2015) and Bangladesh (Buchmann et al., 2017) with varying degrees of
success. Bandiera et al., 2014 find that over the two year study span in Uganda
there were pronounced declines in early marriage (58%), and teen pregnancy
(26%).
In 2015, Uganda instituted a National Strategy on Child Marriage (NSCM),
under which it aims to end child marriage and teenage pregnancy. Since child
marriage is deeply embedded in Ugandan society, the NSCM intends to use a
multi–pronged approach to achieve its objective – improvements to the coun-
try’s legal and policy framework for protecting children, expansion of educa-
tion, empowerment of boys and girls through the provision of information and
critical life skills, and changes to the mindset and beliefs of different commu-
nities/tribes regarding this practice. While Uganda’s program appears to be a
holistic approach for ending child marriage, its success would largely depend
on the way in which the plan is implemented. The results of this study suggest
that if Uganda’s strategy proves to be effective in reducing child marriages, the
country is likely to have a more educated and empowered female population,
and healthier children in the future.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Marriage age distributions.
This clearly shows that marriage age increases as the age at menarche rises.
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3.10 Tables
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Table 3.1: Mean Comparison Across Marriage Ages
Less than 14 14–16 years 16–18 years Above 18 years Full Sample
Marriage Age 13.18 15.54 17.47 21.42 17.37
(1.024) (0.499) (0.499) (2.915) (3.419)
Menarche Age 13.71 14.27 14.64 14.70 14.40
(1.301) (1.296) (1.462) (1.508) (1.453)
Multiple Wives 0.305 0.245 0.237 0.255 0.257
(0.461) (0.430) (0.426) (0.436) (0.437)
Wealth Index -0.0155 -0.00531 0.0263 -0.0127 -0.000891
(1.029) (1.016) (1.017) (0.985) (1.009)
HH size 5.915 5.650 5.637 5.493 5.647
(3.099) (2.782) (2.979) (2.968) (2.951)
Urban 0.231 0.250 0.268 0.374 0.288
(0.422) (0.433) (0.443) (0.484) (0.453)
Telephone 0.0158 0.0247 0.0359 0.0808 0.0427
(0.125) (0.155) (0.186) (0.273) (0.202)
Altitude (in mts.) 1278.8 1287.7 1305.4 1345.2 1307.8
(295.5) (308.1) (291.7) (340.0) (312.5)
East 0.306 0.298 0.261 0.201 0.261
(0.461) (0.457) (0.440) (0.401) (0.439)
North 0.158 0.170 0.125 0.123 0.142
(0.365) (0.376) (0.331) (0.328) (0.349)
West 0.226 0.237 0.285 0.317 0.271
(0.418) (0.425) (0.452) (0.465) (0.445)
Brick House 0.300 0.306 0.333 0.406 0.341
(0.458) (0.461) (0.471) (0.491) (0.474)
This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis for the different age
ranges of marriage age in the sample. The last column provides the summary statistics for the
full sample.
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Table 3.2: First Stage Regressions – Dependent variable is Age at First Marriage
FS 1 FS 2 FS 3 FS 4
Menarche Age 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.45***
S.E. (coef) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Total Obs. 4930 4930 4930 4930
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year FE No No Yes Yes
District Dummy No No No Yes
The outcome variable is women’s marriage age. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The control variables include
woman’s height, woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster altitude (in meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for
the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in an urban area.
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Table 3.3: Impact of Marriage Age on Highest Grade Attained
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Marriage Age 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.75***
S.E. (coef) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Total Obs. 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
District Dummy No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
The outcome variable is women’s highest grade attained. The coefficients are from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation. The standard errors
are robust and clustered at the district level. The control variables include woman’s height, woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster
altitude (in meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in
an urban area.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Marriage Age on Women’s Later Life Outcomes
Literacy Labor Contraception Age FB ANC Usage
Marriage Age 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.02* 1.01*** 0.07
S.E. (coef) 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.07
Total Obs. 4899 4920 4925 4916 4522
Following are the definitions of the outcome variables: Literacy (=1 if literate), Labor (=1 if part of the labour force), Contraception (=1 if used
contraceptive), Age FB (woman’s age at first birth), ANC Usage (=1 if reported using ante natal care). The coefficients are from the second stage
of a 2SLS IV estimation. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The control variables include woman’s height,
woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster altitude (in meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of
multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in an urban area. All specifications also include birth year and district fixed effects.
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Table 3.5: Impact of Marriage Age on Children’s Health Outcomes
HFA Z–Score WFA Z–Score BMI Z–Score Hemoglobin Anemic Severely Anemic
Marriage Age 0.02 0.001 0.11* 0.18*** -0.04*** 0.002
S.E. (coef) 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Total Obs. 4997 4982 4990 4956 4955 4958
Following are the definitions of the outcome variables: HFA (Height for Age Z–score), WFA (Weight for Age Z–Score), BMI Z–score,
Hemoglobin levels (g/dl), Anemic (=1 if hemoglobin below 11 g/dl) and Severely Anemic ( =1 if hemoglobin below 7 g/dl). The coefficients are
from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The control variables include
age of the child, mother’s age at the child’s birth, child gender and birth order of the child, woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster altitude
(in meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in an urban
area. All specifications also include birth year and district fixed effects.
Table 3.6: Potential Mechanisms
Child Health Own Health Large Purchases Visit Family Cook Food Spouse Edu Spouse Edu Gap Spouse Age Gap
Marriage Age 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.39*** -0.35*** 0.35*
S.E. (coef) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.19
Total Obs. 4912 4912 4912 4912 4912 4695 4695 4695
The first five columns take a value of one if the woman reports making decisions about these items. Spouse Edu refers to the highest grade
attained by the husband, Spouse Edu gap refers to the difference in highest grade attained between the woman and her husband, and Spouse
Age Gap refers to the age gap between the woman and her husband. The coefficients are from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation. The
standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. The control variables include woman’s height, woman’s age at first sex
(intercourse), cluster altitude (in meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion,
ethnicity, and living in an urban area. All specifications also include birth year and district fixed effects.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Check – Probit model
Literacy Labor Contraception ANC Usage Anemic Severely Anemic
Marriage Age 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.08* 0.11 -0.07*** 0.001
S.E. (coef) 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01
Total Obs. 4901 4921 4924 4524 4955 4955
Marginal Effect 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.03* 0.08 -0.04*** 0.0005
The definitions of the variables are as explained in the previous tables. Each coefficient comes from a probit model where the outcome variable
is regressed on the woman’s marriage age and a set of controls (discussed earlier). The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district
level. The control variables include woman’s height, woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster altitude (in meters), household size, wealth
index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in an urban area. All specifications include birth
year and district fixed effects. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean value of all the covariates in the model.
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Table 3.8: Robustness Checks – Different Definitions of Marriage Age
Outcome Under 18 Years Under 16 Years Under 14 Years
Education -0.76*** -0.47*** -0.58***
Labor market participation -0.07 -0.04 -0.05
Literacy -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.07***
Contraception use -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12***
Child hemoglobin -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12***
Child– anemic 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
Child– severely anemic 0.04 0.04 0.03
The definitions of the variables are the same as that described earlier, and so are the control
variables. Each column describes the results when the marriage age is defined to be a
categorical variable taking a value of 1 if the woman got married below the age of 18, 16 and 14
years. Each entry is the coefficient of this new marriage age variable when a particular
outcome of interest is chosen in the 2SLS framework used for the main set of results. These
results provide a robustness check of the main results to a change in the definition of the
marriage age variable.
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Table 3.9: Multiple Hypothesis Testing– Romano Wolf
Outcome Regular P-value Adjusted P-value
Education *** ***
Labor market participation ** *
Contraception use * *
Time to first child *** ***
Age at first birth *** ***
Antenatal Checkup NS NS
Child BMI * NS
Child hemoglobin *** **
Child– anemic *** ***
Child– severely anemic NS NS
Decision– Child Health *** **
Decision– Own Health *** ***
Decision– Large Purchases *** **
Decision– Visit Family *** **
Decision– Cook Food *** **
The table shows the significance level of the marriage age variable in regressions where the
mentioned variables are the dependent variable. The regular p–value refers to the level of
significance in the main results, whereas the adjusted p–value refers to the p–values obtained
from the Romano–Wolf procedure. ***, ** and * represent significant at one, five and ten
percent respectively. NS symbolizes that the coefficient on the marriage age variable is not
statistically significant.
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Under the global approach, an RD setup can be estimated using an Instrumen-
tal Variable (IV) strategy, where the allocation rule on either side of the cutoff
provides the IV. The programme assignment rule used by DPEP, that provide
treatment to districts depending on whether their female literacy levels were
more or less than the national average, allows me to construct this IV. In this
setup, whether a district’s female literacy level (in 1991) was above or below
this cutoff (39.2 percent) is the instrument. This instrument is is highly predic-
tive of whether or not a district receives the DPEP programme (DPEPd). I create
a categorical variable (BelowAvgd) that takes a value of one if the district to which
the individual belongs lies below the literacy cutoff (39.2 percent), and takes a
value of zero otherwise. The first and second stage equations of this Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) approach can be written as:
DPEPd = α1 ∗ BelowAvgd + α2 ∗ BelowAvgd ∗ (DFLR − 39.2)+
α3 ∗ BelowAvgd ∗ (DFLR − 39.2)2 + γ ∗ Xidt + νidt ... [FIRSTSTAGE]
Yidt = β1 ∗ DPEPd + β2 ∗ BelowAvgd ∗ (DFLR − 39.2)+
β3 ∗ BelowAvgd ∗ (DFLR − 39.2)2 + δ ∗ Xidt + idt ... [S ECONDSTAGE]
To be a valid instrument for programme participation, the categorical vari-
able (BelowAvgd) needs to satisfy two conditions. The inclusion restriction re-
quires that the potentially endogenous independent variable of interest (DPEPd)
be correlated with the instrument (BelowAvgd). In other words, the instrument
should be a strong predictor of programme participation. This can be directly
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tested and I present these results later in the paper. The second condition is
the exclusion restriction under which the instrument (BelowAvgd) should impact
the outcome only through the instrumented variable (DPEPd), and not through
other variables. The exclusion restriction is not directly testable, but I argue
that it is likely to be satisfied in this setting. In my knowledge, there were no
other government programme at that time (or since) that were allocated based
on the allocation rule of DPEP. Given that there were no discontinuities in the
provision of other government schemes before DPEP, it is apriori unlikely that
there would be any discontinuities in outcomes around the female literacy cut-
off chosen for DPEP. In addition, through some falsification tests I show that
there were no discontinuities in variables that should be unaffected by the pro-
gramme. Hence this instrument (BelowAvgd) is unlikely to be correlated with
any other covariates around this cutoff. I provide a more detailed discussion in
the results section.
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B.1 Item Response Theory
The test scores used in this paper are constructed using Item Response Theory
(IRT). IRT is still an uncommon measure in the education economics literature,
apart from a few exceptions (Singh, 2017, Das and Zajonc, 2010). It is, however,
used in evaluating results from large–scale tests, such as the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA), Trends in International Mathematics
and Science Study (TIMMS), and Graduate Record Examination (GRE).
The main principle of IRT is to differentiate between the latent ability of any
given student to answer a question correctly and the actual response given. This
is done by three different parameters for any given item: the difficulty, discrim-
ination, and the pseudo–guessing parameters.
The Item Response Function (IRF) links the latent ability to the probability of
success in that item for any given respondent. Following Singh, 2017; and Das
and Zajonc, 2010, we use the three-parameter (3PL) logistic model introduced
by Birnbaum, 1968. Given the probability of a correct response Xig=1 for a given
item g, and given ability level , the probability of successful response is:
Pg
(
Xig = 1|θ
)
= cg +
1 − cg
1 + exp
[
1.7ag
(
θi − bg
)] | (B.1)
where bg is the difficulty parameter, ag is the discrimination parameter, and cg
is the pseudo–guessing parameter. The difficulty parameter measures the over-
all difficulty of the item; the discrimination parameter tells how well a given
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item can differentiate between different levels of ability. Finally, the pseudo–
guessing parameter tells how much success in a given item is random and, thus,
unrelated to the respondents ability. Setting the pseudo–guessing parameter to
zero will yield a two–parameter model (2PL), which we have used in the cases
where the maximum likelihood function of the 3PL–model was not converging.
We argue this is not an issue, since the test scores that we were able to estimate
with the 2PL and 3PL models are very strongly correlated (close to 99%).
For comparing the levels of the test scores between the two countries, we
construct the IRT scores from the joint distribution of the scores of the two coun-
tries. The advantage of doing this is that the parameters of IRT are estimated
jointly for the common items, which renders the scores comparable. For all the
regression analysis, we employ IRT scores that were estimated separately for
each country, as we estimate country–specific regression models.
B.1.1 Test score comparability across time and space
The test scores in the second grade were administered in Senegal in 1995–6 and
in Madagascar in 1997–8 for both French and math. During those school years,
there were two tests for both French and math, one at the beginning of the sec-
ond grade and one at the end of the second grade, which we call pretest and
posttest, respectively. During 2012, French and math tests were administered in
both Senegal and Madagascar. These tests were different from the tests admin-
istered by PASEC for the second graders.
Table A.1 below reports which data sets are similar across space and time.
In the regressions we use IRT scores that are calculated for each country; hence,
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we do not exploit the comparability in the regressions, given that we run regres-
sions separately for each country. In comparing the difference in performances
across Senegal and Madagascar, we use the property that the tests are either
fully or partially the same (Figure 1). Table A.1 below explains what the similar-
ities are in different tests across time and space. Notice that tests administered
in the second grade are different from those administered in 2012.
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Figure B.1: Comparison of tests questions
The rows indicate the timing of the test and the columns the country of the test and whether the test is math or French. Each cell
includes an explanation of whether any test of the same discipline in the other country was fully the same (exactly the same test
questions), partially same (some overlap in the test questions), or completely different (such that no overlap in test questions
between countries
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics
SENEGAL Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Highest Grade in 2012 447 8.97 3.82 0.00 15.00
French 2nd grade (pre) 447 -0.06 0.84 -1.47 1.89
French 2nd grade (post) 447 -0.08 0.87 -2.14 2.19
Math 2nd grade (pre) 447 -0.08 0.90 -1.69 2.60
Math 2nd grade (post) 447 -0.07 0.92 -2.59 2.22
Math and French 2nd grade (post) 447 -0.08 0.88 -2.65 2.16
Math and French 2nd grade (pre) 447 -0.05 0.90 -2.02 2.52
2012 Math score 381 0.46 1.43 -3.24 2.90
2012 French score 381 0.46 0.79 -0.86 1.91
2012 Math–French score 381 0.24 0.83 -2.48 1.30
Height in 2012 447 171.88 8.81 149.00 195.00
Female 447 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Age 2012 447 23.80 2.04 16.00 29.00
Mother Education (Dummy) 447 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Father Education (Dummy) 447 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Assets 2nd grade 447 -0.29 0.89 -1.40 1.49
MADAGASCAR Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Highest grade in 2012 333 10.04 3.22 1.00 15.00
French 2nd grade (pre) 333 0.10 1.00 -2.11 2.70
French 2nd grade (post) 333 -0.09 0.99 -2.36 2.51
Math 2nd grade (pre) 333 0.06 0.96 -2.79 1.80
Math 2nd grade (post) 333 0.01 0.89 -2.42 2.15
Math and French 2nd grade (post) 333 -0.04 0.94 -2.43 2.54
Math and French 2nd grade (pre) 333 0.07 1.03 -2.89 3.00
2012 Math score 318 0.28 0.81 -2.01 2.75
2012 French score 312 0.28 0.88 -1.76 2.13
2012 Math and French score 310 0.31 0.83 -2.37 3.03
Height in 2012 333 160.17 7.91 142.00 180.00
Female 333 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age 2012 333 21.85 1.39 19.00 26.00
Mother’s education 333 5.62 3.65 0.00 17.00
Father’s education 333 6.21 3.92 0.00 17.00
Assets 2nd grade 333 -0.08 0.79 -0.76 3.26
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All test
scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Mothers and fathers education were not
measured at baseline, but in 2012; hence, they are not reported in this table. Household asset
index is constructed using factor analysis. Teacher education index is constructed using factor
analysis. The variable consists of variables denoting the education level of the teacher, whether
they have formal teaching training, and whether they have done any internships. Teachers and
directors experience variables denote the years of experience they have been a teacher and a
school director, respectively.
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Table A2.2: Mean comparison across panel and full sample of students at base-
line – Senegal
SENEGAL N(Not Panel) Mean(Not panel) N(Panel) Mean(panel) Difference
French pre 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.02 448 -0.07 0.09*
French post 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.02 448 -0.08 0.11**
Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.02 448 -0.08 0.11**
Math post 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.01 448 -0.07 0.08
French Math post 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.02 448 -0.08 0.10**
French Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 1424 0.02 448 -0.05 0.07
Teacher’s education 1375 12.85 420 12.80 0.04
School Infrastructure 2nd grade 1414 0.09 421 -0.15 0.25***
Assets 2nd grade 1427 0.09 448 -0.29 0.38***
Female 1995-96 1425 0.46 448 0.41 0.05*
Age 2nd grade 1407 8.28 444 8.33 -0.05
Teacher education (PCA) 1335 -0.06 400 0.08 -0.14*
Teacher Experience (yrs) 1420 12.70 435 13.48 -0.78
Dir– Years Exp 1397 11.59 418 11.08 0.51
MADAGASCAR N(Not Panel) Mean(Not panel) N(Panel) Mean(panel) Difference
French 2nd grade (pre) -0.01 2044 0.10 333 -0.11*
French 2nd grade (post) 0.02 2044 -0.09 333 0.11*
Math 2nd grade (pre) -0.01 2044 0.06 333 -0.06
Math 2nd grade (post) 0.01 2044 0.01 333 -0.00
Math and French 2nd grade (pre) -0.01 2044 0.07 333 -0.08
Math and French 2nd grade (post) 0.01 2044 -0.04 333 0.06
Female 0.51 2005 0.53 331 -0.03
Age second grade 8.74 1919 8.21 324 0.53***
Assets 2nd grade 0.02 2044 -0.08 333 0.10**
Teacher education index -0.04 1881 0.02 316 -0.06
Teacher experience (yrs) 14.44 1970 13.65 327 0.79
Director experience (yrs) 12.30 1954 13.12 323 -0.82
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. All test
scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Mothers and fathers education were not
measured at baseline, but in 2012; hence, they are not reported in this table. Household asset
index is constructed using factor analysis. Teacher education index is constructed using factor
analysis. The variable consists of variables denoting the education level of the teacher, whether
they have formal teaching training, and whether they have done any internships. Teachers and
directors experience variables denote the years of experience they have been a teacher and a
school director, respectively.
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Table A2.3: Mean comparison across clusters chosen for follow–up and full sam-
ple of students at baseline
SENEGAL N(Not followed) Mean(Not Followed) N(In follow-up) Mean(In follow-up) Difference
French pre 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.07 1134 -0.04 0.11***
French post 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.15 1134 -0.10 0.25***
Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.12 1134 -0.08 0.21***
Math post 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.14 1134 -0.10 0.23***
French Math post 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.16 1134 -0.11 0.27***
French Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 738 0.12 1134 -0.08 0.20***
Teacher’s education 718 12.72 1077 12.92 -0.20*
School Infrastructure 2nd grade 738 0.28 1097 -0.13 0.41***
Assets 2nd grade 738 0.45 1137 -0.29 0.74***
Female 1995-96 738 0.49 1135 0.42 0.07***
Age 2nd grade 720 8.29 1131 8.30 -0.01
Teacher education (PCA) 698 -0.25 1037 0.12 -0.38***
Teacher Experience (yrs) 738 14.22 1117 12.01 2.21***
Dir– Years Exp 738 12.96 1077 10.45 2.52***
MADAGASCAR N(Not followed) Mean(Not Followed) N(In follow-up) Mean(In follow-up) Difference
French 2nd grade (pre) -0.02 1437 0.03 940 -0.04
French 2nd grade (post) 0.07 1437 -0.10 940 0.17***
Math 2nd grade (pre) -0.03 1437 0.06 940 -0.09**
Math 2nd grade (post) 0.02 1437 -0.02 940 0.04
Math and French 2nd grade (pre) -0.02 1437 0.04 940 -0.06
Math and French 2nd grade (post) 0.06 1437 -0.08 940 0.14***
Female 0.49 1409 0.55 927 -0.06***
Age second grade 8.61 1349 8.75 894 -0.14*
Assets 2nd grade 0.03 1437 -0.03 940 0.06
Teacher education index -0.04 1317 -0.02 880 -0.02
Teacher experience (yrs) 14.60 1377 13.91 920 0.68*
Director experience (yrs) 12.29 1377 12.60 900 -0.31
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. The sample
consists of all the individuals in the 199 communities in Senegal and 47 in Madagascar that
were chosen for the follow–up study, splitting between those in the panel and not in the panel.
All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Mothers and fathers education were
not measured at baseline, but in 2012; hence, they are not reported in this table. Household
asset index is constructed using factor analysis. Teacher education index is constructed using
factor analysis. The variable consists of variables denoting the education level of the teacher,
whether they have formal teaching training, and whether they have done any internships.
Teachers and directors experience variables denote the years of experience they have been a
teacher or a school director, respectively.
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Table A2.4: Mean comparison within clusters that were chosen for follow–up:
individuals reached (panel) and not reached (not in panel) at baseline – Senegal
SENEGAL N(Not in 2012) Mean(Not in 2012) N(In panel) Mean(In panel) Difference
French pre 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.03 448 -0.07 0.04
French post 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.11 448 -0.08 -0.03
Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.08 448 -0.08 -0.00
Math post 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.12 448 -0.07 -0.05
French Math post 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.13 448 -0.08 -0.05
French Math pre 2nd irt 2pl 686 -0.09 448 -0.05 -0.04
Teacher’s education 657 12.99 420 12.80 0.18
School Infrastructure 2nd grade 676 -0.11 421 -0.15 0.04
Assets 2nd grade 689 -0.29 448 -0.29 -0.00
Female 1995–96 687 0.43 448 0.41 0.02
Age 2nd grade 687 8.28 444 8.33 -0.06
Teacher education (PCA) 637 0.15 400 0.08 0.08
Teacher Experience (yrs) 682 11.07 435 13.48 -2.41***
Dir– Years Exp 659 10.05 418 11.08 -1.02**
MADAGASCAR N(Not in 2012) Mean(Not in 2012) N(In panel) Mean(In panel) Difference
French 2nd grade (pre) -0.01 607 0.10 333 -0.10
French 2nd grade (post) -0.10 607 -0.09 333 -0.01
Math 2nd grade (pre) 0.06 607 0.06 333 -0.00
Math 2nd grade (post) -0.03 607 0.01 333 -0.04
Math and French 2nd grade (pre) 0.02 607 0.07 333 -0.05
Math and French 2nd grade (post) -0.09 607 -0.04 333 -0.05
Female 0.55 596 0.53 331 0.02
Age second grade 9.05 570 8.21 324 0.84***
Assets 2nd grade -0.00 607 -0.08 333 0.08
Teacher education index -0.05 564 0.02 316 -0.07
Teacher experience (yrs) 14.06 593 13.65 327 0.41
Director experience (yrs) 12.31 577 13.12 323 -0.81
Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal and 1997–98 in Madagascar. The sample
consists of all the individuals in the 199 communities in Senegal and 47 in Madagascar that
were chosen for the follow–up study, splitting between those in the panel and not in the panel.
All test scores are constructed using country–specific IRT. Mothers and fathers education were
not measured at baseline, but in 2012; hence, they are not reported in this table. Household
asset index is constructed using factor analysis. Teacher education index is constructed using
factor analysis. The variable consists of variables denoting the education level of the teacher,
whether they have formal teaching training, and whether they have done any internships.
Teachers and directors experience variables denote the years of experience they have been a
teacher or a school director, respectively.
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Table A2.5: Grade completed and test scores in 2012 as a function of second grade composite French and math scores:
Inverse Probability Weights using the full PASEC baseline sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SENEGAL Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Composite Math French
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second Grade Composite Score 1.801*** 2.006*** 1.927*** 1.886*** 1.639*** 0.284*** 0.599*** 0.227***
(0.194) (0.213) (0.196) (0.197) (0.328) (0.070) (0.118) (0.069)
Total Obs. 447 447 447 447 447 381 447 381
R–squared 0.168 0.377 0.430 0.435 0.259 0.189 0.218 0.165
F–stat (instrument) 204.7 194.7 204.7 194.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MADAGASCAR Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Composite Math French
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second Grade Composite Score 0.951*** 0.385 0.417 0.422 1.311** 0.352** 0.416*** 0.243
(0.244) (0.318) (0.277) (0.277) (0.541) (0.148) (0.161) (0.153)
Total Obs. 333 333 333 333 333 310 318 312
R–squared 0.083 0.411 0.514 0.516 0.144 0.048 0.006 0.095
F–stat (instrument) 65.8 43.28 44.24 42.84
All regressions weighted with inverse probability weights using the full PASEC sample. Second grade denotes 1995–96 in the case of Senegal
and 1997–98 in Madagascar. The sample sizes for the inverse probability weights are 1875 in Senegal, and 2,377 in Madagascar. All test scores
are constructed using country–specific IRT. Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years. Mothers and fathers education are
continuous variables measured in years for Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any education. Household asset index is constructed
using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust
standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A2.6: Grade completed and test scores in 2012 as a function of second–grade composite French and math scores:
Inverse Probability Weights using the subset of communities chosen for follow–up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SENEGAL Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Composite Math French
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second Grade Composite Score 1.671*** 1.842*** 1.788*** 1.754*** 1.465*** 0.279*** 0.568*** 0.223***
(0.188) (0.206) (0.195) (0.197) (0.309) (0.068) (0.116) (0.066)
Total Obs. 447 447 447 447 447 381 447 381
R–squared 0.151 0.363 0.420 0.425 0.239 0.172 0.199 0.148
F–stat (instrument) 245.4 232.1 245.4 232.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MADAGASCAR Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Edu Years Composite Math French
No School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second Grade Composite Score 0.982*** 0.618* 0.589** 0.595** 1.483*** 0.374** 0.446*** 0.281***
(0.226) (0.318) (0.267) (0.267) (0.501) (0.153) (0.166) (0.155)
Total Obs. 333 333 333 333 333 310 318 312
R–squared 0.082 0.387 0.505 0.508 0.175 0.077 0.024 0.111
F–stat (instrument) 81.98 51.55 53.66 51.04
Height is reported in centimeters. Age is reported in years. Mothers and fathers education are continuous variables measured in years for
Madagascar, and dummies for Senegal for any education. Household asset index is constructed using factor analysis. The row widstat denotes
the Kleibergen–Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak instruments. Heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table A3.1: Mean Differences: Woman–level Analysis Sample
Outcome In woman–level analysis Full Sample Difference
Marriage Age (in years) 17.38 17.40 -0.02
Age (in years) 29.66 29.77 -0.11
Age at first sex (in years) 16.24 16.29 -0.04
Multiple wives dummy 0.25 0.26 -0.01
Wealth Index (0–1) -0.00 -0.01 0.00
HH Size 5.64 5.63 0.01
Urban Dummy 0.28 0.28 -0.01
Altitude 1310.4 1309.04 1.35
East 0.26 0.26 0.00
North 0.15 0.15 0.00
West 0.28 0.27 0.01
SAMPLE SIZE 4949 5643
The total sample consists of 5643 women for whom a marriage age is reported. This
table compares the mean outcomes for women in the woman–level analysis with the
women in the full sample.
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Table A3.2: Mean Differences: Woman–level Analysis Sample
Outcome In woman analysis Not in woman analysis Difference
Marriage Age (in years) 17.38 17.55 -0.17
Age (in years) 29.66 29.57 0.09
Age at first sex (in years) 16.24 16.30 -0.06
Multiple wives dummy 0.25 0.31 -0.06*
Wealth Index (0–1) -0.00 -0.01 0.01
HH Size 5.64 5.59 0.05
Urban Dummy 0.28 0.30 -0.02
Altitude 1310.4 1299.38 11.02
East 0.26 0.25 0.01
North 0.15 0.17 0.02
West 0.28 0.21 0.07**
SAMPLE SIZE 4949 694
The total sample consists of 5643 women for whom a marriage age is reported. This
table compares the mean outcomes for women in the woman–level analysis with the
women who are not in the woman–level analysis.
Table A3.3: Mean Differences – Child Analysis Sample
Outcome In child-level analysis Full Sample Difference
Marriage Age (in years) 17.28 17.40 -0.12
Age (in years) 29.56 29.77 -0.21
Age at first sex (in years) 16.22 16.29 -0.07
Multiple wives dummy 0.24 0.26 -0.02
Wealth Index (0–1) -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
HH Size 5.62 5.63 -0.01
Urban Dummy 0.27 0.28 -0.01
Altitude 1309.4 1309.04 0.35
East 0.26 0.26 0.00
North 0.15 0.15 -0.00
West 0.29 0.27 0.02
SAMPLE SIZE 3998 5643
The total sample consists of 5643 women for whom a marriage age is reported. This
table compares the mean outcomes for women whose children are in the child–level
analysis with the women in the full sample.
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Table A3.3: Mean Differences – Child Analysis Sample
Outcome In child analysis Not in child analysis Difference
Marriage Age (in years) 17.28 17.52 -0.24
Age (in years) 29.56 29.62 -0.06
Age at first sex (in years) 16.22 16.32 -0.10
Multiple wives dummy 0.24 0.31 -0.07*
Wealth Index (0–1) -0.00 -0.01 0.01
HH Size 5.62 5.61 0.09
Urban Dummy 0.27 0.31 -0.04
Altitude 1309.4 1301.38 8.02
East 0.26 0.25 0.01
North 0.15 0.17 -0.02
West 0.29 0.24 0.05**
SAMPLE SIZE 3998 1645
The total sample consists of 5643 women for whom a marriage age is reported.This
table compares the mean outcomes for women whose children are in the child–level
analysis with the women whose children are not in the child–level analysis.
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Table A3.4: Effect of Age at First Sex on Women Outcomes
Education Literacy Employed Contraception Age FB ANC Usage
Age at First Sex 0.18 0.019 0.0022 0.015 0.08 0.008
(0.10) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.068) (0.075)
Marriage Age 0.32*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.79*** 0.07*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07)
Total Obs. 4912 4899 4920 4925 4916 4522
The coefficients are from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation where age at first sex is instrumented using age at menarche.
Marriage age is included as a covariate in the model along with the following controls – woman’s height, cluster altitude (in
meters), household size, wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in
an urban area. The specifications also consist of district and year of birth dummy variables. The standard errors are robust and
clustered at the district level. Following are the definitions of the outcome variables: Education (highest grade attained), Literacy
(=1 if literate), Labor (=1 if part of the labour force), Contraception (=1 if used contraceptive), Age FB (woman’s age at first birth),
ANC Usage (=1 if reported using ante natal care).
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Table A3.5: Effect of Age at First Sex on Child Outcomes
HFA z-score WFA Z-score BMI Z-score Hemoglobin Anemic Severely Anemic
Age at First Sex 1.11 0.12 1.55 1.10 -0.15 -0.14
(1.31) (0.51) (1.48) (1.61) (0.21) (0.14)
Marriage Age 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.48* -0.06** -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.28) (0.03) (0.04)
Total Obs. 4997 4982 4990 4956 4958 4958
The coefficients are from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation where age at first sex is instrumented using age at menarche.
Marriage age is included as a covariate in the model along with the following controls - age of the child, mother’s age at the child’s
birth, child gender and birth order of the child, woman’s age at first sex (intercourse), cluster altitude (in meters), household size,
wealth index and categorical variables for the presence of multiple wives, religion, ethnicity, and living in an urban area. The
specifications also consist of district and year of birth ( dummy variables. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district
level. Following are the definitions of the outcome variables: HFA (Height for Age Z-score), WFA (Weight for Age Z-Score), BMI
Z-score, Hemoglobin levels (g/dl), Anemic (=1 if hemoglobin below 11 g/dl) and Severely Anemic ( =1 if hemoglobin below 7
g/dl). The coefficients are from the second stage of a 2SLS IV estimation. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district
level.
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